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Preface and Editorial Remark
This thesis consists of ve individual papers and a summary. Each paper is self
contained.
This has the advantage that each paper can be read independently, but also the
disadvantage that notation can shift between paper to paper and that repetitions
of arguments are likely to arise.
I also apologise for the use of both American-English and English-English.
The rst chapter refers to "additional tables and results are available upon
request from the authors". I have included this information as a seperate chapter.
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Summary
The two overall themes in this thesis are monetary policy, chapter 1, 2, and 3
and the interrelationships between macroeconomics on business-cycle frequencies
and the bond market, chapter 3 and 4.
The rst chapter, "Real-Time E¤ects of Central Bank Interventions in
the Euro Market", is joint work with Rasmus Fatum. The chapter investigates
the real-time e¤ects of foreign exchange intervention on the Danish kroner - Euro ex-
change rate using o¢ cial intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central
bank. Our analysis employs the two-step weighted least squares estimation proce-
dure of (Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 2003) and an array of robustness
tests. We nd that intervention exerts a statistically and economically signicant
inuence on exchange rate returns when the direction of intervention is consistent
with monetary policy stance, thereby illustrating that sterilized intervention is not
an independent policy instrument. We also show that the exchange rate does not
adjust instantaneously to the unannounced and discretionary interventions under
study.
Endogenity plague intervention studies: Does the exchange rate move in re-
sponse to the intervention or does the intervention occurs due to movements in the
exchange rate? Our real-time intervention study is well-suited for adressing this
issue as we know the exact timing of all interventions.
We control for endogeneity by estimating a reaction function for the central
bank. We use the residuals from this reaction function as a proxy for unexpected
intervention which we then use for obtaining an estimate of the a¤ects of inter-
vention on the exchange rate that is free of simultaneity bias. We nd that some
endogeneity is present even in our intraday analysis though we also nd the resulting
bias is too small to a¤ect the results.
We lastly include macroeconomic news announcement into our regression and
show that the relative inucence of intervention is similar to the relative inuence
of most macro surprises.
While the study of intervention e¤ects on exchange rate levels perhaps is the
rst and foremost interest for the central banker, intervention e¤ects on the bid-
ask exchange rate spread are of great interest for market microstructure theorist
and this is the theme for the second chapter, "The Intraday E¤ects of Central
Bank Intervention on Exchange Rate Spreads". This chapter investigates the
intraday e¤ects of sterilized foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate spreads
using the same data set as used in chapter 1. The main result is that intervention
purchases and intervention sales both exert a signicant inuence on exchange rate
spreads but in opposite directions: Intervention sales of EUR, on average, reduce
the spread while intervention purchases of EUR, on average, increase the spread.
Apparently, the markets uncertainty over the true exchange rate is higher when
the DN has stepped in to defend the DKK, while the opposite occurs when the DN
signals that the DKK is strong. We also show that the signicant and asymmetric
e¤ects of intervention purchases and sales stem from intervention carried out on
"normal" days in terms of exchange rate volatility while intervention appears to be
overlooked by the market when the market is volatile.
Clearly, the ndings illustrate the necessity of distinguishing between interven-
tion purchases and intervention sales when assessing the inuence of intervention
on exchange rate spreads, and likewise to distinguish between periods of high/low
volatility. These new results pave the way for an existing road ahead of the mi-
crostructure theorist.
Interventions in the foreign exchange market is only one policy instrument avail-
able for central banks. A more widely used instrument is the short rate of interest
and this instrument plays a key role in the subsequent two chapters.
The rst of these chapters, "Monetary Policy, Housing, and Macroeco-
nomic E¤ects of Changes in Long Interest Rates", addresses the wide belief
among practitioners and academics alike that aggregate demand depends upon more
interest rates than (expected future) short rates. Standard models in the academic
literature do not have room for a monetary policy transmission mechanism through
long interest rates, and this is what this chapter tries to bring through.
One possible link between changes in long rates and the aggregate economy is the
mortgage market and this is what the model exploits. The representative consumer
derives utility non-seperable from both a consumer goods index and an index of
housing goods. A nancial constraint makes the representative consumer to issue
bonds of long maturities equal to the value of new housing stock. This nancial
constraint contributes with su¢ cient requirements to move the economy away from
a single interest rate model of aggregate demand determination in which monetary
policy can be specied solely in terms of a path of future policy rates. The nancial
constraint makes the user cost of housing to be dependent upon the long interest
rate, and introduces an endogenously determined wedge between bonds of di¤erent
maturities. As a result, the central bank can not determine long rates perfectly
through changes in short rates, and as the consumer can not bypass higher cost of
nancing housing goods by moving down the yield curve, the model clears the road
in a consistent way for a multiple interest rate determination of aggregate demand.
I nd that a one period higher than expected monetary policy rate in this
framework raises the long interest rate, which in turn depresses total output through
increasing costs of nancing.
The emphasis on the role of the yield curve in monetary policy especially arose
during the period from 2004 to 2006, which saw a decline in the long end of the
yield curve while the Fed raised the short end, the so called bond yield conundrum.
This for some unusual behaviour of long interest rates has partly been contributed
to unusual low term premia, which in turn has sparked interest in modeling risk
premia in bonds, and this is the topic of the third chapter in my thesis titled, "Is
the Bond Premium Puzzle Really a Puzzle?".
This chapter tries to resurrect the troubles DSGE models have in modeling
empirical plausible bond risk premia. Standard models within the DSGE literature
either generates implausible low risk premia, (Smets andWouters 2003), (Lawrence,
Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005),(Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson 2007), or if the
model is able to t empirical moments for bond premia, it tend to do so at the
expense of the macroeconomic side of their model the implication being too variable
of the macroeconomic variables, (Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin 2006), (Ravenna and
Seppala 2006), and the discussion in (Rudebusch and Swanson 2007).
The chapter addresses two interrelated aspects of previous DSGE models which
are likely to complicate the modeling of risk premia. Firstly, the model in this
chapter provides closed form solution for bond prices thus bypassing higher order
approximations to get non-zero and non-constant bond premia. Higher order terms
are small by denition, so perhaps the modest success of the DSGE literature in
tting bond risk premia is due to the approximations and not bad models per se.
Secondly, I do not ask what the implication are for bond risk premia in a model
set up for the study of the dynamics of macroeconomic variables, as the question
implicitly is posed in the majority of the existing DSGE models. I instead analyse
whether I can provide a micro foundation for models which are known to generate
plausible risk premia namely the a¢ ne term structure models originated in nance.
I conclude the bond premium puzzle is not a puzzle ones closed form solutions
for bond prices are formed. I nd the model is able to give an explanation to the
decline in bond yields and term premia from the Volker period until the present and
to provide a coherent explanation for the unusual low premia during 2004-2006.
Resumé
Denne afhandling omhandler monetær politik, kapitel 1, 2 og 3, og sammen-
hængen imellem makroøkonomi på mellemlang sigt og obligationsmarkeder, kapitel
3, og 4.
Det første kapitel, "Real-Time E¤ects of Central Bank Interventions in
the Euro Market", er udarbejdet sammen med Rasmus Fatum. Kapitlet analy-
serer real tids e¤ekter af steriliseret intervention på kroner-euro valutamarkedet
ved hjælp af høj-frekvent data for interventioner udført af Nationalbanken. Vores
analyse bruger two-step weighted least squares estimationsmetoden fra (Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 2003) og en række robusthedstest. Vi nder, at inter-
ventioner påvirker valutakursafkast på en både økonomisk og statistisk signikant
måde, når retningen af interventionen er konsistent med den førte pengepolitik,
således at interventioner ikke er et uafhængigt pengepolitisk instrument. Vi viser
også, at valutakursen først påvirkes 20-25 minutter efter den uannonceret og diskre-
tionære intervention.
Interventionsstudier er plaget af endogenietet: Bevæger valutakursen sig på
grund af interventionen eller bliver interventionen udført på grund af valutakurs-
bevægelser? Vi er med vores data sæt i stand til at adressere dette spørgsmål, idet
vi kender det eksakte tidspunkt for udførelsen af alle interventionerne.
Vi kontrollerer for endogenietet ved at estimere en reaktionsfunktion for cen-
tralbanken. Vi bruger residualerne fra denne model som en approksimation til den
uforventede intervention fri for simultanitetsbias. Vi bruger efterfølgende denne
approksimation i vores økonometriske model omtalt tidligere. Vi nder, at en-
dogenietet er til stede i vores interdagsstudie, men at vores estimater af regres-
sionskoe¢ cienterne er ikke kvalitativt påvirket. Endelig inkluderer vi nyheder om
makroøkonomiske variable i vores regression og viser, at e¤ekter af interventioner
på valutakursen er sammenlignelige med e¤ekter af makroøkonomiske nyheder.
Imens analyser af interventionse¤ekter på valutakursniveauer måske er det mest
interessante aspekt ved interventionsinstrumentet for en central bank, så er e¤ek-
ten af en intervention på bid-ask spread af stor interesse for market microstructure
teorien, og dette er emnet for det andet kapitel, "The Intraday E¤ects of Cen-
tral Bank Intervention on Exchange Rate Spreads". Dette kapitel analyserer
intradagse¤ekterne af steriliserede interventioner i DKK/EUR valutakursmarkedet
på forskellen imellem bid - og ask valutakurspriser ved hjælp af det samme datasæt
som brugt i kapitel 1. Hovedresultatet er, at interventionskøb og interventionssalg
begge påvirker bid-ask spread signikant, men i forskellige retninger: Intervention-
ssalg af EUR reducerer, i gennemsnit, spreadet imens interventionskøb af EUR
i gennemsnit udvider spreadet. Markedsusikkerheden omkring den "sande" valu-
takurs er åbenbart højere, når DN forsvarer valutakursen, imens det modsatte er
tilfældet, når DN signallerer at DKK/EUR valutakursen er stærk. Vi viser også,
at den signikante og asymmetriske e¤ekt af interventionskøb og interventionssalg
stammer fra interventioner udført på "normale" dage, denteret som dage med lav
valutakursvolatilitet, imens interventioner der er udført på dage, hvor valutakurs-
markedet er volatilt, bliver overset målt med bid-ask spreadet.
Disse resultater illustrerer nødvendigheden af at skelne imellem interventionskøb
og interventionssalg, når man analyserer påvirkningen på valutakursspread samtidig
med, at analysen bør skelne imellem høj - og lav volatilitet. Disse nye resultater
står tilbage som udfordringer for teoretikere, der arbejder med mikrostruktursteori
på valutakursmarkedet.
Interventioner i valutamarkedet er kun et politik instrument, som central banker
kan benytte til at opnå deres politik mål. Et mere udbredt instrument er den korte
rente, og dette instrument er fundamentet bag de efterfølgende to kapitler.
Det første af disse kapitler, "Monetary Policy, Housing, and Macroeco-
nomic E¤ects of Changes in Long Interest Rates", adresserer opfattelsen
i blandt økonomer, at den samlede efterspørgsel ikke kun afhænger af korte eller
forventede fremtidige renter, men også af lange renter. Standard modeller i den
akademiske litteratur har ikke en monetær transmissions mekanisme igennem en
eller ere lange renter, og det er hvad dette kapitel omhandler.
En mulig sammenhæng imellem ændringer i lange renter og den samlede økonomi
er realkreditmarkedet, og det er hvad modellen i dette kapitel udnytter. Den
repræsentative forbruger får nytte ikke-separabelt fra både et forbrugsindeks og
et boligindeks. Modellen begrænser forbrugerens valg af nansieringsmuligheder til
udstedelse af obligationer med en lang løbetid samtidigt med, at al ny bolig skal
nansieres fuldt ud. Disse egenskaber ved modellen opnås igennem en nansiel
begrænsning, som introducerer tilstrækkelige betingelser til at bevæge økonomien
væk fra en samlet efterspørgselsfunktion, som kun afhænger af (fremtidige forvent-
ede) korte renter. Den nansielle begrænsning gør forbrugsomkostningen af bolig
afhængig af den lange rente og introducerer en endogent bestemt kile imellem oblig-
ationer med forskellig løbetider. Centralbanken kan som et resultat heraf ikke sætte
den lange rente perfekt igennem den korte rente, og forbrugeren må nødvendigvis
bruge den lange rente til nansiering af bolig, selvom den korte rente muligvis er
lavere. Hermed bestemmes den samlede efterspørgsel i modellen på en konsistent
måde blandt andet af den lange rente.
Jeg nder, at en højere end forventet kort pengepolitisk rente i en periode
påvirker den lange rente positivt. Denne højere lange rente presser den samlede
efterspørgsel nedad igennem højere omkostninger i forbindelse med nansiering af
huskøb.
Den større fokus på sammenhængen imellem rentekurven og monetær politik
opstod især i perioden 2004 til 2006, som oplevede en lavere lang rente selvom
den amerikanske central bank strammede pengepolitikken igennem højere penge-
politiske renter; det såkaldte bond yield conundrum. Denne for nogen usædvanlige
udvikling i rente kurven er blevet forklaret med en udsædvanlig lav risiko præmie
på obligationer, hvilket har medfødt en interesse for at modellere risiko præmier på
obligationsmarkedet, og dette er temaet for det tredje kapitel med titlen "Is the
Bond Premium Puzzle Really a Puzzle?"
Dette kapitel prøver at råde bod på de problemer, som repræsentativ agent
DSGE modeller har med at generere empiriske første og anden momenter af risiko-
præmier på obligationsmarkeder. Standard modeller fra DSGE litteraturen gener-
erer enten meget lave risiko præmier i forhold til data, se eksempelvis (Smets and
Wouters 2003), (Lawrence, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005), (Rudebusch, Sack, and
Swanson 2007), eller hvis modellen er i stand til at generere empirisk plausible mo-
menter, så er omkostningen ved dette en makroøkonomisk side af modellen, som
genererer for variable momenter af makroøkonomiske variable, såsom ination, for-
brug og korte renter, se eksempelvis (Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin 2006), (Ravenna
and Seppala 2006), og diskussionen i (Rudebusch and Swanson 2007).
Kapitlet adresserer to relaterede aspekter af eksisterende DSGE modeller, som
komplicerer modelleringen af risiko præmier. For det første giver modellen lukket-
formsløsninger for obligationspriser hvormed at højere-ordens approksimationer
undgås. Disse højereordensled er per denition små, så måske er de mindre gode
resultater for modellering af risikopræmier for den eksisterer litteratur i højere grad
bundet i højere-ordens approksimationer og i mindre grad i modellen. For det andet
så analyserer jeg ikke model implikationerne for risikopræmier i en model bygget til
at analysere dynamikken for makroøkonomiske variable, som spørgsmålet implicit
er stillet i størstedelen af den eksisterende litteratur. Jeg analyserer i stedet for, om
jeg kan give et mikrofundament til modeller, der er i stand til at genere plausible
risiko præmier - de såkaldte a¢ ne rentekurvsmodeller fra den nansielle litteratur.
Jeg konkluderer, at the bond premium puzzle ikke er et puzzle, når modellen
er i stand til at give lukketformsløsninger for obligationspriser. Modellen giver
samtidig også en forklaring på de empirisk observerede faldende nominelle renter og
risikopræmier fra Volker perioden i starten af 80erne til nu, og en sammenhængende
forklaring på den usædvanligt lave risikopræmie i perioden 2004-2006.
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Real-Time E¤ects of Central Bank
Interventions in the Euro Market
Rasmus Fatum and Jesper Pederseny
Abstract
This paper investigates the real-time e¤ects of sterilized for-
eign exchange intervention using o¢ cial intraday intervention
data provided by the Danish central bank. Our analysis employs
a two-step weighted least squares estimation procedure. We con-
trol for macro surprises, address the issue of endogeneity, and
carry out an array of robustness tests. Our main result is that
intervention exerts a signicant inuence on exchange rate re-
turns only when the direction of intervention is consistent with
the monetary policy stance, thereby illustrating that sterilized
intervention is not an independent policy instrument.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) e¤ects of Danish cen-
tral bank intervention in the Euro (EUR) market.1 The interventions
under study are carried out under the provisions of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM II). Proprietary data on o¢ cial, intraday intervention
transactions, provided by the Danish central bank (Danmarks Nation-
albank, henceforth DN), facilitates our investigation. Our investigation
employs the time-series econometrics of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)
and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003).
It is very rare that a central bank makes o¢ cial intraday interven-
tion data available for research.2 In fact, until now only the Bank of
Canada and the Swiss National Bank have made such data available. It
has, however, been a decade or more since the Bank of Canada and the
Swiss National Bank last intervened.3 By contrast, Denmark is currently
pursuing an active intervention policy, i.e. DN carries out sterilized in-
terventions on a discretionary basis when deemed necessary. The DN
intraday intervention data, therefore, constitutes a unique opportunity
to learn about the real-time e¤ects of foreign exchange intervention car-
ried out by a central bank that is currently intervening.
We investigate whether sterilized intervention is an independent pol-
icy instrument or whether it only works when backed by consistent mon-
etary policy (e.g. sterilized intervention sales of domestic currency dur-
ing a period of domestic monetary policy easing). As discussed in Ghosh
(2008), most industrialized countries that intervene use monetary policy
(e.g. changing interest rates) towards achieving domestic goals such as
controlling ination or stimulating growth, while they use sterilized in-
tervention (e.g. sell domestic currency and use open market operations
to o¤-set any impact on money supply or policy rates) towards achieving
exchange rate goals. Sterilized rather than unsterilized intervention is
used since monetary and exchange rate goals are not always compatible.
To illustrate, suppose a country experiences an undesirable appreciation
of its currency as well as inationary pressure. The former would call for
1See Humpage (2003), Neely (2005), and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for recent sur-
veys of the intervention literature.
2Studies of intraday e¤ects of intervention by G3 and other countries use newswire
reports of interventions as a proxy for actual interventions (see, for example,
Dominguez (2003)) or impose assumptions regarding the unknown intraday timing
of interventions. Fischer (2006) illustrates the lack of accuracy of newswire reports
in the context of Swiss interventions.
3See Beattie and Fillion (1999) and Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), respectively,
for early studies of the Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank intraday inter-
vention data sets.
9
lower interest rates (monetary policy easing) while the latter would call
for higher interest rates (monetary policy tightening). Monetary policy
cannot possibly meet both goals. Instead, a country can pursue steril-
ized intervention towards the exchange rate goal and at the same time
use monetary policy towards the domestic goal. As a result, it is not
uncommon to observe sterilized interventions that are monetary policy
inconsistent.4 However, using sterilized intervention to pursue exchange
rate goals independently of monetary goals and the associated monetary
policy stance implicitly assumes that sterilized intervention constitutes
an independent policy instrument.
The period under study encompasses a structural break and two dis-
tinctly di¤erent sub-periods in terms of monetary policy. The o¢ cial
Danish monetary policy rate as well as the key ECB interest rates were
all held constant during the rst sub-period, whereas during the second
sub-period these rates were lowered in tandem by a total of 125 basis
points. Furthermore, the Danish deposit and lending rates were lowered
by a total of 140 basis points (see Nationalbank (2002), Nationalbank
(2003b) and Nationalbank (2004)) during the second sub-period. Ac-
cordingly, the rst sub-period is associated with a neutral Danish mon-
etary policy stance while the second sub-period constitutes a period of
Danish monetary policy easing, both in absolute and relative terms. It
follows that the interventions of the rst sub-period are neither consis-
tent nor inconsistent with monetary policy, while the interventions that
occur during the second sub-period are either monetary policy consis-
tent or inconsistent. We investigate whether monetary policy consistency
matters for the e¤ectiveness of intervention by estimating the e¤ect of
intervention separately across the two sub-periods and separately across
consistent and inconsistent interventions. Our main result is that inter-
vention only works when the direction of intervention is consistent with
the monetary policy stance. This illustrates that even though steril-
ized intervention is by construction detached from monetary policy and,
therefore, it is possible to use sterilized intervention to pursue an ex-
change rate goal while using monetary policy towards a domestic goal
that may conict with the exchange rate goal, doing so is a futile exercise.
In other words, our results show that, in reality, sterilized intervention is
not an independent policy instrument; sterilized intervention only works
in conjunction with monetary policy.
We also assess whether consistency with either o¢ cial or what we
4Ghosh (2008) points to intervention in the DEM/USD exchange rate market in
support of the USD around the February 1987 Louvre Agreement when US interest
rates were held steady and German interest rates were increased as an example of a
monetary policy inconsistent intervention episode.
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refer to as de factoexchange rate policy matter for the e¤ectiveness
of intervention. Contrary to our ndings regarding monetary policy, we
nd no evidence that exchange rate policy consistency is a condition for
e¤ective intervention.
In addition, we address the issue of endogeneity. Doing so reveals
that some endogeneity is present even in our intraday analysis of inter-
vention. However, we also show that the resulting simultaneity bias is
too small to a¤ect our results. We also extend our analysis to incorpo-
rate Danish, German, and Euro-area macro surprises. This allows us
to get a sense of the relative inuence of intervention. We show that
the magnitudes of the coe¢ cient estimates associated with scaled and
thus comparable macro surprises and interventions are similar, thereby
illustrating the importance of taking into account interventions when
estimating exchange rate models.
Since the Danish ERM II intervention experience pertains to main-
taining the exchange rate within a narrow deviation band, our ndings
are applicable to Denmark and other countries that intervene to keep
their respective exchange rates in narrow bands. Additional research
is warranted in order to shed light on whether our results also pertain
to countries intervening to keep their respective exchange rates in wide
deviation bands and to countries with exible exchange rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides an overview of the institutional aspects regarding ERM II and DN
intervention. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the econometric
methodology, respectively. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6
presents several robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Aspects
With the launch of the EUR on 1 January 1999, the ERM II was intro-
duced and replaced the exchange rate mechanism (ERM I) of the Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS). According to the EU Accession Treaty,
successful participation in ERM II is a requirement for joining the EMU
and for adoption of the EUR. Currently Denmark as well as 4 new EU
members participate in ERM II.5
In ERM II, a bilateral central rate and a deviation band is set for the
currency of the participating country vis-à-vis the EUR, but not against
the currency of the other member states. The o¢ cial DKK/EUR central
5Denmark has participated since 1 January 1999, Estonia and Lithuania since 28
June 2004, Latvia since 2 May 2005, and Slovakia since 28 November 2005. Bulgaria,
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania are expected to follow.
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rate is 7.46038 DKK/EUR and the o¢ cial deviation band is set to +/-
2.25 percent.6 The DKK has traded within an even narrower range of
+/- 0.50 percent around the Danish ERM II central rate. The o¢ cial
deviation band for all other ERM II member states is set to +/- 15
percent. Slovakia, however, is the only existing ERM II member using
(almost) the full +/- 15 percent deviation band. Two of the other exist-
ing ERM II member states, Estonia and Lithuania, have EUR currency
boards in place, and one existing ERM II member state, Latvia, similar
to Denmark keeps its currency in a much narrower band than its o¢ cial
deviation band (the LVL has traded within a narrow range of +/- 1.00
percent of the Latvian ERM II central rate).
In order to keep its currency inside the deviation band, the ERM II
member state adjusts its short term interest rates and/or intervenes in
the foreign exchange market. If the currency reaches either the upper or
the lower limit of the deviation band, both the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the central bank of the member state in question intervene
to maintain the exchange rate inside the interior of the band. The ECB
is only obligated to intervene when a currency reaches one of the band
limits.
In reality, interventions when the currency is at the limit of the de-
viation band are avoided. Instead, interventions are carried out when
the currency is in the interior of the band. In the case of Denmark in
ERM II, at no point has the Danish currency been near either the upper
or the lower limit of the band (see Figure 1). Accordingly, our analy-
sis pertains only to interventions carried out unilaterally by the DN.
All DN interventions are discretionary, unannounced and automatically
sterilized.
For additional details regarding the ERM II and the Danish foreign
exchange rate policy see Nationalbank (2003a), ECB (2004), and EU
(2006).
3 Data
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR
market over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. Our sam-
ple period is determined by availability of the data. The data includes
6Prior to the launch of the EUR, Denmark participated in the EMS. Between 1982
and until the launch of the EUR, Denmark successfully maintained a stable exchange
rate vis-à-vis a basket of other EMS currencies within its ERM I deviation band. As
a result, Denmark was in a position to negotiate a tighter o¢ cial ERM II band than
any other ERM II member. E¤ectively, the o¢ cial Danish ERM II deviation band
is a continuation of the o¢ cial Danish ERM I deviation band.
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the exact amount and time-stamp to the nearest minute obtained di-
rectly from the trade-sheet of each intervention transaction. Intervention
amounts are quoted in EUR and a positive amount denotes a purchase
of EUR against a sale of DKK. In accordance with the ERM II provi-
sions, the DN trader conducting an intervention operation is obligated
to write the amount and the exact time of the operation on the trade-
sheet immediately after the completion of each individual intervention
transaction. This information is forwarded to the ECB by the end of
the trading day, at the latest. Our intraday intervention data consists
of this extremely reliable information.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data.7 Our
sample consists of a total of 89 intervention days, encompassing a total
of 220 intervention transactions. On intervention days, the average in-
tervention amount is EUR 164 million. A total of 68 intervention days
consist of EUR purchases. Figure 1 shows that all interventions occur
when the DKK/EUR rate is in the interior of the deviation band.
The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by
Olsen and Associates, collected from commercial banks by Tenfore and
Oanda, and covers the full sample period. The data consists of the bid
and the o¤er spot exchange rate at the end of every 5-minute interval
over every 24-hour period. The quotes are indicative quotes, i.e. not
necessarily traded quotes. We follow Dacorogna, Muller, Nagler, Olsen,
and Pictet (1993) and lter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.
Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold, and Vega (2003), our midpoint (log) exchange rate price at
each 5-minute point is constructed by linearly interpolating the average
of the preceding and immediately following (log) bid and o¤er quotes.
The continuously compounded 5-minute returns (Rt) are calculated as
the change in the 5-minute midpoint prices.8
It is standard in the intraday literature on widely traded currency
pairs (e.g. the USD/EUR, the USD/DEM, the USD/JPY, and the
USD/GBP) to dene a trading day to start at 21.05 GMT the night
before and end at 21.00 GMT on the evening of the trading day in ques-
tion (see Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993)) and, furthermore, to dene a
weekend to start at 21.05 GMT Friday and nish 21.00 GMT Sunday,
7Given the condential nature of the intervention data, we are not at liberty to
display or describe this data in greater detail.
8Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) on p. 40 note that Goodhart,
Ito, and Payne (1996) and Danielsson and Payne (1999) nd that the basic charac-
teristics of 5-minute returns constructed from quotes closely match those calculated
from transaction prices. Transaction prices are not available for the DKK/EUR
exchange rate market.
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see e.g., Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003). The Danish
exchange rate market, however, is di¤erent from the major exchange rate
markets in that there is very little or virtually no trading of the Danish
currency outside of standard Danish business hours (see Nationalbank
(2003a) and ECB (2004)). Therefore, we dene a trading day in the
Danish currency market to start at 8.00 GMT+1 and nish at 17.00
GMT+1.9 Consequently, our analysis considers a total of 752 trading
days consisting of a total of 80476 5-minute DKK/EUR exchange rate
returns.10 Importantly, our trading day denition encompasses all inter-
vention transactions in the period under study.
Table 3 summarizes key statistical properties of our 5-minute returns.
As expected, the returns have fatter tails than a normal distribution, and
the Bera-Jarque test for normality is strongly rejected. The rejection is
mainly attributed to excess kurtosis. The 5-minute return series is far
from being a white-noise process due to long memory, as evidenced by
the Ljung-Box Q-test statistic which rejects that the rst 540 autocorre-
lations (corresponding to one business-week) are jointly zero. This long
memory can be attributed to daily periodicity.
Danish and Euro-Area interest rates are obtained from the websites
of DN (www.nationalbanken.dk) and the ECB (www.ecb.int), respec-
tively. Time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-area macro announce-
ments and preceding survey expectations are obtained from Bloomberg.
Summary statistics regarding interest rates and macro news are available
from the authors upon request.
4 Econometric Methodology
Clearly, the long memory and the intraday periodicity of our exchange
rate series would a¤ect the residuals of a standard OLS regression of
interventions on exchange rate returns, thereby invalidating standard
errors and rendering the associated test statistics unreliable. In order to
obtain consistent and asymptotically e¢ cient estimates of the response
of the foreign exchange series to an intervention we instead employ the
two-step WLS procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).
We model the response of the DKK/EUR exchange rate return, Rt,
9This denition of a trading day carries over naturally to a denition of a weekend,
i.e. we dene a weekend to start at 17.05 GMT+1 Friday and nish at 8.00 GMT+1
Monday.
10We also deleted the following xed holidays from the analysis: 1 January,
Easter (3 holidays), Christmas (24/25/26 December), 31 December as well as 4
Denmark-specic holidays (Store Bededag, Kristi Himmelfartsdag, Anden Pinsedag,
Grundlovsdag).
14
as a linear function of J lagged values of the return itself and K lags of
the intervention variable, It:
Rt = 0 +
JX
j=1
jRt j +
KX
k=0
kIt k + "t ; t = 1:::T (1)
As noted earlier, T=80476. We choose J=5 based on the Schwartz and
Akaike information criteria and we set K=6, i.e. we include 6 lags of
the intervention variable (corresponding to 30 minutes) and vary this
number in our robustness checks. We rst estimate equation (1) by OLS
in order to obtain the estimated residuals, "^t.11
The next step is to model the volatility pattern using the estimated
residuals of equation (1). We follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega (2003) and use the following parameterization:
j"^tj= c1 + c2 +  ^tp
n
+
KX
k=0
kIt k (2)
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q cos
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q2n
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
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+
HX
h=0
h
 
rEURt h   rDKKt h

+ ut
where "^t is the residual of equation (1), and its absolute value proxies for
the volatility in the 5-minute interval t, c1 and c2 are two normalizing
constants, n is the number of intervals in a day (in our case 108), ^t the
one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that contains
interval t), q is a specic intraday calendar e¤ect, Q is the total number
of calendar e¤ects accounted for (Q=8, based on the Schwartz and the
Akaike information criteria), rEURt   rDKKt is the EUR-DKK interest
rate di¤erential, and ut denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard
normal).12
11We also include in the conditional mean model as additional explanatory variables
the distance from parity, i.e. a measure of the distance between the DKK/EUR
exchange rate and the central rate, as well as the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential.
Both variables proved insignicant in all estimations and were thus excluded from
the conditional mean model for the remainder of the analysis.
12We include contemporaneous and lagged values of the EUR-DKK interest rate
di¤erential (captured by the di¤erence between the DN Folio rate and the ECB
Rerate) in the volatility model. We set the number of lags to two, based on the
Schwartz and the Akaike criteria. This inclusion improves the overall t of the model.
However, whether or not we include the interest rate di¤erential in our volatility
model does not a¤ect the signicance of the coe¢ cient estimates associated with the
intervention variable in either the conditional mean or the volatility model.
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We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the rst term after
the vector of constants) using the concept of realized volatility (RV).
RV is dened as the daily sum of squared returns and constitutes an
unbiased, e¢ cient and asymptotically consistent estimate of the true
daily quadratic variation. A key advantage of using RV is that this
semi-parametric approach does not require additional model estimation.
For our baseline analysis we calculate the RV using 30 minute returns.
Di¤erent RV measures are employed as robustness checks.
Since the realized volatility forecast cannot capture the observed
cyclical intraday patterns (the slow decay in the autocorrelations), we
model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of a Fourier exible
form (see Gallant (1981)). A Fourier exible form consists of a number
of sine- and cosine terms with varying degrees of periodicity (the terms
in the parenthesis of equation (2)) It allows for a model specication as
exible as possible, thereby enabling us to t the intraday pattern of the
residuals from equation (1).
Consistent with Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Boller-
slev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), who include their macro news variables
in the volatility equation, we include the intervention variable (i.e. our
main newsvariable) in the volatility model.
4.1 Structural break
We suspect that a structural break related to the change in the mon-
etary policy stance may have occurred during our sample period. We
consequently test for a structural break and parameter instability to en-
sure that our statistical inference is valid. We use the test procedure
described in Andrews (1993).13
We test for parameter stability across all the estimated coe¢ cients
and nd the value of the test statistic to equal 165 at  = 0:2 (where
 is the percentage of the full sample). The test statistic follows the
square of a standardized tied-down Bessel process of order p, where p
is the number of restrictions in the hypothesis. The critical value of a
squared standardized tied-down Bessel process of order 13 is 31.10, thus
the null-hypothesis of parameter stability is strongly rejected at the 20
percent change point mark.14 This translates into a structural break
13An advantage of the Andrews (1993) test is that, unlike a simple Wald test (or
similar tests), this testing procedure does not require advance knowledge regarding
the exact timing of a potential change point. See Andrews (1993) for details regarding
this test.
14We also utilize the ability of the Andrews (1993) testing procedure to focus on
only a sub-sample of the parameter vector to test for parameter stability across the
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on 16 August 2002. Since the Danish deposit and lending rates were
lowered (twice) in August 2002, independently of the ECB who kept its
key interest rates unchanged until the end of 2002, the coinciding change
in the monetary policy stance provides the economic rationale for the
statistical break point.
5 Results
5.1 Benchmark Estimations
Before we investigate whether policy consistency matters for the e¤ec-
tiveness of intervention, we rst carry out the two-step WLS estima-
tion without taking into account the issue of policy consistency. This
provides a useful benchmark against which subsequent results and ro-
bustness checks are compared. We carry out our estimations on the full
sample as well as separately across the 1 January 2002 to 16 August
2002 period (sub-sample 1) and the 17 August 2002 to 31 December
2004 period (sub-sample 2). Since a positive amount of intervention
constitutes a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK, and the exchange
rate is measured in terms of DKK per EUR, a positive cumulative e¤ect
of intervention implies that intervention is e¤ective and inuences the
exchange rate in the intended direction.
Tables 1 displays the result of the benchmark estimation of equation
(1) and tables 4-5 display the result of equation (2). Since the key goal
of intervention in the context of ERM II is to ensure that the value of
a currency is kept within its deviation band, the level e¤ects of inter-
vention displayed in table 1 are of primary interest. The rst column
of table 1 shows that for the full sample the coe¢ cient estimates asso-
ciated with contemporaneous and the rst lag of intervention are highly
signicant and negative, i.e. the opposite sign of what is expected, and
lags 4 through 6 are signicant and positive, i.e. in the intended direc-
tion. The Wald test of the hypothesis that the (positive) sum of the
estimated intervention coe¢ cients is equal to zero cannot be rejected,
i.e. intervention is, on average, not e¤ective over the full sample. The
sub-sample 1 results shown in column 2 are similar and, again, we cannot
reject that the there is no cumulative e¤ect of intervention. However,
sum of the intervention coe¢ cients and separately for each individual intervention
coe¢ cient. This alternative procedure also rejects the null-hypothesis of parameter
stability at the 20 percent change point mark. Additionally, we perform the same
change point test for a specication with a full one-hour lag of interventions included
(i.e. 12 lags of interventions). Again, we nd signicant evidence of a change point
at the 20 percent mark.
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the sub-sample 2 results shown in column 3 are di¤erent. While the
coe¢ cient estimates associated with contemporaneous and lagged inter-
vention are once again of mixed signs and varying degrees of signicance,
the Wald test strongly rejects that the (positive) sum of the estimated
intervention coe¢ cients is equal to zero. In other words, intervention is,
on average, e¤ective and inuences the exchange rate in the intended
direction across sub-sample 2.
Tables 4 and 5 display the results of the estimation of the volatility
model described in equation (2). Intervention has no signicant volatil-
ity e¤ects across either the full sample (column 1, table 4) or sub-sample
2 (column 3, table 4). Only when estimating the volatility model across
sub-sample 1 (column 2, table 4) do we nd signicant e¤ects of inter-
vention (consistent with reduced volatility). Overall, these results do
not suggest that intervention exerts a strong inuence on exchange rate
volatility.15
The validity of the WLS estimation procedure is contingent on the
t of the volatility model. As a rst measure of t we follow Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and, for both sub-samples, plot
the absolute average residuals (for each 5 minute interval across all the
included 752 trading days) estimated from the initial OLS regression
of equation (1) against the tted absolute average residuals from the
estimation of equation (2). Our plots suggest that the volatility model
provides a good t for both sub-samples. As a second measure of t
we plot the raw foreign exchange rate returns against the tted foreign
exchange rate returns from the initial OLS estimation of equation (1)
and against the tted returns from the WLS estimation of equation (1).
While the OLS procedure fails to capture the pattern of the raw returns,
the tted returns from the WLS estimation match the raw returns well.
This comparison conrms the necessity of the WLS procedure as well as
its success.16
5.2 Intervention and Policy Consistency
As noted earlier, the o¢ cial Danish monetary policy rate as well as
the key ECB interest rates were all held constant during sub-sample 1,
whereas during sub-sample 2 these rates were lowered in tandem. Fur-
thermore, the Danish deposit and lending rates were lowered by a total
15While we do not detail the results of the volatility estimations associated with
the subsequent model estimations, these results are available from the authors upon
request.
16These plots as well as the similar plots associated with subsequent estimations
are not shown for brevity but available from the authors upon request.
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of 140 basis points (see Nationalbank (2002), Nationalbank (2003b) and
Nationalbank (2004)) during sub-sample 2. Accordingly, sub-sample 1
is associated with a neutral Danish monetary policy stance while sub-
sample 2 constitutes a period of Danish monetary policy easing, both in
absolute and relative terms. It follows that the interventions during sub-
sample 1 (all purchases of EUR) are neither consistent nor inconsistent
with monetary policy, the intervention purchases of EUR during sub-
sample 2 are monetary policy consistent, and the intervention sales of
EUR during sub-sample 2 are policy inconsistent. This straightforward
classication of all the interventions under study allows us to investigate
whether monetary policy consistency matters for the e¤ectiveness of in-
tervention, by estimating the e¤ect of intervention purchases of EUR
and intervention sales of EUR separately across the two sub-samples.
Table 6 displays the results. As mentioned, sub-sample 1 consists
of all EUR purchases and, therefore, the results displayed in the rst
column of table 6 are identical to the sub-sample 1 benchmark esti-
mation results displayed in the second column of table 1. In terms of
monetary policy consistency, the sub-sample 1 results suggest that inter-
ventions carried out when monetary policy is neutral are not e¤ective.
The second column of table 6 shows that the cumulative e¤ect of the
sub-sample 2 monetary policy inconsistent intervention sales of EUR is
insignicant (the Wald test cannot reject that the there is no cumula-
tive e¤ect of intervention). By contrast, the cumulative e¤ect of the
sub-sample 2 monetary policy consistent intervention purchases of EUR
are of the correct sign and signicant at the 95% level (the Wald test
rejects that the cumulative e¤ect of a consistent intervention is equal
to zero). Clearly, these results suggest that intervention exerts a sig-
nicant inuence on exchange rate returns only when the direction of
intervention is consistent with the monetary policy stance.
The o¢ cial Danish exchange rate policy in terms of the +/- 2.25% de-
viation band around the central rate of 7.4604 DKK/EUR is announced
and known to the markets. In terms of intervention and consistency
with o¢ cial exchange rate policy, an intervention aimed at bringing the
exchange rate closer to the central parity, e.g. an intervention purchase
of EUR when the DKK is appreciated relative to the central rate, is
o¢ cial exchange rate policy consistent, whereas an intervention aimed
at pushing the exchange rate further away from the central rate, e.g.
an intervention purchase of EUR when the DKK is depreciated relative
to the central rate, is inconsistent with the o¢ cial exchange rate policy.
Since the DKK/EUR exchange rate traded between 7.4150 and 7.4592
DKK/EUR throughout the 3 years under study (see Figure 1), it follows
that all intervention purchases of EUR are consistent and all interven-
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tion sales are inconsistent with the o¢ cial exchange rate policy. Con-
sequently, all sub-sample 1 interventions are consistent, all sub-sample
2 intervention purchases of EUR are consistent, and all sub-sample 2
intervention sales of EUR are inconsistent with o¢ cial exchange rate
policy. We have already estimated separately the e¤ects of intervention
purchases and sales and shown in table 6 that only the sub-sample 2 in-
tervention purchases are e¤ective. Put di¤erently, the o¢ cial exchange
rate policy consistent sub-sample 1 interventions are not e¤ective while
the o¢ cial exchange rate policy consistent sub-sample 2 interventions
are e¤ective. This disconnect indicates that whether intervention is con-
sistent with o¢ cial exchange rate policy does not determine whether
intervention systematically inuences exchange rate returns.
Since actual (de-facto) Danish exchange rate policy clearly di¤ers
from the o¢ cial Danish exchange rate policy (or there would have been
no intervention sales of EUR in our sample), we also employ as a mea-
sure of de-factoexchange rate policy consistency the position of the
exchange rate at the time of the intervention relative to the unconditional
full-sample mean of 7.4337 DKK/EUR. In other words, if an intervention
purchase (sale) of EUR occurs when the DKK is appreciated (depreci-
ated) relative to the unconditional full-sample mean, the intervention
is deemed consistent with what we label the de-facto exchange rate
policy. According to this measure of de-facto exchange rate policy
consistency, all sub-sample 1 interventions (all purchases of EUR), all
sub-sample 2 intervention sales of EUR, and 67 of the sub-sample 2 inter-
vention purchases of EUR are consistent with the de-factoexchange
rate policy. The remaining 32 sub-sample 2 intervention purchases of
EUR are de-facto exchange rate policy inconsistent. As before, we
investigate whether this consistency matters for the e¤ectiveness of in-
tervention by estimating the e¤ect of consistent and inconsistent inter-
vention separately across the two sub-samples. In order to take into
account our insights regarding monetary policy consistency we also dis-
tinguish between intervention purchases and intervention sales.
The results are displayed in table 7. The new and interesting nding
here is in regards to the sub-sample 2 intervention purchases of EUR.
As the second column shows, whether intervention purchases of EUR
are consistent or inconsistent with the de-factoexchange rate policy
measure, the cumulative e¤ect on the exchange rate is signicant, of
the right sign, and practically of the same magnitude. This nding
suggests that consistency with de-factoexchange rate policy also does
not determine whether intervention is e¤ective.17
17All the sub-sample 1 intervention purchases of EUR and all the sub-sample 2
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In sum, our investigation of intervention and policy consistency pro-
duces evidence that on the one hand e¤ectiveness of intervention is con-
tingent on its consistency with monetary policy, i.e. intervention only
works when backed by changes in the monetary policy stance in the same
direction as intervention.18 On the other hand, we nd no evidence that
exchange rate policy consistency is a condition for e¤ective intervention.
Taken together, this implies that in the context of the Danish ERM
II experience there is no monetary policy/exchange rate policy trade-o¤.
Instead, in order for intervention to be e¤ective, monetary policy consis-
tency is a necessity, while exchange rate policy consistency is irrelevant.
Importantly, this illustrates that even though sterilized intervention is by
construction detached from monetary policy and, therefore, as discussed
earlier, it is possible to use sterilized intervention to pursue an exchange
rate goal while using monetary policy towards a domestic goal that may
conict with the exchange rate goal, doing so is a futile exercise. In
other words, our results show that, in reality, sterilized intervention is
not an independent policy instrument; sterilized intervention only works
in conjunction with monetary policy.
5.3 Endogeneity
While it seems reasonable to assume that intervention is not triggered
by the contemporaneous exchange rate movement (i.e. the change in ex-
change rate return that occurs over the 5-minute interval within which
intervention is carried out), intervention is likely correlated with recent
(lagged) exchange rate movements and with recent (lagged) intervention.
Accordingly, even our study probably does not perfectly abstract from
endogeneity and, therefore, simultaneity bias could make e¤ective inter-
vention appear ine¤ective. See Neely (2005) for a general discussion of
endogeneity, and Neely (2008) for a survey-based assessment of how fast
intervening central banks react to exchange rate market developments.
In order to control for endogeneity, we follow the daily data studies
by Humpage (1999) and Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) and estimate
a central bank reaction function in order to capture the expected com-
ponent of the intervention variable. In turn, we use the residuals of the
intervention sales of EUR are consistent with both the o¢ cial and the de-facto
exchange rate policy, thus the result regarding no signicant cumulative e¤ect of
intervention pertaining to these two categories of intervention has already been dis-
cussed.
18While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze through which transmission
channel e¤ective intervention works, this nding clearly is in line with the signaling
channel hypothesis, i.e. by carrying out intervention the central bank informs the
market about its future policy intentions and/or fundamentals.
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reaction function estimation (i.e. we subtract the expected component of
intervention from the actual intervention variable in intervals where the
latter is non-zero) as a proxy for unexpected intervention that we then
use for obtaining an estimate of intervention that is free of simultaneity
bias.
The results of the reaction function estimation are displayed in table
8. The results show that the rst four lags of exchange rate returns and
the rst lag of intervention are signicant, conrming the suspicion that
some endogeneity is present in any intervention study, even at the intra-
day frequency. The results of the re-estimation of the benchmark model
with the proxy for unexpected intervention in place of the actual inter-
vention variable are displayed in table 9. The results are qualitatively
identical to the comparable estimation results from estimations that do
not address endogeneity (table 1).19
Overall, addressing the issue of endogeneity in the context of an in-
traday study of intervention tells us two things. One, it shows that some
endogeneity is present even in an intraday analysis of the e¤ectiveness of
intervention. Two, at least in the Danish case, the resulting simultaneity
bias is too small to a¤ect the results.
5.4 Macro Surprises
In order to compare the inuence of intervention relative to the inuence
of macro surprises as well as to ensure that our estimated e¤ects of in-
tervention are not tainted by the coincidental arrival of macro news, we
extend our analysis to include time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-
area macro surprises. Specically, we include macro surprises regard-
ing Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Cur-
rent Account (DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer
Condence (DKCC); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP),
and Industrial Production (DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial
Production (EAIP), and Business Climate Index (EABC). We measure
macro surprises as the di¤erence between macro announcement and pre-
ceding survey expectation obtained from Bloomberg. To facilitate the
comparison of the coe¢ cient estimates of the macro surprises to the coef-
cient estimates of intervention, we follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Vega (2003) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) and
others and standardize the macro news as well as the intervention vari-
19We also control for endogeneity using alternative reaction function specications
with di¤erent lag structures and with lags of the distance from parity measure in-
cluded as an additional explanatory variable. Our results are not sensitive to these
alternative reaction function specications.
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able (i.e. for each variable we divide the surprise by its sample standard
deviation).20
The results are displayed in table 10-12.21 The results show, not
surprisingly, that some but not all of the macro surprises inuence the
DKK/EUR exchange rate. The signicant macro surprises are of the
expected sign, e.g. a higher than expected Danish CPI announcement is
associated with a depreciation of the DKK. The absolute magnitude of
the signicant macro surprise point estimates as well as the estimate of
the magnitude of the cumulative e¤ect of intervention fall in the 0.00002
to 0.00012 range. This shows that the relative inuence of intervention
is comparable to the relative inuence of most macro surprises, thereby
illustrating the importance of taking into account the e¤ect of interven-
tion when estimating exchange rate models. For example, the relative
inuence of intervention is similar to the relative inuence of Danish or
Euro-Area CPI surprises.22
6 Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we carry out the analy-
sis using a di¤erent econometric procedure, a di¤erent intervention lag-
structure, fewer trigonometric terms, and di¤erent RV measures. Addi-
tionally, we address whether interventions that occur on high-volatility
days impact the exchange rate di¤erently. All results pertaining to this
section are available from the authors upon request.
First, the gain in e¢ ciency from the WLS procedure is potentially
costly in terms of inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial
20Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega (2003) show that the conditional mean of the exchange rate generally adjusts
immediately (i.e. jumps) in response to macro news. This is not surprising consid-
ering that the announcement time of macro news is known in advance. Accordingly,
we include only the contemporaneous and the rst lag of the macro surprises in our
estimations. Since the DN interventions are unannounced and carried out on a dis-
cretionary basis, the foreign exchange market participants cannot know in advance
with certainty whether an intervention will occur and if so at what time. We there-
fore allow for an adjustment period of 30 minutes in order to capture the full e¤ect
of the interventions.
21Sub-sample 1 is too short to encompass a su¢ cient number of macro surprises
for a meaningful estimation of the inuence of macro news.
22The magnitude of our estimates regarding macro surprises and intervention are
broadly similar to the comparable estimates regarding US macro surprises found in
Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998), p. 391. They show (unscaled) estimates
in the 0.00001 to 0.00290 range. Our estimates also appear similar to the (scaled)
coe¢ cient estimates displayed graphically in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega
(2007), p. 263.
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estimation of equation (1) are improperly tted in the volatility model
described by equation (2). In order to address this potential concern
we also estimate the e¤ects of intervention on exchange rate returns us-
ing heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard
errors (i.e. we re-estimate equation (1) using HAC errors). The HAC
results are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results based
on the more sophisticated two-step WLS procedure.
Second, in order to test for delayed e¤ects of intervention beyond the
6th lag, we re-estimate our models with 12 lags of intervention included.
We do so using both the WLS and the HAC procedure. The results
based on the WLS procedure show that while the 7th and the 10th lags
are marginally signicant in sub-sample 1 and the 7th lag is signicant
in sub-sample 2, our previously discussed results regarding cumulative
e¤ects remain. When using the HAC procedure, the two marginally
signicant delayed e¤ects in sub-sample 1 become insignicant. Overall,
this robustness check conrms that it takes no longer than about 30
minutes before the exchange rate has fully adjusted to an intervention
operation.
Third, our volatility model includes 8 sine and 8 cosine terms, while
the volatility model of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003)
includes only 4 sine and 4 cosine terms. In order to ensure that our
volatility model isnt over-tted, we also carry out the WLS estimation
using only 4 sine and 4 cosine terms. Our results are robust to this
reduction in the number of trigonometric terms included.
Fourth, while our baseline model uses a RV measure based on 30
minute frequency returns (pertaining to equation (2)), we also estimate
the model using RV measures based on 10 and 60 minute frequency re-
turns. Our results are robust across each of these RV measures. Our
ndings are also robust to replacing the RV series with a daily volatility
series derived from a standard GARCH(1,1) model (as originally pro-
posed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)).
Fifth, in order to assess whether interventions that are carried out
on high-volatility days exert more or less of an inuence on the exchange
rate, we rst dene a high-volatility day as a day with either a signi-
cant intraday volatility jump (i.e. a jump-day, as dened in Andersen,
Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007)) or with a daily realized volatility that is
at least the average realized volatility of the sample plus two times the
standard deviation of the realized volatility. We then add to the mean
equation a stand-alone 0-1 dummy that equals 1 when the 5-minute
interval during which an intervention occurs falls on a high-volatility
day, and re-estimate the baseline model with only the contemporaneous
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dummy added and with the contemporaneous dummy and six lags of
this dummy added. The results show that all the dummies are insignif-
icant across all the samples, implying that whether or not intervention
is carried out when volatility is high does not a¤ect the inuence of in-
tervention. For completeness, we also assess whether interventions that
occur on low-volatility days (dened as a day when the realized volatil-
ity is less than the average realized volatility of the sample minus two
times the standard deviation of the realized volatility) impact the ex-
change rate di¤erently. Again, all the low-volatility day dummies are
insignicant across all the samples.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) e¤ects of Danish inter-
vention in the EUR market over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December
2004 period, using proprietary intraday intervention data provided by
the Danish central bank and the WLS time-series econometrics of Ander-
sen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega
(2003). The Danish ERM II intervention experience pertains to main-
taining the exchange rate within a narrow deviation band. Therefore,
our ndings are applicable to Denmark and other countries that inter-
vene to keep their respective exchange rates in narrow bands (such as
Latvia in ERM II), but not necessarily to countries intervening to keep
their respective exchange rates in wide deviation bands (such as Slovakia
in ERM II) or to countries with exible exchange rates (such as Japan
or the US).
We test for and nd a structural break in the data in August 2002, co-
inciding with the Danish deposit and lending rates being lowered. Based
on the structural break we separate our data into two sub-samples that
are distinctly di¤erent in terms of the stance of the Danish monetary
policy. Sub-sample 1 is associated with a neutral Danish monetary pol-
icy stance while sub-sample 2 constitutes a period of Danish monetary
policy easing, both in absolute and relative terms. This facilitates an
investigation of whether monetary policy consistency of sterilized in-
tervention matters for whether sterilized intervention is e¤ective. Our
results show that intervention only works when the direction of inter-
vention is consistent with the monetary policy stance.
We also assess whether consistency with either o¢ cial or a measure
of de factoexchange rate policy matter for the e¤ects of intervention.
We nd no evidence that exchange rate policy consistency is a condition
for e¤ective intervention.
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Furthermore, we address the issue of endogeneity by estimating a
central bank reaction function in order to capture the expected compo-
nent of the intervention variable. In turn, we use the residuals of the
reaction function estimation as a proxy for unexpected intervention that
we then use for obtaining an estimate of intervention that is free of si-
multaneity bias. We nd that some endogeneity is present even in our
intraday analysis of the e¤ectiveness of intervention, yet we also nd
that the resulting simultaneity bias is too small to a¤ect the results.
In order to compare the inuence of intervention relative to the inu-
ence of macro surprises as well as to ensure that our estimated e¤ects of
intervention are not tainted by the coincidental arrival of macro news, we
also include time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-area macro sur-
prises in our estimations. Our results show, not surprisingly, that some
but not all of the macro surprises inuence the DKK/EUR exchange
rate. More importantly, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates as-
sociated with scaled and thus comparable macro surprises and interven-
tions show that the relative inuence of intervention is comparable to
the relative inuence of most macro surprises.
Our main result is that in order for intervention to be e¤ective, mon-
etary policy consistency is a necessity. This illustrates that even though
it is technically possible to use sterilized intervention to pursue an ex-
change rate goal that may conict with the domestic goal towards which
monetary policy is aimed, doing so is futile. In other words, we show
that sterilized intervention is not an independent policy instrument.
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8 Tables
WLS Estimation of eq. 1: Mean Equation
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.0040 -0.1500 0.0600
(0.0333) (0.7142) (0.2857)
 t -0.15*** -0.32*** -0.08*
(0.0560) (0.4638) (0.0696)
 t 1 -0.16*** -0.26 -0.17***
(0.0578) (0.1844) (0.0369)
 t 2 0.06 0.06 0.04
(0.0632) (0.1579) (0.0702)
 t 3 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06
(0.0714) (0.1250) (0.0896)
 t 4 0.13** 0.12 0.1
(0.0578) (0.1091) (0.0676)
 t 5 0.12** -0.13 0.36***
(0.0533) (0.1429) (0.0679)
 t 6 0.15** 0.16* 0.11
(0.0641) (0.1185) (0.0859)
t 1 -0.64*** -0.76*** -0.61***
(0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0078)
t 2 -0.45*** -0.58*** -0.43***
(0.0075) (0.0116) (0.0086)
t 3 -0.31*** -0.42*** -0.29***
(0.0070) (0.0119) (0.0079)
t 4 -0.2*** -0.26*** -0.19***
(0.0063) (0.0107) (0.0072)
t 5 -0.1*** -0.13*** -0.1***
(0.0050) (0.0082) (0.0061)
Sum 0.1 -0.39 0.31
Wald Test Statistic 1.91 0.63 7.28
Number of observations 220 58 162
Table 1: The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily
DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes current and lagged interventions.
t j denotes lagged 5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients, standard deviations and
the sum for the interventions are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes
signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard in ( ) below the
point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]; Subscript denotes lags.
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Estimation of eq. 2: Volatility
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.0025*** -0.0004 0.0030***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Normalising Constant I -0.0019*** 0.0003 -0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Normalising Constant II 0.0002*** -0.0004 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0001)
Realised Volatility 0.2700*** 0.1300*** 0.2700***
(0.0050) (0.0160) (0.0050)
Interest di¤ erentials
t -0.1400*** -0.0070* -0.0020
(0.0140) (0.0036) (0.0030)
t 1 0.5700** 0.5500 -0.0003
(0.2591) (3.4380) (0.0050)
t 2 -0.3600 -0.4800*** 0.0030
(0.2118) (0.0918) (0.0029)
Interventions
 t -0.0700 -0.3300*** 0.0300
(0.0680) (0.0636) (0.1035)
 t 1 -0.0700 0.0100 0.1100
(0.0700) (0.1250) (0.0909)
 t 2 0.0899 0.0800 0.0900
(0.0899) (0.1231) (0.1139)
 t 3 0.0755 -0.0900 -0.0300
(0.0755) (0.0776) (0.0938)
 t 4 0.0769 -0.1300 -0.0300
(0.0769) (0.0823) (0.0968)
 t 5 0.0833 -0.0040 0.1000
(0.0833) (0.0098) (0.1020)
 t 6 -0.0500 -0.1800*** -0.0040
(0.0794) (0.0690) (0.1000)
Table 4: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression,
equation (1). The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatil-
ity measure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential,
j, and interventions,  t j. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the sine, co-
sine, and interest di¤erentials are multiplied by 1.000. The coe¢ cients and standard
deviations for the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **,
and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard
Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. Subscript denotes lags.
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Estimation of eq. 2: Volatility
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
Sine terms
1 -0.1030*** 0.0210 -0.1400***
(0.0170) (0.0280) (0.0200)
2 -0.0100*** 0.0010 -0.0120***
(0.0017) (0.0030) (0.0020)
3 0.0060*** -0.0030 0.0080***
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0015)
4 0.0064*** -0.002 0.009***
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0017)
5 0.0040*** -0.0020* 0.0060***
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011)
6 0.0031*** 0.0010 0.0040***
(0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0007)
7 -0.0021*** -0.0004 -0.0030***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
8 -0.0013*** -0.0003*** -0.0020***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0007)
Cosine terms
'1 0.0800*** -0.0150 0.1100***
(0.0148) (0.0428) (0.0182)
'2 0.0300*** -0.0060 0.0420***
(0.0054) (0.0085) (0.0067)
'3 0.0130*** -0.0040 0.0170***
(0.0024)*** (0.0055) (0.0027)***
'4 0.0040*** -0.0010 0.0050***
(0.0008)*** (0.0010) (0.0009)
'5 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.0057) (0.0003) (0.0009)
'6 -0.0030*** -0.0010 -0.0030***
(0.0008)*** (0.0077) (0.0008)***
'7 -0.0010* 0.0010 -0.0020**
(0.0005)* (0.0018) (0.0008)**
'8 0.0002 0.0020 -0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0035) (0.0005)
R2 0.11 0.01 0.12
F-statistic 329 7 304
Table 5: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression,
equation (1). The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatil-
ity measure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential,
j, and interventions,  t j. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the sine, co-
sine, and interest di¤erentials are multiplied by 1.000. The coe¢ cients and standard
deviations for the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **,
and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard
Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1: Sales and purchases
Full Sample Sub-sample I Sub-sample II
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
C 0.4359 0.4359 6.9002 0.7757 0.7757
(1.0457) (1.0457) (12.7020) (2.4969) (2.4969)
 t -0.0805 -0.1482* -0.3200*** -0.0749 -0.1050
(0.0854) (0.0776) (0.0647) (0.0845) (0.1094)
 t 1 -0.2002*** -0.1622 -0.2601 -0.1966*** -0.1234
(0.0674) (0.1087) (0.1785) (0.0670) (0.1225)
 t 2 -0.0803 0.2090 0.0605 -0.0746 0.3046*
(0.0528) (0.1163) (0.1645) (0.0531) (0.1630)
 t 3 -0.0337 -0.1011 -0.0259 -0.0314 -0.1642
(0.1231) (0.0858) (0.1146) (0.1229) (0.1182)
 t 4 0.0381 0.1976*** 0.1243 0.0380 0.2223**
(0.0786) (0.0770) (0.1162) (0.0799) (0.0999)
 t 5 0.2086** 0.0868 -0.1276 0.2066** 0.2166
(0.0906) (0.0951) (0.1426) (0.0917) (0.1264)
 t 6 0.2521 0.1006 0.1578* 0.246 0.0817
(0.1846) (0.0798) (0.0838) (0.1855) (0.1146)
t 1 -0.6330*** -0.6330*** -0.7593*** -0.6061*** -0.6061***
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0097) (0.0084) (0.0084)
t 2 -0.4466*** -0.4466*** -0.5828*** -0.4196*** -0.4196***
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0116) (0.0091) (0.0091)
t 3 -0.3082*** -0.3082*** -0.4179*** -0.2875*** -0.2875***
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0119) (0.0086) (0.0086)
t 4 -0.1991*** -0.1991*** -0.2616*** -0.1876*** -0.1876***
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0108) (0.0078) (0.0078)
t 5 -0.1023*** -0.1023*** -0.1326*** -0.0966*** -0.0966***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0083) (0.0064) (0.0064)
Sum 0.1040 0.1824 -0.3437 0.1130 0.4327
Wald Test 0.3010 1.3108 1.7860 0.3583 4.8594**
Table 6: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression of equation 1 in
which interventions are divided into purchases of EUR, a positive intervention, and
sales of EUR, a negative intervention. The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of
the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes the intervention
variable. t j denotes 5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients and the standard deviation
for the constant and the interventions are multiplied by 1.000.000 *, **, and ***
denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors
in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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Reaction function for DN Interventions
Full Sample
C 0***
(0.0615)
 t 1 0.0622***
(0.0185)
 t 2 0.0093
(0.0087)
 t 3 0.0439
(0.0255)
 t 4 0.006
(0.0061)
 t 5 0.0018
(0.0033)
 t 6 0.0302
(0.0180)
t 1 -303.3497**
(133.7626)
t 2 -338.9983**
(145.7333)
t 3 -394.9642***
(135.7151)
t 4 -278.0769**
(126.6711)
t 5 50.0422
(124.0949)
F-test 42.7194
R2 0.0079
Table 8: This table shows the estimates from a reaction function for DN interventions.
The independent variables are lags of the exchange rate returns, current and lagged
macro news, current and lagged Denmark/Euro-Area interest rate di¤erential, and
lags of the dependent variable. The coe¢ cient estimates associated with the constant,
current and lagged macro news, and current and lagged interest rate di¤erential are
not shown for ease of exposition.  t j denotes the intervention variable. t j denotes
5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the constant and the
interventions are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at
respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point
estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1: Interventions from reaction function
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.4421 5.7819 0.6102
(0.9418) (13.0090) (2.2810)
 U;t -1.5470*** -0.2780*** -0.0833
(0.5736) (0.0695) (0.0690)
 U;t 1 -1.6030*** -0.2610 -0.1530***
(0.6237) (0.1846) (0.0528)
 U;t 2 0.7580 0.0699 0.0390
(0.6920) (0.1769) (0.0685)
 U;t 3 -0.4750 -0.0234 -0.0541
(0.6469) (0.1158) (0.0790)
 U;t 4 1.3500** 0.1498 0.1110
(0.5914) (0.1251) (0.0700)
 U;t 5 1.7050** -0.1381 0.2903***
(0.7443) (0.1492) (0.0788)
 U;t 6 1.2380* 0.1027 0.1106
(0.6414) (0.1030) (0.0842)
t 1 -0.6386*** -0.7576*** -0.6136***
(0.0067) (0.0102) (0.0078)
t 2 -0.4518*** -0.5815*** -0.4262***
(0.0074) (0.0122) (0.0085)
t 3 -0.312*** -0.4169*** -0.2922***
(0.0071) (0.0124) (0.0080)
t 4 -0.2013*** -0.2611*** -0.1901***
(0.0064) (0.0111) (0.0072)
t 5 -0.102*** -0.1332*** -0.0963***
(0.0052) (0.0086) (0.0059)
Sum 0.14 -0.38 0.26
Wald Test Statistic 1.6639 1.8852 4.6832**
Table 9: The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily
DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate. The independent variables are current and
lagged unexpected intervention (denoted by  U;t j), and lags of the dependent variable
denoted by t j. Unexpected intervention is dened as the residual of the interven-
tion reaction function estimation (described in Section 5 and displayed in Table 6)
in an interval where actual intervention occurs, and zero otherwise. The coe¢ cients
and the standard deviations for the constant, the interventions and their sum are
multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic
values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1 with news variables
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.4403 - 0.6013
(0.9422) - (2.2802)
 t -0.0132*** - -0.0069
(0.0048) - (0.0058)
 t 1 -0.01295*** - -0.01268***
(0.0050) - (0.0050)
 t 2 0.00554 - 0.0051
(0.0057) - (0.0063)
 t 3 -0.00381 - -0.00468
(0.0055) - (0.0067)
 t 4 0.01133** - 0.00936
(0.0050) - (0.0059)
 t 5 0.01597** - 0.02232***
(0.0068) - (0.0066)
 t 6 0.01061* - 0.00992
(0.0055) - (0.0073)
t 1 -0.6385*** - -0.6135***
(0.0067) - (0.0078)
t 2 -0.4519*** - -0.4264***
(0.0074) - (0.0085)
t 3 -0.312*** - -0.2922***
(0.0071) - (0.0080)
t 4 -0.2012*** - -0.1899***
(0.0064) - (0.0072)
t 5 -0.1019*** - -0.0963***
(0.0052) - (0.0059)
Sum 0.0135 - 0.0225
Wald Test Statistic 2.2369 - 4.5985**
Table 10: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression using news vari-
ables for Denmark, the Euro Area, and Germany. The dependent variable is the rst
di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate. The interven-
tions are standardised to facilitate comparison with the news variable coe¢ cients. All
variables are standardized by dividing each variable by its sample standard deviation.
 t j denotes the intervention variable. t j;n denotes 5 min. fx returns. The co-
e¢ cients and the standard deviation for the constant is multiplied by 1.000.000 The
coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the news variables and interventions are mul-
tiplied by 1.000. There are not a su¢ cient amount of news to estimate the full model
for the rst model. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and
1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values
in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1 with news variables
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
DKUNEMP(0) -0.03 - -0.0334
(0.0280) - (0.0322)
DKUNEMP(-1) -0.0138 - -0.0114
(0.0109) - (0.0106)
DKTB(0) -0.019 - -0.0074
(0.0109) - (0.0111)
DKTB(-1) -0.0053 - 0.0069
(0.0098) - (0.0101)
DKCA(0) 0.0087 - 0.0079
(0.0148) - (0.0136)
DKCA(-1) 0.0125 - -0.0161
(0.0132) - (0.0093)
DKCPI(0) 0.0456 - 0.0482
(0.0491) - (0.0380)
DKCPI(-1) 0.0484** - 0.0192
(0.0219) - (0.0198)
DKGDP(0) -0.1132*** - -0.1177**
(0.0335) - (0.0501)
DKGDP(-1) 0.0183 - -0.0021
(0.0372) - (0.0398)
DKCC(0) 0.0152 - 0.0155
(0.0137) - (0.0144)
DKCC(-1) 0.0209** - 0.0213**
(0.0100) - (0.0104)
Table 11: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression using news vari-
ables for Denmark, the Euro Area, and Germany. The dependent variable is the
rst di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate. Macro
news variables capture news surprises as the di¤erence between actual announcement
and survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The estimations take into account
news regarding Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Cur-
rent Account (DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer Condence
(DKCC); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Produc-
tion (DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business
Climate Index (EABC). All variables are standardized by dividing each variable by
its sample standard deviation. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the news
variables and interventions are multiplied by 1.000. There are not a su¢ cient amount
of news to estimate the full model for the rst model. *, **, and *** denotes signi-
cance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the
point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1 with news variables
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
DEIFO(0) 0.0335** - 0.0338
(0.0162) - (0.0222)
DEIFO(-1) 0.0148 - -0.0389
(0.0139) - (0.0478)
DEGDP(0) -0.0192 - -0.0179
(0.0336) - (0.0329)
DEGDP(-1) -0.0043 - -0.0008
(0.0217) - (0.0229)
DEIP(0) -0.0095 - -0.0048
(0.0089) - (0.0067)
DEIP(-1) -0.026 - -0.0245
(0.0159) - (0.0177)
EACPI(0) -0.08* - 0.06
(0.0423) - (0.0378)
EAIP(-1) -0.02* - -0.03
(0.0128) - (0.0367)
EAIP(0) -0.0012 - 0.0074
(0.0167) - (0.0171)
EAIP(-1) -0.0006 - 0.0005
(0.0098) - (0.0103)
EABC(0) 0.0606*** - 0.0697***
(0.0198) - (0.0218)
EABC(-1) -0.0167 - 0.0272
(0.0254) - (0.0221)
Table 12: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression using news vari-
ables for Denmark, the Euro Area, and Germany. The dependent variable is the
rst di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate. Macro
news variables capture news surprises as the di¤erence between actual announcement
and survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The estimations take into account
news regarding Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Cur-
rent Account (DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer Condence
(DKCC); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Produc-
tion (DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business
Climate Index (EABC). All variables are standardized by dividing each variable by
its sample standard deviation. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the news
variables and interventions are multiplied by 1.000. There are not a su¢ cient amount
of news to estimate the full model for the rst model. *, **, and *** denotes signi-
cance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the
point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: 5 min. DKK/EUR spot exchange rate and interventions in mill. EUR over
the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. A positive intervention corresponds
to a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK. The upper and lower lines are the ERM
II deviation bands. Interventions are plotted against the central parity exchange rate
of 7.46038.
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The Intraday E¤ects of Central
Bank Intervention on Exchange
Rate Spreads
Rasmus Fatum and Jesper Pedersenyand Peter Norman
Sørensenz
Abstract
This paper investigates the intraday e¤ects of sterilized for-
eign exchange intervention on exchange rate spreads using o¢ cial
intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central bank.
Our main result is that intervention purchases and intervention
sales both exert a signicant inuence on exchange rate spreads
but in opposite directions: Intervention sales of EUR, on average,
reduce the spread while intervention purchases of EUR, on aver-
age, increase the spread. We also show that the signicant and
asymmetric e¤ects of intervention purchases and sales stem from
intervention carried out on "normal" days in terms of exchange
rate volatility while intervention appears to be overlooked by the
market when the market is volatilite.
Key words: Foreign Exchange Intervention; Intraday Data;
Exchange Rate Spreads
JEL Classications: D53; E58; F31; G15
Corresponding author. Fatum is also a member of the Economic Policy Re-
search Unit (EPRU) at the University of Copenhagen. This research was begun
while Pedersen was at Danmarks Nationalbankt. We thank Danmarks Nationalbank
for providing the o¢ cial intraday intervention data. The views expressed do not
necessarily reect the views of Danmarks Nationalbank.
yAddress: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede
6, 1455 Copenhagen K, and Nationalbanken, Havnegade 5, 1453 Copenhagen K.
Jesper.Pedersen@econ.ku.dk.
zAddress: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Studiestraede
6, 1455 Copenhagen K, and Nationalbanken, Havnegade 5, 1453 Copenhagen K.
Peter.norman.sorensen@econ.ku.dk.
41
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) e¤ects of Danish central
bank intervention in the Euro (EUR) market on exchange rate spreads.
The interventions under study are carried out by the Danish central bank
(Danmarks Nationalbank, henceforth DN) over the 1 January 2002 to 31
December 2004 time-period under the provisions of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM II).1 Proprietary data on o¢ cial intraday intervention
transactions provided by the DN, along with indicative 5-minute spot
bid and ask DKK/EUR exchange rate prices, facilitate our investiga-
tion. Our main result is that intervention purchases and intervention
sales both exert a signicant inuence on exchange rate spreads but in
opposite directions. The signicant and asymmetric e¤ects of interven-
tion purchases and sales stem from intervention carried out on normal
days in terms of exchange rate volatility while intervention appears to
be overlooked by the market dealers when the market is volatile.
While the literature investigating the exchange rate level and volatil-
ity e¤ects of intervention is vast, the literature on intervention and ex-
change rate spreads is extremely scarce.2 Existing contributions to the
latter literature are Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000), who analyze lower
frequency (daily) intervention data, and Chari (2007), who analyzes less
than accurate newswire reports of intervention as a proxy for o¢ cial
intraday interventions.3 Both studies conclude that, on average, inter-
vention increases the exchange rate spread.
Unlike their contributions, our study investigates the intraday e¤ects
of intervention on exchange rate spreads using accurate o¢ cial interven-
tion transactions data. We are the rst to do so.4
1Denmark has participated in ERM II since 1 January 1999. In ERM II, a bilateral
central rate and a deviation band is set for the currency of the participating country
via-á-vis the EUR, but not against the currency of the other member states. The
o¢ cial DKK/EUR central rate is 7.46038 DKK/EUR an the o¢ cial deviation band
is set to +/- 2.25 percent. The DKK has traded within an even narrower range of
+/- 0.50 percent around the Danish ERM II central rate. The o¢ cial deviation band
for all other ERM II member states is set to +/- 15 percent. For additional details
on the institutional aspects of ERM II and DN intervention see Fatum and Pedersen
(2007).
2See Humpage (2003) and Neely (2005) for recent surveys of the intervention
literature. See Hasbrouck (2007) for a overview of the market microstructure theory.
3Fischer (2006) illustrates the lack of accuracy of newswire reports in the context
of Swiss interventions.
4It is very rare that a central bank makes o¢ cial intraday intervention data avail-
able for research. The Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank, and now DN
are the only central banks that have made such data available. The Bank of Canada
and the Swiss National Bank have not intervened since 1998 and 1995, respectively.
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Our empirical research question is whether intervention exerts an in-
traday inuence on exchange rate spreads. In order to answer this ques-
tion we estimate time-series models of the exchange rate spread with
intervention as the focal explanatory variable. We carry out our base-
line estimations using OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances. As a methodological
robustness test we also estimate the baseline model using the two-step
weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and
Bollerslev (1998).
Using the same data and sample period as ours while assessing the
intraday e¤ects of intervention on exchange rate returns rather than on
exchange rate spreads, Fatum and Pedersen (2007) show that the period
under study encompasses a structural break, coinciding with a change in
the Danish monetary policy stance. We carry out a standard Wald test
and conrm that the break point identied in Fatum and Pedersen (2007)
also applies to the context of our study. Consequently, we estimate our
models over the full sample as well as separately across two sub-samples.
Fatum and Pedersen (2007) also show that while intervention pur-
chases of EUR are e¤ective in inuencing exchange rate returns over the
majority of the sample period, intervention sales of EUR are not.5 This
leads us to suspect that intervention purchases and sales may also af-
fect the exchange rate spread di¤erently. To test whether this is indeed
the case, we also estimate all our models with intervention purchases
of EUR and intervention sales of EUR entering as separate explanatory
variables.
Furthermore, we take into account the possibility that the impact
of intervention on exchange rate spreads depends on the state of the
market around the time intervention is carried out. Particularly, we
test whether interventions carried out on days when the exchange rate
market is characterized by high intraday volatility are more or less in-
uential than interventions that occur on other days. We do so by rst
distinguishing between intervention on high-volatilitydays (dened as
a day with either a signicant intraday volatility jump, i.e. a jump-day
By contrast, the DN intraday intervention data provides an opportunity to learn
about the real-time e¤ects of foreign exchange intervention carried out by a central
bank that is currently intervening.
5Fatum and Pedersen (2007) note that the one sub-period is associated with a
neutral Danish monetary policy stance while the other constitutes a period of Dan-
ish monetary policy easing both in absolute and relative terms (i.e. the interventions
that occur during the latter sub-period are either montary policy consistent or in-
consistent). Their main result is that intervention only a¤ects exchange rate returns
when the direction of intervention is consistent with the monetary policy stance.
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as dened in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007), or with a daily
realized volatility that is at least the average realized volatility of the
sample plus two times the standard deviation of the realized volatility
of the sample) and non-high-volatilitydays, i.e. normaldays and,
subsequently, by entering as separate variables interventions that occur
on high-volatilitydays and interventions that occur on normaldays.
In addition, we follow Naranjo and Nimalendran (2000) and others
and take into account the possibility that our intervention variable con-
tains an expected component, we control for macro news surprises, and
we include lags of the intervention variables to allow for the possibility
of delayed e¤ects.
Our baseline estimations with only one intervention variable included
(containing both intervention purchases and sales in one and the same
variable) suggest that intervention has no signicant intraday inuence
on the exchange rate spread. However, once we allow for the possibility
that purchases and sales can have di¤erent e¤ects, our results show that
intervention purchases as well as sales do in fact signicantly inuence
the exchange rate spread, but in opposite directions: Intervention sales
of EUR, on average, reduce the spread while intervention purchases of
EUR, on average, increase the spread. Apparently, the markets uncer-
tainty over the true exchange rate is higher when the DN has stepped
in to defend the DKK, while the opposite occurs when the DN signals
that the DKK is strong. Clearly, our nding illustrates the necessity
of distinguishing between intervention purchases and intervention sales
when assessing the inuence of intervention on exchange rate spreads.
Disentangling interventions on high-volatilitydays from interven-
tions on normal days while also distinguishing between intervention
purchases and intervention sales reveals that the signicant and asym-
metric e¤ects of intervention purchases and sales are not uniform across
intervention days but stem solely from the e¤ects of interventions that
are carried out on normaldays. In other words, interventions that oc-
cur on high-volatility days have no impact on the exchange rate spread,
i.e. interventions appear to be less relevant for the market dealers when
the market is volatile, while interventions that occur on normaldays
signicantly impact the exchange rate spread in the asymmetric manner
previously discussed.
Fatum and Pedersen (2007) point out that the Danish ERM II in-
tervention experience pertains to maintaining the exchange rate within
a narrow deviation band and, therefore, their ndings are applicable
to Denmark and other countries that intervene to keep their respective
exchange rates in narrow bands, but not necessarily to countries inter-
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vening to keep their respective exchange rates in wide deviation bands
or to countries with exible exchange rates. A similar disclaimer applies
to our study, i.e. data permitting, additional research is warranted in
order to shed light on whether our results are broadly applicable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present
the data and the econometric methodology, respectively. Section 4 dis-
cusses the results. Section 5 presents several robustness checks. Section
6 concludes.
2 Data
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR
market over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. Our sam-
ple period is determined by availability of the data. The data includes
the exact amount and time-stamp to the nearest minute obtained di-
rectly from the trade-sheet of each intervention transaction. Intervention
amounts are quoted in EUR and a positive amount denotes a purchase
of EUR against a sale of DKK. In accordance with the ERM II provi-
sions, the DN trader conducting an intervention operation is obligated
to write the amount and the exact time of the operation on the trade-
sheet immediately after the completion of each individual intervention
transaction. This information is forwarded to the ECB by the end of
the trading day, at the latest. Our intraday intervention data consists
of this extremely reliable information.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data.6 Our
sample consists of a total of 89 intervention days, encompassing a total
of 220 intervention transactions. On intervention days, the average in-
tervention amount is EUR 164 million. A total of 68 intervention days
consist of EUR purchases. Figure 1 shows that all interventions occur
when the DKK/EUR rate is in the interior of the deviation band.
The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by
Olsen and Associates, collected from commercial banks by Tenfore and
Oanda, and covers the full sample period. The data consists of the bid
and the o¤er spot exchange rate at the end of every 5-minute interval
over every 24-hour period. The quotes are indicative quotes, i.e. not
necessarily traded quotes. We follow Dacorogna, Muller, Nagler, Olsen,
and Pictet (1993) and lter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.7
6Given the condential nature of the intervention data, we are not at liberty to
display or describe this data in greater detail.
7Transactions bid and ask prices are not available for the DKK/EUR exchange
rate market.
45
It is standard in the intraday literature on widely traded currency
pairs (e.g. the USD/EUR, the USD/DEM, the USD/JPY, and the
USD/GBP) to dene a trading day to start at 21.05 GMT the night
before and end at 21.00 GMT on the evening of the trading day in ques-
tion (see Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993)) and, furthermore, to dene
a weekend to start at 21.05 GMT Friday and nish 21.00 GMT Sunday
(see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003)). The Danish ex-
change rate market, however, is di¤erent from the major exchange rate
markets in that there is very little or virtually no trading of the Danish
currency outside of standard Danish business hours (see Nationalbank
(2003a) and ECB (2004)). Therefore, we dene a trading day in the
Danish currency market to start at 8.00 GMT+1 and nish at 17.00
GMT+1.8 Consequently, our analysis considers a total of 752 trading
days consisting of a total of 80476 5-minute DKK/EUR exchange rate
returns.9 Importantly, our trading day denition encompasses all inter-
vention transactions in the period under study.
Table 2 summarizes key statistical properties of our 5-minute ex-
change rate spreads (dened as ask minus bid). As expected, the series
has fatter tails than a normal distribution, and the Bera-Jarque test
for normality is strongly rejected. The rejection is mainly attributed
to excess kurtosis. The spreads series is far from being a white-noise
process due to long memory, as evidenced by the Ljung-Box Q-test sta-
tistic which rejects that the rst 540 autocorrelations (corresponding to
one business-week) are jointly zero. This long memory can be attributed
to daily periodicity.
Danish and Euro-Area interest rates are obtained from the websites
of DN (www.nationalbanken.dk) and the ECB (www.ecb.int), respec-
tively. Time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-area macro announce-
ments and preceding survey expectations are obtained from Bloomberg.
Summary statistics regarding interest rates and macro news are available
from the authors upon request.
8This denition of a trading day carries over naturally to a denition of a weekend,
i.e. we dene a weekend to start at 17.05 GMT+1 Friday and nish at 8.00 GMT+1
Monday.
9We also deleted the following xed holidays from the analysis: 1 January,
Easter (3 holidays), Christmas (24/25/26 December), 31 December as well as 4
Denmark-specic holidays (Store Bededag, Kristi Himmelfartsdag, Anden Pinsedag,
Grundlovsdag).
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3 The Empirical Model
We model the response of the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread, St, as a
linear function of K lagged values of the spread itself and J lags of the
intervention variable (in absolute terms), It:
St = C +
KX
k=0
jSt k +
JX
j=0
jIt j + "t ; t = 1:::T (1)
As noted earlier, T=80476. We choose K=6 based on the Schwartz
and Akaike information criteria and we set J=0 in our baseline estima-
tions (we control for delayed e¤ects by setting K=12 in our robustness
estimations).10
To ensure that the long memory and the intraday periodicity of the
exchange rate spreads series does not invalidate standard errors, thereby
rendering the associated test statistics unreliable, we carry out the base-
line estimations using OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances.
As a methodological robustness test we also estimate the baseline
model using the two-step weighted least squares (WLS) procedure de-
veloped by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). In order to do so, we rst
estimate equation (1) by OLS in order to obtain the estimated residuals,
"^t. We then model the volatility pattern using these estimated residuals
and the following parameterization:
j"^tj= c1 + c2 +  ^tp
n
+
KX
k=0
kIt k (2)
+
 
QX
q=1
q cos

q2n
108

+ 'q sin

q2n
108
!
+ ut
where "^t is the residual of equation (1), and its absolute value proxies
for the volatility in the 5-minute interval t, c1 and c2 are normalizing
constants, n is the number of intervals in a day (in our case 108), ^t the
one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that contains
10We also include in the conditional mean model as additional explanatory variables
the distance from parity, i.e. a measure of the distance between the DKK/EUR
exchange rate and the central rate, as well as the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential.
Both variable proved insignicant in all estimations and were thus excluded form the
conditional mean model for the remainder of the analysis.
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interval t), q is a specic intraday calendar e¤ect, Q is the total number
of calendar e¤ects accounted for (Q=6, based on the Schwartz and the
Akaike information criteria), and ut denotes the residuals (assumed to
be standard normal).
We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the rst term after
the vector of constants) using the concept of realized volatility (RV),
calculated on 30 minute returns.11 Since the realized volatility forecast
cannot capture the observed cyclical intraday patterns (the slow decay
in the autocorrelations), we model the higher frequency periodicity by
inclusion of a Fourier exible form, see Gallant (1981).12 Consistent with
Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega (2003), who include their macro news variables in the volatility
equation, we include the intervention variable (i.e. our main news
variable) in the volatility model.
3.1 Structural break
In their study of the intraday e¤ects of DN interventions on DKK/EUR
exchange rate returns, Fatum and Pedersen (2007) show that a struc-
tural break occurred on 16 August 2002.13 They argue that since the
Danish deposit and lending rates were lowered (twice) in August 2002,
independently of the ECB who kept its key interest rates unchanged un-
til the end of 2002, the coinciding change in the monetary policy stance
provides the economic rationale for the statistical break point.
Since our data and sample period are the same as that of Fatum
and Pedersen (2007), we also take into account the possibility that the
same 16 August 2002 structural break a¤ects our study of the intraday
e¤ects of DN interventions on DKK/EUR exchange rate bid-ask spreads.
Using a standard Wald test we conrm that a structural break occurred
on 16 August 2002.14 Consequently, to allow for parameter instability
11RV is dened as the daily sum of squared returns and constitutes an unbiased,
e¢ cient and asymptotically consistent estimate of the true daily quadratic variation.
A key advantage of using RV is that this semi-parametric approach does not require
additional model estimation.
12A Fourier exible form consists of a number of sine- and cosine terms with varying
degrees of periodicity (the terms in the parenthesis of equation (2)) It allows for a
model specication as exible as possible, thereby enabling us to t the intraday
pattern of the residuals from equation (1).
13Fatum and Pedersen (2007) employ the change point test procedure of Andrews
(1993). This test does not require advance knowledge regarding the exact timing of
a potential change point.
14We use a standard Wald test rather than the Andrews (1993) procedure since,
given the ndings of Fatum and Pedersen (2007), we do have advance knowledge
regarding the suspected exact timing of the potential change point.
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and to ensure that our statistical inference is valid, we also carry out our
analysis separately on two sub-samples, the 1 January 2002 to 16 August
2002 period (sub-sample 1), and the 17 August 2002 to 31 December
2004 period (sub-sample 2).
4 Results
Table 3 displays the results of the baseline estimation of equation (1).
The rst column of Table 3 shows that for the full sample the coe¢ cient
estimate associated with contemporaneous intervention is insignicant.
Columns 2 and 3 show that this also the case for sub-samples 1 and 2.
These initial estimations would suggest that intervention has no intraday
inuence on the exchange rate spread.
As noted earlier, in their analysis of the intraday e¤ects of interven-
tion on exchange rate returns, Fatum and Pedersen (2007) show that
over the majority of the sample period only purchases of EUR are e¤ec-
tive in inuencing exchange rate returns while intervention sales of EUR
are not. Consequently, their ndings illustrate the importance of dis-
tinguishing between intervention purchases and sales when investigating
the e¤ects of intervention on exchange rate returns. To allow for the pos-
sibility of similar non-uniform e¤ects across intervention purchases and
sales in our context of analyzing exchange rate spreads, we re-estimate
the baseline model with intervention purchases and sales entering as
separate variables.
The results of the baseline estimation with separate intervention pur-
chases and sales variables (both in absolute terms) are displayed in Table
4. The full sample results reported in the rst column reveal that con-
temporaneous intervention purchases as well as contemporaneous sales
do indeed signicantly inuence the exchange rate spread but in oppo-
site directions. While intervention sales of EUR decrease the exchange
rate spread, intervention purchases of EUR increase the spread. The
second column displays the results pertaining to sub-sample 1. Since all
intervention carried out during sub-sample 1 are purchases of EUR, the
sub-sample 1 results are identical to the sub-sample 1 results displayed in
Table 3 and thus do not reveal any new insights. Sub-sample 2, however,
contain both intervention purchases and sales and, as the third column
of Table 3 shows, the sub-sample 2 results are qualitatively identical to
the results pertaining to the full sample (thereby implying that the full
sample results stem from the e¤ects of intervention during sub-sample
2).
Certainly, these results make clear the necessity of distinguishing
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between intervention purchases and intervention sales when assessing
the inuence of intervention on exchange rate spreads.
4.1 Intervention on High-Volatility Days
In order to test whether interventions that occur on high-volatility
days impact the exchange rate di¤erently, i.e. do interventions that
are carried out on high-volatilitydays exert more (or less) of an in-
uence on the exchange rate, we distinguish between intervention on
high-volatilitydays (dened as a day with either a signicant intra-
day volatility jump, i.e. a jump-dayas dened in Andersen, Bollerslev,
and Diebold (2007), or with a daily realized volatility that is at least the
average realized volatility of the sample plus two times the standard de-
viation of the realized volatility of the sample) and non-high-volatility
days, i.e. normaldays. Subsequently, we enter as separate variables
interventions that occur on high-volatilitydays and interventions that
occur on normaldays in our estimations.
Table 5 displays the results for all interventions divided into separate
high- and non-high volatility day interventions, and Table 6 displays the
results for intervention sales and purchases divided into separate high-
and non-high volatility day interventions, respectively. Table 5 does not
provide any new insights as the variable containing all interventions is
insignicant with respect to interventions carried out on high-volatility
days as well as with respect to interventions carried out on non-high-
volatility days. This simply conrms the necessity of taking into account
that intervention purchases and sales impact the exchange rate spread
in opposite directions.
Table 6, however, reveals that the signicant and asymmetric e¤ects
of intervention purchases and sales are not uniform across intervention
days but stem solely from the e¤ects of interventions that are carried out
on non-high-volatility days. Particularly, our results show that interven-
tions that occur on high-volatility days have no impact on the exchange
rate spread, i.e. interventions appear to be overlooked by the market
when the market is volatile, while interventions that occur on normal
days signicantly impact the exchange rate spread in the asymmetric
manner previously discussed.
5 Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we take into account the
possibility that the intervention variable contains an expected compo-
nent, control for macro news surprises, carry out the analysis using a
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di¤erent econometric procedure, and include lags of the intervention
variables to allow for the possibility of delayed e¤ects.
First, while there is no reason to believe that intervention is trig-
gered by the contemporaneous exchange rate spread (i.e. the change in
exchange rate spread that occurs over the 5-minute interval within which
intervention is carried out). Fatum and Pedersen (2007) show that in-
tervention is correlated with recent (lagged) exchange rate movements
and with recent (lagged) intervention even at the intraday frequency.15
Accordingly, our intervention variable is comprised of an unexpected
as well as an expected component. To ensure that failure to disentan-
gle the latter component from the intervention variable does not lead
to an underestimation of the true impact of intervention on exchange
rate spreads, we therefore disentangle the expected component from the
intervention variable and, in turn, re-assess the e¤ect of intervention
on exchange rate spreads employing only the unexpected component of
intervention.16 Specically, we follow Fatum and Pedersen (2007) and
estimate a central bank reaction function to capture the expected com-
ponent of the intraday intervention variable. In turn, we subtract the
expected component of intervention from the actual intervention variable
in intervals where the latter is non-zero. The resulting series constitutes
a proxy for unexpected intervention variable.17 The results of estimat-
ing the e¤ects of unexpected intervention on exchange rate spreads are
displayed in Tables 8 (all interventions in one variable) and 9 (sepa-
rate intervention sales and purchases variables). As the tables show, the
results are qualitatively identical to the comparable estimation results
from estimations that do not distinguish between actual intervention and
unexpected intervention (Tables 3 and 4).18
Second, to ensure that our estimated e¤ects of intervention are not
tainted by the coincidental arrival of macro news, we extend our analy-
sis to include time-stamped Danish, German, and Euro-area macro sur-
prises. Specically, we include macro surprises regarding Danish Un-
employment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Current Account
(DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer Condence
15See Neely (2008) for a survey-based assessment of what prompts central banks
to intervene in the foreign exchange market.
16In the context of exchange rates and monetary policy news, Fatum and Schol-
nick (2008) show that failure to disentangle the surprise component from the actual
monetary policy change leads to an underestimation of the impact of monetary policy.
17The results of the reaction function are displayed in table 7.
18We also estimate the e¤ects of unexpected intervention using proxies derived from
alternative reaction function specications with di¤erent lag structures and with lags
of the distance from parity measure included as an additional explanatory variable.
Our results are not sensitive to these alternative reaction function specications.
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(DKCC); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Indus-
trial Production (DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Produc-
tion (EAIP), and Business Climate Index (EABC). We measure macro
surprises as the di¤erence between macro announcement and preceding
survey expectation obtained from Bloomberg. To facilitate the compar-
ison of the coe¢ cient estimates of the macro surprises to the coe¢ cient
estimates of intervention, we follow Fatum and Pedersen (2007) and
standardize the macro news as well as the intervention variable (i.e. for
each variable we divide the surprise by its sample standard deviation).19
The results pertaining to the model where intervention purchases and
sales enter as separate variables are displayed in Table 10 and 11.20 Our
results show that a few of the macro surprises inuence the DKK/EUR
exchange rate spread and, more importantly, that the baseline results re-
garding the asymmetric and signicant e¤ects of intervention purchases
and sales remain unchanged.21
Third, we re-estimate the baseline model using the WLS procedure
of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). The WLS results pertaining to the
conditional mean equation are displayed in Table 12 and are qualitatively
identical to the conditional mean results based on the less sophisticated
HAC baseline estimation procedure.22
Fourth, in order to test for delayed e¤ects of intervention, we re-
estimate our baseline models with 12 lags of intervention included (i.e.
we set J=12 in Equation (1)). The results are displayed in Tables 16
(all interventions in one variable) and 17 (separate intervention sales and
purchases variables). Table 16 shows that, with the exception of a mar-
19Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and
Vega (2003) show that the conditional mean of the exchange rate generally adjusts
immediately (i.e. jumps) in response to macro news. Accordingly, we include only
the contemporanuous and the rst lag of the macro surprises in our estimations.
20Sub-sample 1 is too short to encompass a su¢ cient number of macro surprises
for a meaningful estimation of the inuence of macro news.
21The (absolute) magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates associated with the stan-
dardized macro surprise are similar to the (absolute) magnitude of the coe¢ cient
estimates associated with the standardized interventions, thereby showing that the
relative inuence of intervention on exchange rate spreads is comparable to the rel-
ative inuence of most macro surprises. A similar result is found in Fatum and
Pedersen (2007) who show that the relative inuence of intervention on exchange
rate returns is comparable to the relative inuence of macro surprises.
22Tables 13 through 15 show the results of the WLS (OLS) estimation of the volatil-
ity equation (equation (2)) associated with the model where intervention purchases
and sales enter as separate variables. Interestingly, while intervention purchases and
intervention sales impact the conditional mean of the exchange rate spread in oppo-
site directions, these tables show that intervention purchases and sales both reduce
the volatility of the exchange rate spread.
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ginally signicant 11th lag associated with the full sample estimation,
we nd no signicant e¤ect of intervention when we do not distinguish
between intervention sales and intervention purchases. Table 17 shows
that, once again we nd asymmetric and signicant contemporaneous
e¤ects of intervention sales and purchases, consistent with what we have
previously discussed. When we distinguish between purchases and sales,
the 4th lag of intervention sales and the 11th lag of intervention pur-
chases are also signicant across both the full sample and sub-sample 2.
Their respective signs are consistent with the respective signs associated
with the previously discussed contemporaneous e¤ects.
In sum, all our robustness checks conrm that intervention purchases
and intervention sales both exert a signicant inuence on exchange rate
spreads but in opposite directions.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) e¤ects of intervention
on bid-ask exchange rate spreads using proprietary intraday intervention
data provided by the Danish central bank and indicative 5-minute spot
bid and ask DKK/EUR exchange rate quotes. All the interventions
under study are carried out in the DKK/EUR market over the 1 January
2002 to 31 December 2004 period.
It is very rare that a central bank makes o¢ cial intraday intervention
data available for research. It is, therefore, not surprising that existing
studies of the e¤ects of intervention on exchange rate spreads are forced
to either use less than accurate newswire reports of intervention in order
to analyze the intraday e¤ects of intervention or use o¢ cial daily inter-
vention data to analyze the daily e¤ects of intervention. Our study is
the rst to analyze the intraday e¤ects of intervention on exchange rate
spreads using o¢ cial, time-stamped intraday intervention data.
We test whether intervention exerts an intraday inuence on ex-
change rate spreads by estimating time-series models of the exchange
rate spread with intervention as the focal explanatory variable. In par-
ticular, we estimate OLS with HAC standard errors and covariances and,
as a methodological robustness check, we also employ the two-step WLS
procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998).
We take into account the possibility that intervention purchases and
sales may a¤ect the exchange rate spread di¤erently and, consequently,
estimate models with intervention purchases of EUR and intervention
sales of EUR entering as separate explanatory variables. We also take
into account the possibility that the impact of intervention on exchange
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rate spreads depends on the state of the market around the time inter-
vention is carried out and distinguish between intervention carried out
on high-volatilitydays and intervention carried out on normaldays.
Our main result is that intervention purchases and intervention sales
both exert a signicant inuence on exchange rate spreads, but in op-
posite directions: Intervention sales of EUR aimed at appreciating the
domestic currency, on average, reduce the spread, while intervention pur-
chases of EUR aimed at depreciating the domestic currency, on average,
increase the spread. Clearly, this result illustrates the necessity of dis-
tinguishing between intervention purchases and intervention sales when
assessing the inuence of intervention on exchange rate spreads. We also
show that these signicant and asymmetric e¤ects of intervention pur-
chases and sales stem from intervention carried out on normaldays
in terms of exchange rate volatility, while intervention appears to be
overlooked by the market when carried out when the market is volatile.
54
References
Almeida, A., C. Goodhart, and R. Payne (1998): The E¤ects of
Macroeconomic News on High Frequency Exchange Rate Behavior,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33, 383408.
Andersen, T. G., and T. Bollerslev (1998): Deutsche Mark-
Dollar Volatility: Intraday Activity Patterns, Macroeconomic An-
nouncements, and Longer-Run Dependencies, Journal of Finance,
53, 219265.
Andersen, T. G., T. Bollerslev, and F. X. Diebold (2007):
Roughing It Up: Including Jump Components in the Measurement,
Modeling, and Forecasting of Return volatility,Revies of Economics
and Statistics, 89, 701720.
Andersen, T. G., T. Bollerslev, F. X. Diebold, and C. Vega
(2003): Micro E¤ects of Macro Announcements: Real-Time Price
Discovery in Foreign Exchange,American Economic Review, 93, 38
62.
Andrews, D. (1993): Test for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point,Econometrica, 61, 821856.
Bollerslev, T., and I. Domowitz (1993): Trading Patterns and
Prices in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market, Journal of Fi-
nance, 48, 14211443.
Chari, A. (2007): Heterogeneous Market-Making in Foreign Exchange
Markets: Evidence from Individual Bank Responses to General Bank
Intervention,Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 39, 11371161.
Dacorogna, M. M., U. A. Muller, R. J. Nagler, R. B. Olsen,
and O. V. Pictet (1993): A Geographical Model for the Daily and
Weekly Seasonal Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market,Journal
of International Money and Finance, 12, 413438.
ECB (2004): The monetary policy of the ECB, European Central
Bank, Frankfurt.
Fatum, R., and J. Pedersen (2007): Real-Time E¤ects of Cen-
tral Bank Intervention in the Euro-Market,Danmarks Nationalbank
Working Papering Paper no. 46-2007.
Fatum, R., and B. Scholnick (2008): Monetary Policy News and
Exchange Rate Responses: Do Only Surprises Matter?, Journal of
Banking and Finance, 32, 10761086.
Fischer, A. M. (2006): On The Inaccuracy of Newswire Reports
for Empirical Research on Foreign interventions,Journal of Interna-
tional Money and Finance, 25, 12261240.
Gallant, A. R. (1981): On the Bias in Flexible Functional Forms
and Essentially Unbiased Form: The Fourier Flexible Form,Journal
of Econometrics, 15, 211245.
55
Hasbrouck, J. (2007): Empirical Market Microstructure. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York., rst edn.
Humpage, O. (2003): Goverment Intervention in the Foreign Ex-
change Market,Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper
no. 03-15.
Naranjo, A., and M. Nimalendran (2000): Government Inter-
vention and Adverse Selection Costs in Foreign Exchange Markets,
Review of Financial Studies, 13, 453477.
Nationalbank, D. (2003a): Monetary Policy of Denmark, second
edition, Danmarks Nationalbank, Copenhagen.
Neely, J. C. (2005): An Analysis of Recent Studies of the E¤ect of
Foreign Exchange Intervention, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Working Paper no. 05-30.
(2008): Central Bank Authorities Beliefs about Foreign Ex-
change Intervention, Journal of International Money and Finance,
27, 125.
56
7 Tables
Daily Intervention
Number of Interventions Average Amount
All 89 164
Purchases 68 158
Sales 21 -182
Intraday Interventions
Number of Interventions Average Amount
All 220 67
Purchases 157 69
Sales 63 61
Table 1: This table shows summary Statistics for the Invervention Variable. The av-
erage amount is denoted in millions of Euros. Data source: Danmarks Nationalbank
Sample period: 1 January 2002 31 December 2004
Summary Statistics for bid-ask Spreads
Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis
0.019 0.0315 3.0272 12.5202**
(0.001) (-) (0.0080) (0.0170)
Minimum Maximum BJ-test for Normality LB Q-test (5-day lag)
0 0.3083 426800*** 38942***
[5.9915] [3.8415]
Table 2: Data runs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. The data consists
of 80.476 observations on DKK/EUR exchange rate. The spreads are calculated from
bid- and ask prices from Olsen Financial Technologies. The data consists of 80476
observations of DKK/EUR exchange rate bid - and ask prices. The exchange rate
spreads are calculated as ask minus bid prices. *, **, and *** denotes signicance
at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below the point
estimates. Critical values in [].
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Baseline Regression and subsample
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 jIt k + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 t 1,7278 0,2822 1,9319
(1,4013) (1,9821) (1,7399)
C 0,0021*** 0,0042*** 0,0023***
(0,0001) (0,0004) (0,0001)
t 1 0,3234*** 0,0987*** 0,3381***
(0,0095) (0,0132) (0,0102)
t 2 0,1981*** 0,1243*** 0,1974***
(0,0077) (0,0119) (0,0084)
t 3 0,1161*** 0,0714*** 0,1154***
(0,0074) (0,0119) (0,0082)
t 4 0,0974*** 0,0910*** 0,0938***
(0,0074) (0,0125) (0,0080)
t 5 0,0691*** 0,0783*** 0,0650***
(0,0079) (0,0133) (0,0086)
t 6 0,0862*** 0,0896*** 0,0828***
(0,0067) (0,0110) (0,0073)
R2 0,58 0,10 0,60
Number of Observations 220 58 162
Table 3: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions
on bid-ask spreads. I denotes absolute intervention. S denotes the bid-ask spread
measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute intervention variable.
t j denotes coe¢ cients on contemporanous and lagged 5 min. fx spreads. The coe¢ -
cients for the constant, the interventions and their standard deviations are multiplied
by 100.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per
cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Baseline Regression and subsample
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 jI
Purc
t j +
J
j=1 jI
Sales
t j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample II
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
 t -2,1529** 3,5530* -0,2304** 0,4965*
(1,0658) (1,8655) (0,1074) (0,2634)
C 0,0021*** 0,0021*** 0,0023*** 0,0023***
(0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001)
t 1 0,3233*** 0,3233*** 0,3380*** 0,3380***
(0,0095) (0,0095) (0,0102) (0,0102)
t 2 0,1981*** 0,1981*** 0,1974*** 0,1974***
(0,0077) (0,0077) (0,0084) (0,0084)
t 3 0,1161*** 0,1161*** 0,1155*** 0,1155***
(0,0074) (0,0074) (0,0082) (0,0082)
t 4 0,0974*** 0,0974*** 0,0938*** 0,0938***
(0,0074) (0,0074) (0,0080) (0,0080)
t 5 0,0691*** 0,0691*** 0,0650*** 0,0650***
(0,0079) (0,0079) (0,0086) (0,0086)
t 6 0,0862*** 0,0862*** 0,0829*** 0,0829***
(0,0068) (0,0068) (0,0072) (0,0072)
R2 0,60 0,60
Number of Observations 157 63 99 63
Table 4: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions on
bid-ask spreads. I denotes absolute intervention purchases or sales. S denotes the bid-
ask spread measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute intervention
variable. t j denotes coe¢ cients on contemporanous and lagged 5 min. fx spreads.
The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and their standard deviations are
multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Interventions and Volatility
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 jI
Purc;H:vol
t j +
J
j=1 jI
Sales;H:vol
t j
+Jj=0 jI
Purc;L:vol
t j +
J
j=1 jI
Sales;L:vol
t j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample 2
High Vol day Low Vol day High Vol day Low Vol day
Sales
 t 0,6682 -3,0099*** 0,5164 -3,1693***
(0,8225) (1,0592) (0,8217) (1,0660)
Number of Observations 70 87 30 69
Purchases
 t 0,6505 5,8077*** -1,2167 7,7709***
(2,8653) (2,3141) (5,4948) (2,6954)
Number of Observations 19 44 19 44
R2 0,58 0,60
Table 6: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions on
bid-ask spreads in which interventions are partitioned into interventions that fall on
high/low volatility days. A high volatility day is dened as a day with a signicant
intraday volatility "jump" as dened in Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold, 2007 and
days with a RV higher than two times the standard deviation of the RV though the
sample. A low volatility day is dened as all other intervention days. I denotes
absolute intervention purchases or sales. S denotes the bid-ask spread measured in
pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute intervention variable. Estimates of
the coe¢ cients for the contemporanous and lagged 5 min. fx spreads are not shown
for brevity. The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and their standard
deviations are multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively
the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Reaction Function
It = +Kk=0t kSt k +
J
j=1 jIt j + "t
C 0***
(0,0167)
 t 1 0,0627***
(0,0185)
 t 2 0,0097
(0,0087)
 t 3 0,0443
(0,0255)
 t 4 0,0065
(0,0061)
 t 5 0,0023
(0,0034)
 t 6 0,0307
(0,0181)
t 1 -304,48**
(133,82)
t 2 -340,50**
(145,83)
t 3 -396,42***
(135,78)
t 4 -279,28**
(126,78)
t 5 49,367
(124,10)
F-test 51***
R2 0,0075
Table 7:  t j denotes the intervention variable. t j;n denotes 5 min. fx re-
turns. The coe¢ cients for current and lagged macro news, and current and lagged
Denmark/Euro-Area interest rate di¤erential are not shown for ease of exposition.
*, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level.
Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Intervention e¤ects from reaction function on spreads
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 
unexp
j It j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 unexpt 1,7278 0,2668 1,9362
(1,4153) (1,9865) (1,7594)
C 0,0021*** 0,0042*** 0,0023***
(0,0001) (0,0004) (0,0001)
t 1 0,3234*** 0,0987*** 0,3381***
(0,0095) (0,0132) (0,0102)
t 2 0,1981*** 0,1243*** 0,1974***
(0,0077) (0,0119) (0,0084)
t 3 0,1161*** 0,0714*** 0,1154***
(0,0074) (0,0119) (0,0082)
t 4 0,00974 0,091*** 0,0938***
(0,0074) (0,0125) (0,0080)
t 5 0,0691*** 0,0783*** 0,065***
(0,0079) (0,0133) (0,0086)
t 6 0,0862*** 0,0897*** 0,0828***
(0,0067) (0,0110) (0,0073)
R2 0,58 0,10 0,60
Number of Observations 220 58 162
Table 8: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute unexpected in-
terventions estimated from the reaction function on bid-ask spreads. The unexpected
intervention is dened as the residual of the intervention reaction function estima-
tion (displayed in table 7) in an interval in which actual intervention occurs, and
zero otherwise. S denotes the bid-ask spread measured in pips. I denotes absolute
intervention.  unexpt j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute unexpected intervention
variable. t j denotes coe¢ cients on contemporanous and lagged 5 min. fx spreads.
The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and their standard deviations are
multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Intervention e¤ects from reaction function on spreads
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 
unexp
j I
Sale=Purc
t j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample II
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
 unexpt -2,2089** 3,5643* -2,3623** 4,9926*
(1,0720) (1.8814) (1,0806) (2,6572)
C 0,0021*** 0,0023*** 0,0023*** 0,0023***
(0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001) (0,0001)
t 1 0,3233*** 0,3380*** 0,3380*** 0,3380***
(0,0095) (0,0102) (0,0102) (0,0102)
t 2 0,1981*** 0,1974*** 0,1974*** 0,1974***
(0,0077) (0,0084) (0,0084) (0,0084)
t 3 0,1161*** 0,1155*** 0,1155*** 0,1155***
(0,0074) (0,0082) (0,0082) (0,0082)
t 4 0,0974*** 0,0938*** 0,0938*** 0,0938***
(0,0074) (0,0080) (0,0080) (0,0080)
t 5 0,0691*** 0,0650*** 0,0650*** 0,0650***
(0,0079) (0,0086) (0,0086) (0,0086)
t 6 0,0862*** 0,0829*** 0,0829*** 0,0829***
(0,0067) (0,0073) (0,0000) (0,0073)
R2 0,58 0,60
Number of Observations 157 63 99 44
Table 9: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute unexpected in-
terventions estimated from the reaction function on bid-ask spreads. The unexpected
intervention is dened as the residual of the intervention reaction function estima-
tion (displayed in table 7) in an interval in which actual intervention occurs, and
zero otherwise. I denotes absolute intervention. S denotes the bid-ask spread mea-
sured in pips.  unexpt j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute unexpected intervention
variable. t j denotes coe¢ cients on contemporanous and lagged 5 min. fx spreads.
The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and their standard deviations are
multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Interventions and News
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 
Purc=Sales
j It j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample 2
Interventions
 Salest -0,0014* -0.0015**
(0.0007) (0.0007)
 Purc:t 0,0017* 0.0023*
(0.0009) (0.0012)
Danish News
DKUNEMPt 0,0104 0,0108
(0,0060) (0,0060)
DKUNEMPt 1 0,0081 0,0102**
(0,0048) (0,0044)
DKTBt 0,0001 0,0045
(0,0040) (0,0041)
DKTBt 1 -0,0027** -0,0035
(0,0017) (0,0021)
DKCAt -0,0019 -0,0112***
(0,0046) (0,0035)
DKCAt 1 -0,0028 -0,0044
(0,0007) (0,0043)
DKCPIt -0,0117** 0,0138
(0,0051) (0,0150)
DKCPIt 1 0,0056 -0,0048
(0,0056) (0,0078)
DKGDPt -0,0024 -0,0085
(0,0111) (0,0099)
DKGDPt 1 -0,0196** -0,0274***
(0,0088) (0,0054)
DKCCt 0,0122*** 0,0120**
(0,0048) (0,0049)
DKCCt 1 -0,0061** -0,0065**
(0,0028) (0,0029)
Table 10: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions on
bid-ask spreads and macroeconomic news. I denotes absolute interventions standard-
ized by its sample standard deviation to facilitate comparison. S denotes the bid-ask
spread measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the standardized absolute
intervention variable. Newsh;t denotes a vector of macroeconomic news variables.
Macro news variables are dened as the di¤erence between actual announcement and
survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The estimation includes news regard-
ing Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Current Account
(DKCA); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Production
(DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business Cli-
mate Index (EABC). All variables are standardized by dividing each variable by its
sample standard deviation. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10,
5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates.
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Interventions and News
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 
Purc=Sales
j It j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample 2
German News
DEIFOt -0,0095** -0,0101***
(0,0039) (0,0038)
DEIFOt 1 0,0037 0,0018
(0,0037) (0,0045)
DEGDPt -0,0150*** -0,0155***
(0,0026) (0,0026)
DEGDPt 1 -0,0057*** -0,0057***
(0,0020) (0,0020)
DEIPt 0,0075* 0,0035
(0,0040) (0,0033)
DEIPt 1 0,0031 0,0070
(0,0062) (0,0075)
Euro Area News
EACPIt -0,0051 -0,0053
(0,0033) (0,0058)
EACPIt 1 0,0031 0,0044
(0,0026) (0,0033)
EAIPt 0,0036 0,0029
(0,0028) (0,0031)
EAIPt 1 -0,0011 -0,0023
(0,0026) (0,0023)
EABCt -0,0212 -0,0355
(0,0187) (0,0243)
EABCt 1 0,0035 0,0134
(0,0093) (0,0098)
R2 0,58 0,60
Table 11: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions on
bid-ask spreads and macroeconomic news announcements. I denotes absolute inter-
ventions standardized by its sample standard deviation to facilitate comparison. S
denotes the bid-ask spread measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the stan-
dardized absolute intervention variable. Newsh;t denotes a vector of macroeconomic
news variables. Macro news variables capture news surprises as the di¤erence between
actual announcement and survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The esti-
mation includes news regarding Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance
(DKTB), Current Account (DKCA); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP),
and Industrial Production (DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production
(EAIP), and Business Climate Index (EABC). All variables are standardized by di-
viding each variable by its sample standard deviation. *, **, and *** denotes signi-
cance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point
estimates.
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2WLS of Baseline Regressions
Interventions Sales Purchases
 t 1,0222 -2,1853* 3,0219**
(1,0385) (1,1259) (1,4767)
Number of Observations 220 63 157
Table 12: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions on
bid-ask spreads estimated using the two-stage weighted least squares methodology from
Andersen et al. 2003. Only the coe¢ cients on the absolute interventions, denoted by
 t j, are shown for brevity. The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and
their standard deviations are multiplied by 100.000. R2 is not applicable
to the two-stage WLS estimation procedure. *, **, and *** denotes signicance
at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point
estimates.
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2WLS, Volatility
"^t = c+ 
^tp
n
+
PK
k=0 kIt k +
PQ
q=1

q cos

q2n
108

+ 'q sin

q2n
108

+ ut
C 0.1414** Normalising Constant I -0.1000**
(0.0562) (0.0423)
Normalising Constant II 0.0118** Realised Volatility 55.182***
(0.0051) (0.8613)
Sine terms Cosine terms
1 0.0019 '1 -0.0060***
(0.0018) (0.0024)
2 0.0013 '2 -0.0016***
(0.0007 (0.0003)
3 0.0009*** '3 -0.0004***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
4 0.0006*** '4 -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0000)
5 0.0005*** '5 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001)
6 0.0003*** '6 0.0019***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Dummy terms
1 0.0023** 2 0.0046**
(0.0012) (0.0008)
3 0.0026**
(0.0008)
Interventions
 t -0.3721***  t 1 -0.3889***
(0.11471) (0.1121)
 t 2 -0.2644*  t 3 -0.2102
(0.1338) (0.1471)
 t 4 -0.3710***  t 5 -0.4104***
(0.1144) (0.1345)
 t 6 -0.2830
(0.1571)
R2 0.12
Table 13: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regres-
sion. The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatility mea-
sure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, and interventions,  t j. j denote dummies
which captures intra-day spikes in volatility due to market openings/closings, and
moneymarket clearing. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. The coe¤cient and standard deviation for the interventions are
multiplied by 10.000. Standard errors in () below point estimates. Subscript, besides
for the dummies, denotes lags.
68
2WLS, Volatility Equation
"^t = c+ 
^tp
n
+
PK
k=0 kI
Purc=Sales
t k +
PQ
q=1

q cos

q2n
108

+ 'q sin

q2n
108

+ ut
C 0.1410** Normalising Constant I -0.0997**
(0.0562) (0.0423)
Normalising Constant II 0.0118** Realised Volatility 55.337***
(0.0052) (0.8607)
Sine terms Cosine terms
1 0.0018 '1 -0.0060***
(0.0018) (0.0024)
2 0.0013 '2 -0.0016***
(0.0007 (0.0003)
3 0.0009*** '3 -0.0004***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
4 0.0006*** '4 -0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
5 0.0005*** '5 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001)
6 0.0003*** '6 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Table 14: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regres-
sion. The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatility mea-
sure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, and interventions,  t j. j denote dummies
which captures intra-day spikes in volatility due to market openings/closings, and
moneymarket clearing. The coe¤cient and standard deviation for the interventions
are multiplied by 10.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates. Subscript, besides
for the dummies, denotes lags.
69
2WLS, Volatility Equation, continued
Dummy terms
1 0.0023** 2 0.0045**
(0.0012) (0.0008)
3 0.0026**
(0.0008)
Purchases Int. Sales
 t -0.2224*  t -0.5007**
(0.1172) (0.2354)
 t 1 -0.3704**  t 1 -0.4093**
(0.1349) (0.2087)
 t 2 -0.1923  t 2 -0.4508
(0.1486) (0.2655)
 t 3 -0.0282  t 3 -0.6038**
(0.1829) (0.2206)
 t 4 -0.3753***  t 4 -0.3365
(0.1136) (0.2579)
 t 5 -0.3951***  t 5 -0.4126
(0.1316) (0.3174)
 t 6 -0.2055  t 6 -0.3000
(0.1679) (0.2782)
R2 0.12
Table 15: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regres-
sion. The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatility mea-
sure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, and interventions,  t j. j denote dummies
which captures intra-day spikes in volatility due to market openings/closings, and
moneymarket clearing. The coe¤cient and standard deviation for the interventions
are multiplied by 10.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5,
and 1 per cent level. Standard errors in () below point estimates. Subscript, besides
for the dummies, denotes lags.
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Baseline Regression and subsamples with 12 lags
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 jIt j + "t
Full Sample Subsample I Subsample II
 t 1,6810 0,2775 1,9135
(1,4037) (1,9976) (1,7446)
 t 1 -0,5042 -2,4392** -0,0225
(1,1577) (1,1214) (1,4798)
 t 2 0,2932 -0,8658 0,4518
(1,2884) (1,8811) (1,6052)
 t 3 -1,1781 0,7895 -1,9946
(1,6851) (1,5533) (2,1954)
 t 4 0,2541 -3,1637*** 1,3806
(1,1928) (0,7460) (1,5351)
 t 5 -1,2533 -1,8947 -1,3343
(1,4401) (1,3262) (1,8452)
 t 6 -0,7760 1,2344 -1,5952
(1,6262) (1,6162) (2,1093)
 t 7 -1,3256 -2,2094 -1,0437
(1,5610) (1,6510) (1,9900)
 t 8 0,2967 -2,0304 0,7409
(1,2793) (1,6057) (1,6050)
 t 9 1,2481 -2,7234*** 2,2612
(1,6773) (0,9440) (2,1845)
 t 10 0,6611 -0,7754 0,7604
(2,0785) (1,4467) (2,7280)
 t 11 3,1952* 1,0125 3,5684
(1,7536) (1,8282) (2,2417)
 t 12 0,7215 -1,2472 1,1388
(1,8260) (1,5018) (2,3663)
R2 0,58 0,10 0,60
Table 16: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions
on bid-ask spreads. I denotes absolute intervention purchases or sales. S denotes
the bid-ask spread measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute
intervention variable. Estimates of the coe¢ cients for the contemporanous and lagged
5 min. fx spreads are not shown for brevity. The coe¢ cients for the constant, the
interventions and their standard deviations are multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and ***
denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors
in () below point estimates.
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Baseline Regression and subsamples with 12 lags
St = +Kk=1t kSt k +
J
j=0 jI
Purc
t j
+Jj=1 jI
Sales
t j + "t
Full Sample Sub-sample II
Sales Purchases Sales Purchases
 t -2,1819* 3,4503* -2,3237** 4,9226*
(1,1248) (1,8686) (1,1332) (2,6384)
 t 1 0,7898 -1,0935 0,6903 -0,5735
(1,4005) (1,5603) (1,3866) (2,3259)
 t 2 -0,3360 0,5531 -0,4756 1,0895
(1,4027) (1,7141) (1,4055) (2,4661)
 t 3 -2,7695*** -0,4982 -2,8887*** -1,4359
(0,7827) (2,3915) (0,7967) (3,6408)
 t 4 0,9923 -0,1608 0,9034 1,6067
(1,9388) (1,4910) (1,9374) (2,2367)
 t 5 -0,5029 -1,6062 -0,6291 -1,6696
(2,4431) (1,6822) (2,4688) (2,4661)
 t 6 2,2341 -2,0190 2,1208 -3,8539
(1,8347) (2,1039) (1,8365) (3,1113)
 t 7 0,6056 -2,1833 0,4538 -1,9539
(2,3389) (1,9113) (2,3423) (2,8315)
 t 8 0,5591 0,2652 0,4162 1,1528
(1,1137) (1,7543) (1,1105) (2,5403)
 t 9 -0,6302 1,9709 -0,7766 4,2187
(1,2147) (2,3117) (1,2158) (3,4562)
 t 10 1,7767 0,0934 1,6450 -0,0721
(2,7288) (2,7150) (2,7190) (4,1744)
 t 11 -0,6181 4,8293* -0,7826 6,5795*
(1,0114) (2,4403) (1,0110) (3,5576)
 t 12 0,1382 1,1181 -0,0007 2,1484
(1,8617) (2,5257) (1,8555) (3,8590)
R2 0,58 0,60
Table 17: This table shows the estimates of a regression of absolute interventions
on bid-ask spreads. I denotes absolute intervention purchases or sales. S denotes
the bid-ask spread measured in pips.  t j denotes the coe¢ cient on the absolute
intervention variable. Estimates of the coe¢ cients for the contemporanous and lagged
5 min. fx spreads are not shown for brevity. The coe¢ cients for the constant, the
interventions and their standard deviations are multiplied by 100.000 *, **, and ***
denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard errors
in () below point estimates.
72
8 Figures
Figure 1: 5. min DKK/EUR spot exchange rate and interventions in mio. EUR over
the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. A positive intervention corresponds
to a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK. The upper and lower lines are the ERM
II deviation bands. The interventions are plotted against the central parity exchange
rate of 7.46038 DKK/EUR.
73
Monetary Policy, Housing, and
Macroeconomic E¤ects of Changes
in Long Interest Rates
Jesper Pedersen
University of Copenhagen,
and Danmarks Nationalbank
Abstract
It is widely believed, both in academia and among practition-
ers, that monetary policy a¤ects the aggregate economy through
changes in the long or medium end of the yield curve as well
as through changes in the short rate. Standard models in the
academic literature do not have such a mechanism. This paper
addresses this short coming. I build and calibrate a DSGE-model
in which long bond yields inuence the macro economy through
the housing sector. Bonds of long maturities plays an indepen-
dent role for monetary policy through housing in this model as
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1 Introduction
"..., if spending depends on long-term interest rates, spe-
cial factors that lower the spread between short-term and
long-term rates will stipulate aggregate demand. Thus, - -,
"a higher short-term rate is required to obtain the long-term
rate and the overall mix of nancial conditions consistent
with maximum sustainable employment and stable prices."
[Ben Bernanke, 2006]1
"My main purpose in calling attention to the term struc-
ture puzzle here is not to resolve it, but rather to urge central
bank research departments to give it high priority. It may
be the piece of the monetary transmission mechanism about
which we are most in the dark", [Alan S. Blinder, 2006]2
This paper analyses the relationship between monetary policy and
the macro economy through changes in long interest rates. The aggre-
gate economy is surely not independent of the evolution of long interest
rates and this interrelationship between the aggregate economy and long
interest rates might also play a key element in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. But it is di¢ cult to say much about this from state-of-
the-art macroeconomic DSGE-models, as it is quite hard to come by a
structural model in which long interest rates play a role for the economy
independently of the short rate, as in these DSGE-models long interest
rates are just expectations of future short rates and have no feed-back
e¤ects to the macro economy.
The nancial constraint in this paper is su¢ cient to move the stan-
dard DSGE framework away from a single-interest-rate model of aggre-
gate demand determination. The expectations hypothesis does not hold
so long rates are thus not just a stand in for expected averages of future
short-rates. The nancial constraint restricts the consumer from bypass-
ing the long bond market completely and move down the yield curve in
the search for cheaper ways to nance housing, and lastly, the nancial
constraint introduces an endogenous wedge between bond yields for dif-
ferent maturities. This independent long interest rate and bidirectional
feed-back e¤ects from short-rates to long-rates and back onto the econ-
omy thus provide a framework for the study of monetary policy through
the whole yield curve.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. A one period
1Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke before the Economic Club of New York,
New York, March 20, 2006
2Monetary Policy Today, 2006.
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higher-than-expected monetary policy short rate in this model depresses
output by tilting intertemporal consumption and through a higher long
interest rate increases the costs of nancing housing propagating the
e¤ects of the monetary policy shock. Further, the long interest rate sig-
nicantly mitigates the co movement problem for given relative price
rigidities in the economy through higher long interest rates which in-
crease the cost of nancing.
I utilise housing and mortgage markets to accomplish these results
in the model framework. Consumers derive utility non separable from a
consumption goods index and a housing goods index. I introduce a -
nancial friction into the model such that the consumer need to nance all
new housing purchases by bond issuances of a specic time-to-maturity,
m, in which m is strictly above one period.
Durable goods are often considered to be interest-rate sensitive. This
is especially so for durable goods which demand a price at the time of the
purchase which is too big to be covered by the income of the consumer
within the same period and thus demand a need for nancing. One
obvious example of such a durable good is housing. For a brief survey of
the mortgage markets for di¤erent countries, see Calza, Monacelli, and
Stracca (2006). Four things are apparent from their analysis. Firstly, the
typical duration of a mortgage contract is around 15 years but varies from
10 to 30 years. These di¤erences are in economic terms hard to explain
and mostly reect national traditions, cultural factors, as well as the
institutional framework which the nancial sector operates in. Second,
the construction sector does play a signicant role for the business-cycle.
In 2002 for the U.S., new construction accounted for 412 billion U.S.
dollars or around 4% of GDP, while i.e. this number is as high as around
18% for Spain. Further, uctuations in residential investment account
for more than 18% of the uctuations in GDP. Thirdly, in absolute
numbers the importance of housing is also clear: There are roughly 72
million owner occupied houses in the U.S., while there are around 1.3
million housing starts of 1-4 unit dwellings. 2/3 of households own their
own home in the U.S., and the value of residential real estate makes up
over 75% of total assets for the median household, Survey of Consumer
Finances (2001). Lastly, Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted in
1999 for the U.S., found that on average, households spend around 19%
of their total expenditures on shelter.3
3Long interest rates can also a¤ect the aggregate economy through demands from
rms, institutional investors, the government, as well as from consumers. Firms might
wish to match the maturity of their assets and this need to be done by long-term
bonds, as investments in capital are often long time investments. Though bond yields
are highly correlated, there can be portfolio demand for longer bonds, and these long
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The production side consists of two sectors, a consumption goods
production sector and a construction sector. Final goods producers
assemble intermediate goods into a nal good, while the intermediate
goods producers face monopolistic competition and Calvo-pricing. This
set-up delivers two interdependent New-Keynesian Phillips curves.
I otherwise keep the model as simple as possible to identify and isolate
the e¤ects of long interest rates upon the macro economy, but this goal
necessitates a variation of the degree of price stickiness in construction
goods due to lack of empirical evidence for price rigidity in durables
and due to the co movement problem found in two-sector models with
durables and asymmetrical nominal rigidities.4 The problem in these
two sector models is that if one sector expands the other contracts, and
this stands in sharp contrast to empirical evidence.
The model in this paper is not the only model with a long interest
rate, but it is to my knowledge the rst model that includes a long inter-
est rate with an independent role for the macro economy in a structural,
micro founded framework. Examples from macroeconomics includes,
Fuhrer (1996) which incorporates a long rate into a macroeconomic
model, but this inclusion is not build upon a structural framework and
the di¤erence between interest rates arises exogenously. Another exam-
ple is McCallum (1994), who analyses the expectations hypothesis, but
his model is not a general equilibrium model and has no interrelations
between yields and the rest of the economy. One recent example from
nance literature is Vayanos and Vila (2007), which introduces a specic
form for utility such that each investor demands only a specic matu-
rity. Their partial equilibrium model does not allow for feedback e¤ects
from yields to macroeconomic variables. Examples from macro-nance
includes Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005),
Ravenna and Seppala (2006), Pedersen (2008) among many. This re-
search program models the short-rate by a Taylor-rule and prices bonds
by no-arbitrage introducing an endogenously determined wedge between
bond yields in terms of a (possible) time varying risk premia. While
these models can tell a lot about the determinants of risk premia, the
cross-section of bond yields, as well as their dynamics through time, they
can not tell much about the relationship between the nancial market
bonds might even be safer investments than investments in shorter maturity bonds
in an environment with stable ination as we reside in today, see e.g. Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2006). Life-insurance companies as well as pension funds have preferences
for bonds with maturities of much more than a year. Central banks often nance
public debt by issuance of long bonds with maturities of around 10 year. This papers
focus is limited to the mortgage market.
4See e.g., Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) and Monacelli (2008)
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and the macro economy. The reason is the models do not allow for any
feed-back between yields and the macro economy and the consumers can
simply bypass the long bond market and use short rates instead.
The paper that comes close to a multiple interest rate model of aggre-
gate demand determination is Andres, Salido, and Nelson (2004) whose
model includes long interest rates with feedback e¤ects to the macro
economy. However, Andres, Salido, and Nelson (2004) need to impose
quite strong assumptions to get a long interest rate with an independent
role in the economy. They specically assume that only some agents are
restricted from trading in all bonds, and their wedge between a long rate
and a short rate is exogenous.
This paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets up the macro-
economic model. Section 2.1 sets up the demand side in general, and
analyses the nancial friction, the key relationships in the economy and
a new channel for the impact of the monetary policy changes in particu-
lar. Section 2.2 sets up the supply side, while section 2.3 deals with the
public sector. I solve and calibrate the model in section 3. I analyse the
equilibrium dynamic response to a monetary policy change in the model
with sticky non-durable prices and exible durable prices in section 3.2,
and in the case of symmetric price rigidity in section 3.3. Section 4
concludes.
2 The macroeconomic model
I set up a standard, closed-economy DSGE model, see e.g., Smets and
Wouters (2003), Woodford (2003), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999),
with two main di¤erences. Firstly, the model consists of two sectors, a
consumption sector and a housing sector. The representative consumers
utility function in these two goods is assumed to be non separable. Sec-
ondly, I impose that the representative consumer needs to issue bonds
with a maturity longer than one period to nance any new purchases of
housing.
2.1 The representative consumer
Let Ct denote non-durable consumption, Ht the stock of housing, 0 <
 < 1 the rate of depreciation, and Xt = Ht   (1  )Ht 1 the ow
of housing, in which the variables are composite consumption goods
consisting of di¤erentiated products produced by monopolistically com-
petitive nal goods producers. The consumer derives utility from con-
sumption goods and housing goods, while working, Nt, gives disutility,
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and  > 1; '; ; ! > 0:
U (Ct; Ht; Nt) =
(CtH
!
t )
1    1
1    

1 + '
N1+'t (1)
 governs both the intertemporal rate of substitution and given the re-
striction  > 1, housing and consumption are Edgeworth substitutes,
UCH < 0: The implication of (1) is that the utility from non-housing
consumption depends on the size of the housing stock and that the
IS-relation consequently will depend upon the net growth rate in the
housing stock, Ht  Ht 1.
The consumer faces the following budget constraint:
PCtCt+PHt (Ht   (1  )Ht 1) =WtNt+t Tt 
 
Pt Bt  Bt 1

(2)
PCt, PHt denotes the price of a housing unit and a consumption good
respectively. Pt denotes a row vector where each element corresponds
to price of a zero-coupon bond each with di¤erent maturity. Bt rep-
resents the quantity of such claims purchased by the consumer at the
end of period t such that negative entries correspond to borrowing. The
constraint says that the households purchases of consumption and new
housing cannot exceed the income from labour, WtNt, prot shares from
the production sector, t, and taxes paid, Tt. Further, the consumer
can purchase bonds maturing in period n, Pt Bt, and the consumer re-
ceives income from bonds purchased at previous periods maturing in this
period, Bt 1.
2.1.1 A nancial constraint for the mortgage market
The consumer also faces the following nancial constraint:
PHt (Ht   (1  )Ht 1)  Pmt Bmt (3)
m denotes the time-to-maturity of the bond which I assume is longer
than one period e¤ectively ruling out the short-rate as an instrument
for nancing housing. The constraint forces the consumer to nance all
changes in the stock of housing, PHt (Ht   (1  )Ht 1), with issuances
of bonds, Bmt , to the price P
m
t such that the value of new housing pur-
chases is balanced by the nominal value of a bond portfolio.
The nancial constraint imposes an implicit adjustment cost of chang-
ing the housing stock as the consumer not only need to pay the price
PHt for an extra unit of housing, but the consumer also needs to -
nance the value of the extra housing unit by a potentially expensive
instrument, the long rate of interest. The consumers in this economy
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does accumulate savings through purchases and sales of bonds to smooth
consumption through time, but they are restricted by (3) to use these
savings to purchase housing.
I assume the government holds the mortgage bonds issued by the
consumers. The nancial constraint thus resemblance a cash-in-advance
constraint in terms of an implicit monopoly for the public sector of pro-
viding mortgage bonds and money respectively. Specically, mortgage
bond trading in between consumers is ruled out as the government has
a monopoly in buying mortgage bonds at issuance, and the consumers
must purchase any housing by exactly the bond with maturity m.
The constraint captures two widely observed aspects of the real econ-
omy: Consumers usually do not have savings large enough to cover their
housing purchases up front but instead nance the excess amount on
the bond market, and they do so by bonds with maturities above one
period.5 ;6 Some long interest rate should matter for aggregate economic
variables. I do not attempt to analyse these institutional factors nor do I
try to endogenise the choices of mortgage contract - the choice between
xed versus variable contracts and between the maturity of the bond
used in the contracts.7 The nancial constraint aims to capture all these
choices and properties of mortgage markets in one simple and tractable
equation.
2.1.2 The consumersproblem
The problem for the consumer is to maximise (1) with respect to labour,
consumption and housing subject to (2) and (3) with t and tt being
their respective Lagrange multipliers:
max
C;H; B
Et
1X
t=T
tEt [U (Ct; Ht; Nt)]
 t

PCtCt  WtNt   t + Tt +
 
Pt Bt  Bt 1

+ PHt (Ht   (1  )Ht 1)

 tt [PHt (Ht   (1  )Ht 1)  Pmt Bmt ]
5See the discussion in the introduction.
6The constraint also rules out the possibility of adding past wealth to the port-
folio. I could have assumed that, say, only a certain percentage of the port-folio needs
to be raised on the nancial markets, but I have refrained from doing so as it would
not have changed the analysis signicantly.
7Examples from nance includes Campbell and Viceira (2001) and Campbell and
Cocco (2003). Campbell and Viceira (2001) derives a partial equilibrium model for
consumption and portfolio choice and show that long bonds are appropriate assets
for investors who have hedging demands due to a whish for stable income. Campbell
and Cocco (2003) analyses households choice of instrument for nancing mortgages,
and nd similar conclusions. These models are however not easily incorporated into
a general equilibrium framework.
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The optimality conditions for optimal consumption, labour supply, bond
holdings, housing, and mortgage bonds are the following:
t =
UCt
PCt
(4)
UNt = UCt
Wt
PCt
(5)
0 =  t Pt + Et

t+1 Pt+1

;8n6=m (6)
0=UHt   tPHt + Et [t+1 (1  )PHt+1] (7)
 ttPHt + Et [t+1t+1 (1  )PHt+1]
0 =  tPmt + Et

t+1P
m
t+1
  ttPmt (8)
Relation (4) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow
value of the ow budget constraint, while (5) is the standard optimality
condition for the choice between consumption and labour. (6) is the
Euler-equation for optimal consumption through time. I combine (6)
with (4) and dene the stochastic discount factor as:
Mt+1  t+1
t
= 

Ct+1
Ct
  
Ht+1
Ht
!(1 )
PCt
PCt+1
(9)
Conditions (7) and (8) arise from the nancial constraint and are new
compared to the work-horse DSGE model. They together provide su¢ -
cient conditions to move this model into a multiple-interest-rate frame-
work for determination of aggregate demand. Sections 2.1.3 through
2.1.5 will scrutinize their implications for the user cost of housing, the
relation between short and long interest rates, and the IS relation, while
2.1.6 will put the pieces together and analyse monetary policy in this
framework for given prices.
2.1.3 The user cost of housing and the nancial constraint
The housing market and the nancial constraint together bring feed-
back e¤ects between bond yields and the macro economy. This section
explains how.
Relation (7) could be written into the following standard expression,
if (3) were not imposed such that t = 0
UHt
UCt
= usc=0  Qt    (1  )Et

UCt+1
UCt
Qt+1

(10)
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in which I have dened the relative price of housing in units of the con-
sumption good as Qt  PHtPCt . Relation (10) equates the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption of housing and non-durables, the left
hand side, to the user cost of housing, the right hand side. This user cost
depends positively on the relative price in terms of consumption today
and negatively on the relative price in the period to come. The latter
term constitutes the expected discounted marginal utility of the gains
from expanding future consumption through the resale value of the ex-
tra unit of housing relatively to using that extra income on consumption
today.
Substitute (7) into (8) to see how (3) breaks this standard condition
in (10):
UHt
UCt
= usc=0 +Qt

t   Et

t+1Mt+1 (1  ) PHt+1
PHt

(11)
Hence, the user cost of housing is positively dependent upon the cost of
nancing housing by the long bond. However, expression (11) shadows
the interdependence between the long rate and the user cost of housing,
but an approximation and an introduction of (8) brings this relationship
out in light:8
UHt
UCt
 ~Qt    (1  )Et

UCt+1
UCt
~Qt+1

(12)
in which I have dened the e¤ective relative price
~Qt  Qt
 
Et

RXmt+1

Rft
!
I have also introduced the gross risk free rate of interest, Rft , given by the
inverse of the conditional expectation of the stochastic discount factor,
and I have rewritten (8) into
t = Et

Mt+1RX
m
t+1
  1 (13)
8(12) is an approximation as it discard covariance terms such that I can write
Et

Mt+1RX
m
t+1
  Et[RXmt+1]
Rft
and Et
h 
Et+1

Mt+2RX
m
t+2
  1 UCt+1UCt Qt+1i 
Et

UCt+1
UCt
Qt+1
RXmt+2
Rft+1
  UCt+1UCt Qt+1

. The covariance terms left out will likewise
not be present in the full model solution due to the use of log-linearisations.
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Et

RXmt+1
  Et hPmt+1Pmt i denotes the expected holding period return from
holding mortgage bonds. Using denition of a bond yield with maturity
n, ynt =   1n log (P nt ), I can write the holding period return as
Et

Pm 1t+1
Pmt

= Et

exp
 
ymt   (m  1)
 
ym 1t+1   ymt

(14)
The holding period return thus depends positively on this periodsyield
and negatively on the change in the yield over the holding period.
To get the intuition behind the presence of (14) in (12), note from
(10) the holding period return from holding a maturing bond implicitly is
present in models with durable goods without (3), as in these models only
the one period (real) rate determines the durable/non-durable margin.
Hence, the second term in (14) is zero in models without (3).
With (3), the intuition behind expression (10) holds except that rela-
tive prices, Qt, are altered by the presence of the long and short interest
rate. The mortgage bond yield is a cost for the consumer from purchas-
ing more housing this period as this is the implicit rate the consumer
needs to nance new housing with. The consumer is however free to alter
the housing stock in the period to come and close a similar value of his
bond portfolio explaining the presence of the second term in (14). The
reverse holds for the second holding period return in (12) when the con-
sumer takes into account the resale value of housing in the determination
of the user cost of housing this period.
Take in the model reduces to a standard model without (3) if long
bond yields a return equal to the short rate; it is the relative price that
determines optimal consumption between di¤erent goods and it is the
interest rate spread that alters the relative price of housing in (14). The
user cost of housing depends on the real rate with respect to consumption
goods, Rft , as the latter reects the opportunity cost of investing in new
housing instead of putting your money in a one-period bond.
2.1.4 The expectation hypothesis and the nancial constraint
The following section explains how, in contrast to standard models, long
rates in this model can not simply be dened as expected future short
rates due to an endogenous wedge between bonds of di¤erent maturities.
As a result, the central bank can not determine long rates perfectly
through changes in short rates.
That the nancial constraint breaks the expectations hypothesis in
this economy can be seen by rewriting (8) into a relationship between
the yield of a long bond, ymt , future expected short interest rates, and
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future expected multipliers:
ymt =
1
m
m 1X
i=0
Et [it+i] +
1
m
m 2X
i=0
Et

t+i

(15)
in which lower case letters denote log deviations from steady state.
Specically, it denotes the short rate of interest, and t denotes the
log linearised multiplier on the nancial constraint around its steady
state. The di¤erence between short - and short interest rates thus arises
endogenously in terms of an average of expected future multipliers on
the nancial constraint.9 ;10
When (3) binds, the long interest rate in its steady state, ym =
 +
 
m 1
m

, is higher than the short rate in the steady state, i = .
Hence, from (8) the wedge between short and long term bonds can be
interpreted as a measure of the cost of being forced to nance housing
with a relatively expensive instrument, the long interest rate, compared
to the short-rate of interest. From (13) this wedge can further be given
a pecuniary value in terms of the net holding period return from holding
mortgage bonds.11
9In contrast, Andres, Salido, and Nelson (2004) introduces an exogenously wedge,
while Graeve, Emiris, and Wouters (2008) introduces an exogenous risk premia shock
on long bonds.
10A binding nancial constraint, however, does not imply the existence of a dom-
inated asset. The price of a mortgage bond as of time t is given by (8), but after
one-period, that bond is no longer a bond with maturity m, but with maturity m 1,
and given free trading in the secondary mortgage market, any di¤erence between a
"standard" bond and a mortgage bond is traded away.
Secondly, the shadow value of borrowing short is zero after one period. The la-
grange multiplier can be interpreted as the marginal value for the consumer in terms
of utility of relaxing the nancial constraint marginally. The nancial constraint only
binds for the consumer in the period where he purchases the new housing stock.
Thirdly, the consumer needs to go long in the mortgage bond and short in the
short-rates to exploit possible arbitrage opportunities between the mortgage bond
and other bonds. However, to exploit such arbitrage opportunities, the multiplier
must be positive, so the consumer needs to go short in the mortgage bond. But
in the steady-state the consumers are always short in the mortgage market, as the
consumers buy housing, and they thus need to decrease their stock of housing to
exploit the arbitrage opportunity. The latter points can be seen from (11).
11The net return would be zero if the investor were allowed to nance housing by
the short-rate: 1 = Et
h
Mt+1R
f
t
i
= Et [Mt+1]R
f
t , and hence t = 0, so the standard
DSGE model without the nancial constraint is in fact a special case of the model,
namely the case in which the maturity of the mortgage bond is one.
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2.1.5 The IS relation and the nancial constraint
The distinction between short-rates and long-rates matters not only for
the intratemporal choice between the goods in the economy in (11), but
also for intertemporal consumption. To see this, log linearise (4) and (6)
around their steady states to obtain the model implied IS-relation
ct = Et [ct+1]  1

Et [it   Ct+1]  ! (1  )

Et [ht+1] (16)
in which Ct+1 correspond to ination in the price level for the consump-
tion goods sector. I can substitute out the growth in the housing stock
by the mortgage bond price in equilibria in which the nancial constraint
binds:
ct=Et [ct+1]  1

Et [it   Ct+1] + ! (1  ) m

Et

ymt+1

 ! (1  ) 

Et

bmt+1   pHt+1

+
! (1  ) 

ht (17)
Hence, the IS-relation in this economy depends on both the short-rate
and the long-rate in the economy in a consistent, micro founded way in
which the distinction between them matters.
The rst two terms on the right hand side of (17) are standard: A
higher monetary policy rate, a higher it, increases the real rate in terms
of consumption goods, as consumption good prices are sticky, causing
an reallocation of consumption from the present to the future. This
e¤ect is the standard real e¤ect from changes in the monetary policy
rate. Further, a higher long interest rate depresses current consumption
through the third term on the right hand side of (17). This is due
to the fact that the consumersmarginal utility of extra consumption
depends upon the size of the housing stock, the non-separable utility
function, and that the consumer must borrow to satisfy the demand for
the size of the house, the nancial constraint. Current consumption falls
in response to change in the policy rate by the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, 1

. The same holds for changes in the long interest rate but
the e¤ect is further determined by the elasticity of marginal utility of an
extra unit of consumption with respect to changes in the level of housing,
HtUCHt
UCt
= ! (1  ), and by the rate of depreciation, . The next term in
(17) is the debt to equity ratio, bmt+1  pHt+1, introducing a wealth e¤ect
in the IS-relation.
Current housing stock a¤ects the current level of consumption in the
same way as changes in the long rate does, but the e¤ect can be given a
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di¤erent interpretation namely as capturing habit formation as in e.g.,
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), in the sense that marginal utility of
consumption approaches innity if the level of consumption approaches
habits. Housing is in this paper a slow-moving state variable which
a¤ects non-durable consumption due to a non-separable utility function.
As shown by Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) housing in a framework with
adjustment costs for reoptimisation of new housing, as in this model,
can be thought of as a microfoundation for habit formation. That is,
the marginal utility of consumption approaches zero if the consumer is
homeless - when the housing stock approaches zero.
In total the aggregate demand side consists of the IS-relation, (16),
the nancial constraint, (3), and housing demand, (11).
2.1.6 Monetary policy and the nancial constraint
With the demand side in place, I can in greater detail explain what I de-
note the second monetary transmission mechanism. A one-period higher
than expected current short rate, it, tilts intertemporal consumption
through (17), as is standard in the DSGE framework, see e.g., Woodford
(2003).
A one-period higher than expected nominal short-rate pushes bond
yields up through the rst part of (15). However, the expectations hy-
pothesis is in this model broken, so higher expected future short rates
are not su¢ cient to push long interest rates up. A higher short rate gives
rise to a higher multiplier on the nancial constraint as well, see (8), so
both terms in (15) rises and the mortgage bond yield consequently rises
in response to higher short rates.
The e¤ect of the higher bond yield is two fold. Firstly, bond returns,
RXmt+1, depends positively on bond yields and negatively on changes in
future yields. A positive but temporary shock to bond yields, like a
monetary policy shock, therefore gives rise to an expected positive bond
holding return, and increases the user cost of housing, as the consumer
is short in mortgage bonds. That is, the e¤ective relative price in (12)
is increased changing the optimal allocation between consumption and
housing at the margin.12
Secondly, the higher long interest rate depresses current consumption
directly, see section 2.1.5 and (17), and indirectly through lower housing
stock. That is, the higher user cost of nancing depresses the housing
12Notice the consumer is restricted from bypassing these higher prices of nancing
new housing by moving down the yield curve to a cheaper way of nancing housing
through the nancial constraint.
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stock downwards through time as the consumer reinvest less in new
housing, see section 2.1.5 and (17), as reinvestment is more expensive
due to the higher long rate.
I emphasize the role of expectations. It is the expected future path of
short rates that determine consumption growth in the standard model,
see e.g., Gali (2008). The same holds in this model but to a greater
extend. The long rate moves in response to expectations of future short
rates, the rst term in (15), and the more the central bank can a¤ect
these expectations, the more long interest rate moves and the more ef-
fective is monetary policy through this channel.
The higher user cost of nancing, the direct e¤ect on current con-
sumption through the long interest rate, the fall in the housing stock
and its e¤ect upon current consumption together give rise to a second
interest rate channel.
The analysis in this section and the previous sections in section
(2.1.2) is for given prices. I next introduce the production side and
move on to general equilibrium.
2.2 The production sector
The production side consists of two sectors. One sector produces con-
sumption goods and one sector produces housing. The latter sector is
denoted the construction sector.13
I model the two sectors in a standard way. Intermediate rms pro-
duce goods under monopolistic competition, while a perfectly compet-
itive nal goods producer uses these inputs into the production of the
respective goods. The focus of this paper is not on asymmetries be-
tween sectors and I thus keep the sectors symmetric except that I allow
for asymmetric price rigidities within the respective sectors for the inter-
mediate goods producers. That is, I assume: no sector specic shocks,
free labour movement equalising sector wages, and a symmetric constant
returns to scale production function for the intermediate rms.
I consider three versions of the model. Firstly and secondly a model
with sticky prices in consumption and exible prices in durables with
and without the nancial constraint imposed, and lastly, a model with
symmetric nominal rigidities. I consider a model without the nancial
constraint to be able to identify and isolate the e¤ects of (3). I vary the
13Capital is another plausible channel for monetary policy a¤ects of long interest
rate changes. This e¤ect could perhaps be introduced through a nancial friction on
the production side resembling the friction I have imposed on the demand side in
this paper. I leave the introduction of capital into such a set-up for future research.
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intersectoral degree of nominal rigidities for an empirical and a theoret-
ical reason.
While there has been done a lot of empirical work on the degree of
price rigidity for non-durables, see e.g., Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Ven-
able (1997), Bils and Klenow (2004), and Kashyap (1995), there has
not been done similar work on the degree of price rigidity for durables.
Theoretical arguments have been put forward. As analysed in the in-
troduction, housing is an important asset for both the cross-section of
consumers and for the individual consumer. House prices can therefore
be considered as having asset pricing behaviour and thus vary widely.
The perception that prices of housing are downward sticky has at the
time of writing shown not to hold either. Barsky, House, and Kimball
(2007) argues that house prices overshoot in response to a monetary
contraction suggesting that house prices may be quite exible.
It is theoretically likely that durable good prices in general and house
prices in particular can be quite exible being relatively expensive on a
per-unit basis. If implicit or explicit menu costs have xed components
in these markets, the incentives to reset prices on a frequent basis are
relatively high compared to non-durable goods.
However, I do not nd all these arguments convincing for this model
framework. I model housing as an index where the price of the goods
are set for the individual elements of the index. The production and
pricing framework for, say, concrete or windows, are not likely to be
widely di¤erent from, say, meat or clothing.
2.2.1 The co movement problem
The theoretical reason behind the consideration of two pricing frame-
works for durables is the co movement problem, see e.g., Monacelli (2008),
Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007): In response to monetary policy
shocks, if price stickiness is asymmetric in the two sectors, whenever
spending contracts in one sector it tends to expand in the other. This is
not what is found in the data. U.S. data suggests a strongly procyclical
response of durable spending to a shock to monetary policy, and a posi-
tive co movement with non-durable spending, as shown in e.g., Monacelli
(2008). This is an important problem as construction accounts for a rel-
atively big part of aggregate activity.14
The co movement problem generally arises in symmetric two-sector
models with sticky prices in one sector and exible prices in the other, see
e.g., Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007), Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca
14See the introduction.
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(2006). I now show the co movement problem is likely to prevail in
this model. Assume for now exible construction goods prices. Denote
t  UCt ~Qt as the shadow value of an extra unit of the housing good
and rewrite (11) as follows
UCt ~Qt  t = UHt +  (1  )Et [t+1] (18)
This is a di¤erence equation int, which can be rewritten into an innite
sum of expected, discounted, marginal utilities of housing:
t =
1X
j=0
( (1  ))j UHt+j (19)
Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) argue the right hand side of (19) is
approximately constant for low values of the rate of depreciation, which
is likely to hold for perhaps the most durable good you can think of,
housing, and thus for this model. Specically, a high stock-ow ratio,
1

, implies that a change in production of housing, YXt, only give rise to
small changes in the marginal utility of housing, UHt, and if the rate of
depreciation is low, the multiplier on housing is a¤ected by housing ows
in the distant future. Therefore, temporary shocks to the economy, like a
monetary policy shock, are unlikely to a¤ect the multiplier signicantly,
and can for long-lived durables be treated as approximately constant.
This near constancy has profound implications for the properties of
the model. A close to constant left hand side of (19) implies UCt ~Qt like-
wise is constant such that any variation in the relative prices is matched
by a variation in the consumption of the non-durable of the same sign.
If non-durables goods prices are sticky and durable goods prices are
exible, the relative price, Qt, falls in response to a one period positive
monetary policy shock and construction increases.15
Though the analysis above gives an uncontroversial explanation of
the co movement problem it is controversial in this model as I have
assumed the relative interest rate terms in the e¤ective relative price, ~Qt,
did not move in response to the shocks, an assumption which is unlikely
to hold. It is without a full solution to the model unclear how important
these movements are for the co movement problem and whether the
introduction of the nancial constraint can solve or mitigate the problem.
What is clear is that I need to break the co movement problem if I want to
identify and isolate the e¤ects of higher long rates upon construction as
the e¤ects explained in section 2.1.6 are possibly can drown by changes
15The details of the arguments can be found in e.g., Monacelli (2008).
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in the relative price. I therefore vary the degree of relative, nominal
rigidity from one extreme, sticky consumption goods price and exible
construction goods prices, to another extreme, completely symmetric
nominal price rigidity between sectors.
2.2.2 Final goods producers and Intermediate goods - in gen-
eral
The nal goods in the two sectors are produced from intermediates,
which are assembled through the following production function:
Zt =

n
  1

z
Z
Nz
zt (i)
 1

 
 1
in which z = cc; xx and Z = YXt; YCt denotes intermediate goods and
nal goods respectively in each sector. nz is the number of goods in each
of the sectors, and NC = [0;nC ] ; NX = [nC ; 1) such that nC + nX = 1.
 governs the price elasticity of demand for the good and is assumed to
be strictly above one.
The nal goods producers minimise their costs and solve:
min
z(i)
Z 1
0
pzt (i) zt (i) di st:

n
  1

z
Z
Nz
zt (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
 Zt
in which the price of intermediate good i in sector z is denoted by pzt (i)
The demand for the intermediate good in sector z is given by the well-
known expression
zzt (i) =
1
nz
Zt

pzt (i)
Pzt
 
The price index follows from this expression:
Pzt =

1
nz
Z
Nz
pzt (i)
1 
 1
1 
I assume for simplicity a linear production function with labour being
the only input
Yzt (i) = N
z
t (i)
in which N zt (i) denotes labour input into sector z for rm i. With labour
free to ow across sectors, and with constant returns to scale production
function, the wage rate will be equalised across rms and across sectors in
equilibrium in this economy, and all rms across sectors and across rms
will have the same nominal marginal cost of production,MCt = Wt@F (Nt)
@Nt
=
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Wt, and will employ the same amount of workers, Ntj (i) = Ntk (j) = Nt.
The prot maximisation problem for the intermediate producer is:
max
pz(i)
z =
1
nz
Zt

pzt (i)
Pzt
 
(pzt (i) Wt)
A producer which is free to reset prices each period sets its price, pt (i),
as a markup, M z  
( 1) , over nominal marginal cost, MCt  Wt:
pzt (i) =M
zMCt 8ji (20)
Deviations from this optimality condition under completely exible prices
can arise due to nominal rigidities introduced next.
2.2.3 Intermediate goods producers in particular - the pro-
duction of consumption goods
Following Woodford (2003) and Yun (1996), intermediate good rms
in the consumption sector face Calvo pricing such that 1   C of the
producers in the sector are allowed to be reset in each period, while
C of the prices remain unchanged. Each supplier which can chose a
new price for its good at time t faces the same problem as anybody else
who can change its price at that date. The optimal price, pCt, for the
individual rm that can change its price will in equilibrium equal the
price chosen by the rest. The pricing index for this sector is therefore
given by:
PCt = [(1  C) p1 Ct + CP 1 Ct 1]
1
1  (21)
The intermediate goods producer takes into account the dynamic as-
pect of the price setting, and maximises the present value of his prots
discounting these prots by the stochastic discount factor, (9),
max
pt(i)
Et
" 1X
T=t
T tC Mt;T(:)
#
=Et
" 1X
T=t
T tC Mt;T
"
1
nC

pCt (i)
PCt
 
YCt
PCt
(pCt (i) Wt)
##
and sets his price such that the expected mark-up equals the desired
mark-up:
0 = Et
264 1X
T=t
T tC Mt;T
264 YCtPCt

pCt(i)
PCt
 
(1  )
+ YCt
PCt

pCt(i)
PCt
  1
Wt
PCt
375
375 (22)
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Together with the price index, this equation determines the evolution
of the aggregate price in the production sector of consumption goods
given the evolution of consumption output and the disturbances in the
economy, and these equations thus constitute the aggregate-supply block
of the consumption goods sector.
I can log-linearize (21) and (22) and combine them to obtain a New-
Keynesian Phillips curve for the production sector of consumption goods:
Ct= 
CmcCt + Et [Ct+1] (23)
C  (1  C) (1  C)
C
I can substitute out marginal cost with some measure of the output in
the economy and some measure of the natural rate of output in the
economy dened as the output that would prevail in the economy under
exible prices. These expressions are derived next.
2.2.4 Output for the production of consumption goods
I start by the consumption goods sector. I can impose the equilibrium
condition PCt = pCt (i) 8i in (20) since all rms within a sector share
the same characteristics given that all rms in a sector are free to set its
prices. (2.2.2). This condition, together with the production function,
YCt (i) = N
C
t (i), the identity for the labour force,
Nt = N

Ct +N

Xt = nCN

t + nXN

t = nCY

Ct + nXY

Xt
and imposing the equilibrium condition YCt (i) = YCt in (5), allows me
to write output of consumption goods as:
YCt =
1
nC

1
MC
 1
'
Y
  
'
Ct H
!(1 )
'
t  
nX
nC
YXt
The equilibrium condition for the durable is less simple as housing is
a stock variable for the consumer but a ow variable for the producer.
In equilibrium, the producers produce the ow of housing which is in
demand in that period:
YXt=Ht   (1  )Ht 1 = Xt ,
Ht=
1X
i=0
(1  )i YXt i
A log-linearization of the equations yields:
yCt=

! (1  )    'nX
'nC + 

yXt (24)
+
! (1  )
'nC + 
(1  )ht 1   1
'nC + 
mCt
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The production of consumption goods depends on the housing stock in
the previous period, ht 1, production of housing in this period, yXt, and
the mark-up, mCt . The interdependence between the sectors is due to
the non-separability of housing and consumption in the utility function.
I leave interpretations until after I have derived a relationship for pro-
duction in the construction sector.
2.2.5 Intermediate goods producers in particular - the con-
struction sector
I consider two pricing frameworks for the construction sector: One in
which the producers are free to set their prices at the beginning of each
period, and a second framework where only some of the producers are
able to reset prices. The construction sector under the latter framework
is completely symmetric to the production sector of non-durables goods
in the section above.
Under exible prices the rms simply maximise prot in each period,
the analysis from section (2.2.2) holds, and the optimal choice of pricing
for the intermediate goods producer in the construction sector is thus
given by:
pHt (i) =M
HMCt = PHt (25)
The optimal condition for the consumerslabour supply is given by
(5) as not only must the consumer in optimum be indi¤erent between
working and consuming, but also between working and consuming in
either sector. I note that in the exible price equilibrium, the mark-up is
always equal to the desired mark-up (MHt =M
H), and a log-linearisation
of (5) can be written as:
yXt =
! (1  ) (1  )
('nX   ! (1  ) )ht 1  
 + 'nC
('nX   ! (1  ) )yCt
The production in the construction sector for the case of sticky non-
durables - exible durables, can already be interpreted as the natural
rate of output if production in the consumption sector is at its natural
level. Hence, the natural level of output in construction goods can be
written as:
yNXt=
! (1  ) (1  )
('nX   ! (1  ) )ht 1  
 + 'nC
('nX   ! (1  ) )y
N
Ct
  1
('nX   ! (1  ) )m
H
t
This is the output block of the construction sector in which lagged hous-
ing stock captures the durability of good, while the interdependence with
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the consumption sector captures the non-separability between housing
and consumption for the consumer.
2.2.6 The aggregate production sector
I next rewrite the output relations for the two sectors in a simpler way.
I can substitute out marginal cost in (23) with (24) using:
mcCt = ('nC + )
 
yCt   yNCt

=  mCt
The production side of the sticky non-durables - exible durables model
thus consists of a New Keynesian Phillips curve for the consumption
sector as a function of the output gap for that sector:
Ct = ('nC + )
C
 
yCt   yNCt

+ Et [Ct+1]
yNCt =

! (1  )    'nX
'nC + 

yNXt +
! (1  )
'nC + 
(1  )ht 1 (26)
I notice that if production in the consumption sector is at its natural
rate of output so is construction of new housing ows, yNXt = yXt. I
can also introduce into the aggregate production framework above the
following proportionality between the production sectors:
yXt   yNXt= XC
 
yCt   yNCt

(27)
 XC    + 'nC
('nX   ! (1  ) )
I get an expression for the relative price in terms of consumption
goods, Qt, in the case of sticky construction goods prices and exible
consumption goods prices from a log linearisation of the optimal price
for the construction goods producer, (25), the rst e¢ ciency condition
for the consumersoptimal choice between labour and consumption, (5),
PHt =MPCt
UNt
UCt
I impose equilibrium conditions and log linearise to get
qt = ( + 'nC) yCt + ('nX   ! (1  ) ) yXt   ! (1  ) (1  )ht 1
The production side in the model in which all producers in the econ-
omy are restricted from resetting their price in each period consists of
two interdependent New Keynesian Phillips curves for the consumption
sector and construction sector respectively:
Ct=
CmcCt + Et [Ct+1] ; 
C  (1  C) (1  C)
C
(28)
mcCt =('nC + )
 
yCt   yNCt

+ ('nX   ! (1  ) )
 
yXt   yNXt

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Ht=
HmcHt + Et [Ht+1] ; 
H  (1  H) (1  H)
H
(29)
mcHt =('nX   ! (1  ) )
 
yXt   yNXt

+ ( + 'nC)
 
yCt   yNCt

2.3 The public sector: Monetary policy and the
government
Monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor rule as thoroughly dis-
cussed in the literature, see e.g., Woodford (2003):
it = {+  Ct + "
mp
t (30)
it  log

Rft

is the policy rate and { denotes its steady state value. "mpt
reects a stochastic discrepancy between the target for the short-rate,
which the central aims to hit, and the actual short-rate and can thus
be interpreted as a monetary policy shock. I assume the central bank
obeys the Taylor rule and raises its policy rate in response to shocks to
ination such that the parameter  , is greater than one.
The central bank is not assumed to stabilise an aggregate pricing in-
dex, but instead stabilises ination in the consumption index. This is not
controversial in the case of sticky consumption goods prices and exible
construction goods prices, as in this case ination in the construction
sector does not give rise to any welfare losses for the consumers, see e.g.,
Aoki (2001).16 I keep ination in consumption goods in the Taylor-rule
in the case of sticky prices in both sectors, and I check the robustness of
the model with a Taylor rule in the construction ination index.
I assume the government holds the mortgage bonds issued by the
consumer. The interpretation is that a public institution resembling,
say, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac is set up to provide the consumers with
loans and to create liquidity in the mortgage bond market.
I specify an exogenously given path for public expenditures and I
consider a rule for the determination of the level of tax collections net of
transfers, Tt. I assume the government runs a public debt which, for sim-
plicity, consists of risk less, one-period nominal bonds. The government
thus faces the following budget constraint:
Mt + P
1
t B
1
t + P
m
t B
m
t = B
1
t 1 +B
m
t 1 +Mt 1 + Ptg   Tt
16In the case of exible prices in construction goods sector, the output in this sector
is always equal to the natural rate in that sector dened exactly as the output that
would prevail if the all producers in that sector were able to reset their prices at the
beginning of each period.
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As in section 2.1, B1t denotes bond holding as of time t maturing after
this period, which trades at price P 1t , and likewise, B
m
t denotes mortgage
bond holdings as of time t. On the right hand side, B1t 1 and B
m
t 1
indicates public debt and mortgage bonds maturing at time t, while
Ptg  PCtGCt + PXtGXt denotes public consumption of housing and
consumption goods.
I impose a balanced budget requirement for the government whereby
the primary decit must equal the net interest payments on the out-
standing debt and mortgage bond holdings following Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2000), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001):
Tt   Ptg =

1
P 1t
  1

P 1t B
1
t +

1
Pmt
  1

Pmt B
m
t
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) denes a Ricardian scal
policy as a scal policy that ensures a present discounted value of total
government liabilities that converges to zero under all possible, equilib-
rium or o¤-equilibrium, paths of endogenous variables. Given a mone-
tary policy rule that ensures a strictly positive interest rate, a balanced-
budget rule is Ricardian since the rule ensures that total government
liabilities are constant.
A Ricardian scal policy together with a monetary policy that is
not dependent on the paths of the debt nor taxes that conforms to the
Taylor principle,   > 1, implies a determinate equilibrium for aggre-
gate demand, ination and interest rates, see e.g., Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000), and Wood-
ford (2003). Intuitively, in the case of a Ricardian scal policy rule the
endogenous variables are independent of scal policy as the public debt
is bounded and the public sector therefore does not need to, say, print
an innite amount of money nor raise taxes to excessive levels at any
point in time.
2.4 Equilibrium and market clearing
Equilibrium in goods markets implies the production of the nal goods to
be allocated to household total expenditure and government expenditure
in the respective sectors:
YXt = Xt
YCt = Ct
Equilibrium in the labour market requires:
Nt = N
C
t +N
X
t
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Equilibrium in the government bond market requires the total net sup-
ply of bonds for all maturities is zero. The real nancial constraint dic-
tates that all new housing purchased by the consumers must be nanced
through the mortgage market:
bR;mt 
Bmt
PCt
= Qt
Xt
Pmt
Lastly, the government sector equilibrium consists of the balanced bud-
get requirement.
2.5 Deterministic steady state
The steady state user cost of housing can be determined from (11) and
the rst order condition for mortgage bond holdings, (8),
UH
UC
=Q (1   (1  )) (1 + )
= ~Q f1  (1  ) g (31)
in which ~Q  PH
PC
rxm
Rf
denotes the steady state value of the e¤ective
relative price, rxm denotes the steady-state holding period return from
a mortgage bond, and Rf  1

is the gross real interest rate. (31)
highlights the role of the yield curve in determining the user cost of
housing. As expected, if the cost of nancing new housing purchases in
the mortgage market equals the real short rate, rxm = Rf , the user cost
of housing collapses into the standard e¢ ciency condition for durables.
But a higher cost of mortgage nancing relatively to nancing by the
real short rate, rxm > Rf , tilts the optimal choice of relative spending on
housing towards more consumption on non-housing goods in the steady-
state.
I assume a steady-state ination rate of zero in both sectors. In a
ex price steady-state the relative price of housing is one, Q  PH
PC
= 1
and steady-state consumption is therefore given by
C =
1
!

rxm
Rf
  (1  )  rx
m
Rf

H
Real steady-state mortgage bond holdings can be determined from (3):
bR;m =
H
Pm
=
X
Pm
The consumer is short in mortgage bonds in the steady-state, as the
consumer need to renance the housing purchases needed to keep the
housing stock constant due to the rate of depreciation, .
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I can pin down the steady-state housing stock with the help of steady-
state consumption and the budget constraint:
H =
!N
rxm
Rf
  (1  )  rxm
Rf
	
+ 
(32)
Notice the steady-state housing stock depends on mortgage nancing
such that higher long interest rates decreases the stock of housing in the
economy in its steady state. I can lastly use (5), (31), and (32) to get
the steady-state labour supply:
N =
"
1
M

C
H
  
C
H
+ 
 !(1 )+# 1' !(1 )+
3 Analysing the model: The monetary transmis-
sion mechanism through a long interest rate
I solve, calibrate and analyse the models in the following sections. Atten-
tion will only be given to the monetary transmission mechanism through
changes in the short rate, the short ratese¤ect upon the long rate, and
the key role of the long rate for the determination of the user cost of
housing. I focus on the key variables in the model: ination, consump-
tion of both goods, relative prices, and the mortgage bond yield.
3.1 Calibration and solution method
I analyse the model properties through a calibration using Uhlighs toolkit,
see Uhlig (1995). Time is in quarters. I set the discount factor, , to
0.99, which implies a 1 percent real rate per quarter. !, the parameter
which governs the relationship between housing and consumption in (1),
must be positive to ensure positive marginal utility of housing. I set the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 2 and I set the elasticity of
labour supply around 0.6, which is standard in the literature, and which
is typically found in microeconometric studies. The Calvo parameter,
C , is set to 0.75, which gives an average duration of a price contract of
one year, while I set the weight on ination in the Taylor rule, (30), to
1.5. I likewise normalise the steady-state total production to be 1, and
I assume that the size of the housing sector is 25% of the total economy
following Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007). I follow Calza, Monacelli,
and Stracca (2006) and set the depreciation of the housing stock equal
to 0.005 or a yearly depreciation rate of 2%, which is quite conservative,
see e.g., Fraumeni (1997). The duration of the mortgage bond is set to
20 quarters.
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3.2 The response to a monetary policy shock in the
case of sticky construction prices and exible
consumption goods prices
This section analyse the model with (3) imposed in the case of com-
pletely asymmetric nominal rigidities. Construction goods prices are
fully exible, consumption goods prices are sticky and the production
sector consequently consists of relations (27) and (28) with natural rate
of output given by (26). Figure 1 displays the equilibrium dynamics of
the model to a monetary policy shock.17
A current one period higher than expected short rate lowers ination
and consumption of non-durable goods, see (17). This is what I have
denoted the rst monetary transmission channel. Two additional things
happen. Firstly, the relative price of housing falls, as consumption goods
face nominal rigidities, while construction goods prices do not. Secondly,
the long interest rate rises in response to the higher short rate, see (15),
thereby increasing the cost of nancing new housing purchases, see (12),
depressing output further through (17). This is what I have denoted the
second monetary transmission channel.
The relative price e¤ect dominates the e¤ect of higher cost of nanc-
ing and construction shoots up. Hence, the nancial constraint does not
solve the co movement problem presented in section 2.2 in a two-sector
model with symmetries across sectors, sticky non-durable and exible
durable prices.
I thus need to diminish the relative nominal rigidity between the sec-
tors, if I want to analyse the independent role of the nancial constraint.
It is nevertheless useful to compare the behaviour of construction of new
housing in this model to a model without the nancial constraint. That
is, a model reduced to (10) and (16) in which the expectations hypothesis
holds and the e¤ective relative price equals the relative price, ~Qt = Qt.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium dynamics of the sticky-exible price
economy in the absence of (3) to a shock to the monetary policy rate.
The dynamics look qualitatively similar: Ination, the relative price, and
consumption jump down in response to the monetary policy tightening,
while construction shoots up. However, the nancial constraint does
mitigate the co movement problem.
Figure 3 shows the di¤erence between the equilibrium dynamics to
17I plot all impulse response functions with di¤erent legends. A bond yield is the
average interest rate on a bond and the movements in the long interest rate are thus
by nature small.
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a monetary policy shock in the model with and without the nancial
constraint. A positive value for, say, construction in gure 3 implies
that construction shoots up by more in the model without constraint
(3) imposed. The model is not able to completely solve the co move-
ment problem - the relative price e¤ect dominates - but construction
shoots up by around 2.5 percentage point less in the model with the
nancial constraint than in the model without it. Hence, the co move-
ment problem is diminished for given relative nominal rigidities between
the sectors in a model with (3) imposed.
3.3 The response to a monetary policy shock in the
case of equally sticky prices
I now neutralise the relative price e¤ect to identify and isolate the impli-
cations for the aggregate economy of the nancial constraint. To achieve
this, I restrict producers of construction goods from resetting their prices
each period and instead force them to operate in the same environment
as the consumption good producers did in the model above. The produc-
tion side of the model consequently consists of relations (28) and (29). I
set the Calvo parameter in the construction sector, H , equal to 0.75 as
in the consumption goods sector, such that the degree of nominal rigid-
ity is equal across all producers in the economy. Hence, relative prices
are constant, Qt  ~Qt, such that the e¤ective relative price under (3) is
approximately equal to the relative interest rates, ~Qt  Et[RX
m
t+1]
Rft
.
Figure 4 shows the equilibrium dynamics of this model to a one period
shock to the current monetary policy rate. The higher policy rate lowers
demand and ination in the non-durable sector falls, see (17). This is
the same equilibrium response to a monetary policy shock as in the basic
model without the nancial constraint, and the e¤ects arise through the
rst monetary policy channel described in section 2.1.6. Further, in
response to the higher short-rate, the long interest rate rises through
(15) and this causes a contraction in the construction sector through the
user cost of housing, see (11), a further downward pressure upon current
consumption through (17), and this is the second channel for monetary
policy.
To get a grasp of the quantitative e¤ects of the nancial constraint,
I, as in section 3.2, consider a model with the same calibration and
same relations but without the constraint (3) imposed.18 Figure 5 shows
the di¤erence between the equilibrium dynamics of the model with an
18The impulse response functions for this model are left out of the paper for brevity.
However, gure 5 shows impulse response functions for the most important variables.
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equal degree of nominal rigidity with and without the nancial constraint
imposed. A positive value for, say, construction in gure 5 implies that
construction shoots up by more in the model without constraint (3)
imposed.
Construction falls in both models, but construction falls by 0.15 per-
centage points more in the model with the nancial constraint (top-right
gure in gure 5) and this is thus the quantitative e¤ect of the nancial
constraint in a model with completely symmetric rigidities. Both the
relatively lower housing stock and the higher bond yield feeds into the
IS-relation, equation (17), in the model with the nancial constraint and
consumption falls relatively more in the model with the nancial con-
straint. Ination is relatively higher in the model without the nancial
constraint arising as a consequence of the both relatively higher output
of consumption goods and greater activity in the construction sector.
Aggregate output is consequently greater without feedback e¤ects from
the long interest rate. Specically, relative aggregate output peaks at 20
basis points 3 quarters hence, and this is thus the quantitative e¤ect of
the nancial constraint on aggregate demand.
Figure 4 and 5 crystallises the main contribution of this paper. The
long interest rate plays an independent role di¤erent from the short-
rate, as the long interest rate a¤ects housing alone, and this monetary
policy channel is important a¤ecting around 25% of the total economy.
This together imply the transmission mechanism is altered from the
standard one-interest rate model, as the economy wide implications of
a monetary policy shock works not only through changes in short rates
and the implied e¤ect through the intertemporal rate of substitution, but
also through a downward pressure upon consumption of housing goods
through a higher cost of nancing goods.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyses the interaction between long interest rates, housing,
and monetary policy. I build a model which takes a rst step towards
a greater understanding of the equilibrium feed-back e¤ects between
the yield curve and the aggregate economy. The model provides an
independent role for the long interest rate through a nancial friction
which directly a¤ects the user cost of housing. This e¤ect opens up for
a second monetary policy channel di¤erent from the e¤ects of changes
in real short-rates upon the intertemporal consumption of non-durable
goods.
The long interest rate and its e¤ects upon the macro economy sig-
101
nicantly changes the way the monetary transmission mechanism works
in a DSGE model. Higher long-interest rate depresses consumption of
new housing through higher user cost, and as housing is big relatively
to the total economy, this e¤ect is economically important. I nd the
introduction of the long interest rate into a two-sector model is not by
it self su¢ cient to solve the co movement problem though it mitigates
it signicantly.
The policy implication of these ndings is that monetary policy mak-
ers need to study two relations further. One is the e¤ects from changes in
short interest rates onto longer interest rates. Second, it is vital for the
impact of monetary policy to understand how long rates a¤ect durables.
This is not a trivial task as the properties and the foundations of the
economically most important durable goods sector, the housing sector,
varies considerably both across countries and through time.
I do not see this conclusion as the end of the nancial constraint
introduced in this paper but rather as the beginning, as it opens of for
a host of possibilities to study. It could be interesting to introduce the
nancial constraint into a bigger model with more markets, and it could
especially be interesting to include capital into the model in this paper
and impose a similar nancial constraint as in this paper on the capital-
investment decision for rms in the economy. I leave this for future
research.
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5 Figures
Figure 1: The e¤ect upon key variables of an innovation to the mon-
etary policy rate in a sticky-exible price model in which the nancial
constraint is imposed
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Figure 2: The e¤ect upon key variables of an innovation to the mon-
etary policy rate in a sticky-exible price model without the nancial
constraint imposed
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Figure 3: The di¤erence between the e¤ects upon key variables of an
innovation to the monetary policy rate a model with sticky-exible prices
with and without the nancial constraint
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Figure 4: The e¤ect upon key variables of an innovation to the monetary
policy rate in a sticky-sticky price model in which the nancial constraint
is imposed
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Figure 5: The di¤erence between the e¤ects upon key variables of an
innovation to the monetary policy rate a model with symmetric nominal
rigidities with and without the nancial constraint
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Abstract
Empirical evidence points towards a mean term premium for
a 10 year bond of around 160 basis points per year and an un-
conditional standard deviation of around 50. DSGE models with
standard preferences have found it hard to generate these num-
bers. Common for these models is the use of higher-order ap-
proximations to generate non-zero, non-constant risk premia. I
use closed-form solutions for bond prices, and I apply a nancial
model for the study of nancial markets and not the other way
around as in the existing DSGE literature. The parameters in
the nancial model are mapped to structural parameters from an
underlying DSGE model. I generate plausible mean term premia,
while the unconditional standard deviation resides on the margin
with a model that fares no worse than a standard DSGE model.
The model gives an interpretation of the decline in term premia
from the Volker period in terms of better anchored ination ex-
pectations.
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1 Introduction
DSGE models have found it hard to model bond risk premia. Empirical
evidence for 10 year bonds points to a mean term premium of around 160
basis points per year with an unconditional standard deviation of around
50.1 DSGE models nd a mean term premia of around 2 basis points
per year and an unconditional standard deviation of around 0.1.2 The
disability of the DSGE literature to generate moments of term premia
has been denoted the Bond Premium Puzzle.
The DSGE literature generally looks at nancial markets with an
Euler equation for the study of macroeconomic quantities and less for
the study of risk. The DSGE literature also needs to use higher order
approximations to generate non-zero, non-constant risk premia.3 But
higher order terms are small by denition, so perhaps the modest suc-
cess of the DSGE literature in tting bond risk premia is due to the
approximations and not bad models per see. I consequently introduce
closed-form solutions for bond prices within the a¢ ne framework derived
from an Euler equation with an eye for the t of risk premia in a struc-
tural model. I ask in the light of these changes: Is the bond premium
puzzle really a puzzle? My answer to this question is no.
It is not irrelevant for macroeconomic research that standard spec-
ications of macroeconomic models cannot account for important fea-
tures of nancial markets. Sargent (2007) argues that until economists
have succeeded in getting a consumption-based asset pricing model that
works well, the New-Keynesian IS curve is built on sand because a rep-
resentative agents consumption Euler equation exactly is the IS-curve
central to the policy transmission mechanism in modern models. Risk
premia are also important to study in a macroeconomic framework ex-
actly through its role as the ip-side of the nancial markets.4 If you
can say a lot about macroeconomic variables in a model, which is able
to get risk premia right, you can also say a lot about the underpinnings
of risk and uncertainty, which are the backbone of the nancial industry.
Moreover, the bond market is massive and clearly plays a key role for
1The term premium is dened as the di¤erence between a forward rate of maturity
n and the expected future risk free rate n-periods hence. See e.g., Rudebusch and
Wu (2004), Kim and Wright (2005), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006).
2See e.g., Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), Rudebusch, Sack, and
Swanson (2007), Lawrence, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
3The exception is Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005) which obtain closed form
solutions for bond prices. However, their paper has a di¤erent motivation than risk
and they do not analyse risk premia directly.
4See e.g., Cochrane (2001) and Cochrane (2007).
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consumption and investment. As of 2006, the size of the international
bond market is an estimated $45 trillion which roughly equals total world
GDP, and bonds and interest rates act as underlying assets on a host of
derivatives.5
The consumption-based asset pricing literature has lately been quite
active in yield-curve modeling. Habit formation has been introduced into
the models, see e.g., Wachter (2006), following the reverse engineering
exercise in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), as well as recursive utility as
in Epstein and Zin (1989) combined with learning and adaptive expec-
tations, e.g., Piazzesi and Schneider (2007). Being partial equilibrium
models they tell little about the underlying macroeconomic sources that
generate the premia, and are as such less suited for the study of the
interactions between the macro economy and the nancial markets.
With the exception of the paper by Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson
(2007), the main focus of the DSGE literature, see e.g., Woodford (2003),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Smets and Wouters (2003), has not
been the nancial markets. Papers which explicitly analyse the bond
markets have used various nominal and real rigidities but end up with
implausible small moments of term premia, see e.g., Rudebusch, Sack,
and Swanson (2007), Rudebusch and Swanson (2007). Some successful
papers in this respect, Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006) and Ravenna
and Seppala (2006), tend to t term premia moments at the expense of
the macroeconomic side of their model, see also Rudebusch and Swanson
(2007).
This paper successfully ts bond risk premia as a result of two dif-
ferent modeling strategies relative to the existing literature. Firstly, I
construct a nancial model for the study of nancial markets starting
from a class of nancial models that empirically ts moments of term
premia. Markedly, these a¢ ne term structure models (AFTM), see e.g.,
Dai and Singleton (2002), Du¢ e and Kan (1994) and Ang and Piazzesi
(2003), provides closed-form solutions for bond prices and thus clears
the way for avoiding higher-order approximations.
The AFTM are based upon reduced form relations while I want to
study the interactions between a structural, macroeconomic model and
the bond market. I therefore set up a macroeconomic model, which
provides a micro-foundation for these relations and I identify structural
parameters that determine the size and variability of risk premia. The
question is consequently not what the implications are for bond risk
premia in a model set up for the study of the dynamics of macroeconomic
5Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt Bond Market Association as of November
2006, and World Bank.
112
variables, as in the existing DSGE literature. The question is instead
whether I can provide a micro foundation for nancial models which are
known to generate plausible bond risk premia.
I follow Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005) which uses the macro-
economic model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), while the consumer
preferences are subject to a preference shock. This preference shock takes
the form of stochastic habits due to Dai (2003), while I extend this habit
term with a subjective ination target. As shown in the paper, standard
preferences, like CARA preferences and habits, in a representative agent
model can neither generate plausible levels nor time variation in term
premia. Some extra terms in the representative consumerspreferences
are therefore needed if the model aims to deliver some hope in solving
the bond premium puzzle
Though stochastic habits have been applied in the existing literature,
e.g., Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005), I stress the economic reason-
ing behind the inclusion of the specic form of the preference shock is
dubious and its introduction into the model is a short-cut to achieve
time variation in risk premia. However, I show the terms are su¢ cient
to generate time-variation in term premia at business-cycle frequencies,
the stochastic habit term, and to model long run levels of nominal bond
yields and term premia, the subjective ination target, while the mecha-
nisms which generate risk premia can be given economic interpretations.
Stochastic habits, the subjective ination target, and the functional form
assumptions can in this view be seen as a second best microfoundation
for time variation in risk premia.
With habits, the marginal utility of consumption tomorrow depends
on consumption today. With stochastic habits, the interdependence be-
tween consumption today and marginal utility tomorrow is stochastic
and thus is marginal utility of an extra unit of consumption in the fu-
ture.
Means of time-series are hard to estimate and this is particularly so
for bond yields and bond risk premia, as these are both very persistent
and exhibit regime shifts, and this is the motivation behind the inclusion
of the subjective ination ination target.6 Nominal US yields show
rising yields until the beginning of the 1980s as a response of rising
ination. Thereafter, yields slowly decreased until the present. I not
only want to t means of bond yields and risk premia but also these
persistent, long run swings. Shocks to the subjective ination target
does exactly this being a main determinant of the long run swings in risk
6See e.g. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008) who estimate a regime-switching model
for bond yields and identies four regimes.
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premia and bond yields through an assumption about almost unit-root
behaviour, while it has almost no impact upon risk premia on business-
cycle frequencies, through a specic assumption about the correlation
between the subjective ination target shock and shocks to ination.
The subjective ination target captures the consumersaversion to
ination and can be thought of as a proxy for the cost of money holding.
A shock to the subjective ination target is a signal to the consumer that
the economy is likely to reside in a state with relatively high ination
in the future with a monetary policy tightening on its way with higher
real rates and lower consumption growth. A positive shock therefore de-
creases the utility of a given level of consumption and creates uncertainty
about the value the consumer attach to future asset payo¤s. Further,
the subjective ination shock creates persistent uncertainty about future
consumption growth as the shock a¤ects ination which is combated by
the central bank depressing consumption through higher real rates. Risk
compensation on the bond market depends upon consumption growth
because the consumers valuation of future payo¤ is dependent upon
past consumption through habits. The bond market therefore demands
a compensation for bearing subjective ination target risk both through
habits and through the uncertainty surrounding valuation of future pay-
o¤s.
The second strategy is to reverse engineer the parameters of the
macro-nance model along the lines of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
The mean term premium can not be increased through higher standard
deviations on the shock process or high risk aversion parameters as such
a boost also will boost the impulse responses in the underlying macro
economy. Accordingly, the task is to calibrate the macro-nance model
to generate plausible term premia and plausible dynamics for macro-
economic variables simultaneously with a standard calibration from the
DSGE literature.
The rst and most important contribution in this paper is that once
a su¢ ciently exible pricing model for bond prices with closed-form so-
lutions is applied, the bond premium puzzle disappears. Secondly, all
parameters in the macro-nance model can be given a clear economic in-
terpretation and key properties in terms of means, standard deviations,
determinacy, and impulse response functions are in line with both the
existing literature and with empirical evidence for the macro economy
and the nancial market. Finally, I am able to provide an economic in-
terpretation to the empirical observation of a decline in bond risk premia
and yields from the 80sto the present culminating with the so-called
bond yield conundrum during 2004-2006, which saw not only low but also
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negative risk premia, higher policy rates but a decrease in long yields. I
explain these movements in terms of a series of small negative shocks to
the subjective ination target through the years capturing long lasting
credibility gains in the conduct of monetary policy.
This paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets up a macro-
nance model of the term structure of interest rates. Section 2.1 pro-
vides an overview of the nancial side of the model to which the macro-
economic is mapped into. Section 3 introduces the consumers into the
economy and discusses how the functional form of their preferences trans-
forms into the term structure model introduced in section 2.1. Section
4 introduces the supply-side. Section 5 explains how the habit specica-
tion and the subjective ination target applied in this paper a¤ect the
macro economy and risk premia. Section 6 introduces monetary policy.
Section 7, solves for the bond prices in this macro-nance model. Section
8 analyses the model properties, and compares the key properties of the
model to empirical evidence, as introduced in section 8.1. This is done
through a calibration, as discussed in section 8.2. Section 9 concludes.
2 A simple macro-nance model of the yield curve
2.1 An overview
The following sections set up a macro-nance model of the term structure
of interest rates. The idea is to derive an Essentially AFTM from an
underlying macro economy, as there exists strong empirical evidence in
favour of this class of bond pricing models to t key moments of bond
yields including risk premia.7 This overview explains where I am going.
The price of a zero coupon bond at time t with time-to-maturity n
in an AFTM is given by:
P nt = exp
h
An +B
0
nXt
i
(1)
Yields are dened from prices as ynt =   1n log (P nt )    1npnt . Xt denotes
a vector of state variables in the economy
Xt+1 = + Xt +"t+1
in which  is the autoregressive parameter matrix,  is its vector of
constants, and denotes the covariance matrix for the underlying shocks
in the economy, "t+1, specied to be homoscedastic. The coe¢ cient An
and the matrix Bn only depends upon the maturity of the bond, and
7See i.e. Piazzesi (2003) for a survey of this class of models.
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respect the following recursions visualising the no-arbitrage restrictions
imposed upon the nancial markets by the AFTM:
An+1=An +B
0
n ( 0) +
1
2
B
0
n
0
Bn   0 (2)
B
0
n+1=B
0
n ( 1) 
0
1
Let Rft denote the gross risk free rate of interest and let it  log

Rft

denote the log risk free rate which in the following will be denoted simply
as the risk free rate. The yield of a bond which matures in the next
period must equal risk free rate which in the AFTM follows:
it = 0 + 
0
1Xt
The vector 
0
1 determines the loading of the state variables in the econ-
omy to the risk free rate of interest, while 0 determines the level of the
risk free rate of interest in the absence of any shocks.
This paper focus on risk premia and the key determinants behind
risk premia are the parameters 0 and 1. To see this in a simple way,
dene the expected, log-holding period return from holding an n-period
bond for one period in excess of the risk free rate of interest as
Et

hprnt+1
Et pn 1t+1   pnt   it
= 1
2
V art
 
hprnt+1
  covt  mt+1; hprnt+1 (3)
= 1
2
B
0
n 1
0
Bn 1 +B
0
n 1t (4)
in which I have introduced the (log) stochastic discount factor mt+1 
log (Mt+1) which prices all assets in the economy. The rst term is a
Jensen inequality term while the second term is a risk premium, which
arises from a non-zero covariance between the discount factor and the
return on the asset. From (4), the functional form for the risk premia
in an AFTM is given by B
0
n 1t: t 0+
0
1Xt denotes the market
price of risk ; the Sharpe ratio that an asset must earn if it loads on a
specic shock.8 The market price of risk is also equal to the Girsanov
kernel used to change probability measure, so An;Bn are functions of
the stochastic processes for the state variables in the economy under the
equivalent martingale measure. B
0
n 1 is the loading on bond prices of a
8The Sharpe ratio is dened as the excess return above the risk free rate divided
by its standard deviation. It can be shown that the standard deviation of (4) in an
AFTM equals BTn 1. Disregarding the Jensen-term, t therefore equals the Sharp
ratio.
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shock to the state-variables in the economy such that B
0
n 1 together
is the quantity of risk or the expected uctuation which investors can
expect from bond prices.
The model is essentially a¢ ne if 1 6= 0, which implies state-dependent
risk premia and therefore that the expectations hypothesis does not hold.
A completely a¢ ne model, 1= 0, can clearly not generate non-zero
standard deviations in risk premia. On the contrary, Dai and Singleton
(2002) shows that it is the combination of time variation in market prices
of risk, that is 1 6= 0, and correlated factors in a multifactor model that
is able to generate term premia as found in data.9
Market prices of risk and risk aversion arise from consumer prefer-
ences so the risk premium must be a function of the underlying deep
parameters in the economy. I provide an economic mapping to the
reduced-form relations in the AFTM through a closed economy DSGE
model along the lines of Woodford (2003), and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999), following Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005). I introduce exter-
nal stochastic habit formation in preferences to generate an essentially
AFTM due to Dai (2003), and I introduce an extra variable into the
habit term denoted the subjective ination target, which captures long
run swings in the term premium by introducing long run uncertainty
about the growth of consumption. As stressed in the introduction, both
stochastic habits and the subjective ination target are modeled in a
lax way relatively to the DSGE literature, but from (4), if the model
aims to t empirical bond premia it is of utmost importance to gener-
ate a non-zero 1 from the underlying model and these terms together
achieve this. CARA preferences, like used in many models within the
DSGE framework, as an example only generate a complete a¢ ne model,
while standard habit formation as in i.e. Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
is harder to t into the AFTM framework.
The following subsections provide the detail of the model, while
propositions (1) and (2) summarise the mapping between the AFTM
and the macro economy.
9Another way to introduce time variation in (4) is through conditional het-
eroskedasticity,  = t, such that the state-variables in the economy are of the
CIR form. However, for these models to be admissible, the market price of risk need
to be of the completely a¢ ne from, which clearly restricts the sign of risk premia in
the economy. See Du¤ee (2002) and Dai and Singleton (2002) for more on this topic.
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3 A simple macro-nance model of the yield curve:
The consumers
The representative consumer solves the following maximisation problem
with respect to labour supply, Nt, and an index of consumption goods,
Ct, in which Pt denotes the price level in the economy and t is the
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint:
max
C;N
Et
1X
t=T
tEt [U (Ct; Nt;Qt)]
 t

PtCt + Tt  WtNt   t +
 
Pt Bt  Bt 1

Pt denotes a row vector where each element corresponds to price of
a zero-coupon bond each with di¤erent maturity. Bt is the quantity
of these assets held at the end of period t by the consumer such that
negative entries correspond to borrowing. Pt denotes the price level in
the economy. The budget constraint says the consumer purchases of
consumption net of taxes, Tt, cannot exceed the income from labour,
WtNt, prot shares from the production sector, t, and the income from
bonds purchased at previous periods maturing at time t, Bt 1. The con-
sumer also purchases bonds maturing in period n, Pt Bt.10 The parameter
0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor.
I assume the household has some market power in the wage setting
process, and is free to reset wages at the beginning of each period. Con-
sequently the only di¤erence between a standard model with perfect
competition on the labour market and this model is the inclusion of a
wage mark-up, MWt , see e.g., Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) The
e¢ ciency conditions for optimal consumption, labour supply, and bond
holdings are the following:
t =
UCt (Ct;Qt)
Pt
(5)
UNtM
W
t = UCt (Ct;Qt)
Wt
Pt
(6)
10The budget constraint does not say that the consumer cannot buy or sell non-
maturing bonds but does include, say, a 10-year bond hold in 8 years. This can be
seen from the following simplied example with only two bonds of di¤erent maturity.
Consider the following budget constraint for the consumer: Ct   P 1t B1t   P 2t B2t =
Yt  B1t 1  B2t 2. Dene Bt 1  B1t 1 +B2t 2 as maturing debt, and dene its law
of motion as Bt = B2t 1 + Bt, which allow me to write: Ct   P 1t Bt   P 2t B2t =
Yt  Bt 1 , Ct  P 1t
 
B1t +B
2
t 1
 P 2t B2t = Yt  Bt 1  B2t 2  P 1t B2t 1. The total
resources are therefore not only this period bonds and maturing bonds, but also the
market value of the non-maturing long bonds.
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0 =  t Pt + Et

t+1 Pt+1

;8n (7)
Equation (5) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow
value of the ow budget constraint, while (6) is the optimality condition
for the consumption/leisure choice. (7) is the Euler equation for optimal
consumption through time.
I assume the following functional form for the utility function:
U (Ct; Nt) =
C1 t Qt   1
1    

1 + '
N1+'t (8)
in which  > 0, determines the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, ' > 0,
governs the Frisch labour supply, and  > 0. Qt denotes a preference
shock or an external stochastic habit term due to Dai (2003) and intro-
duced into the macroeconomic literature by Gallmeyer, Hollield, and
Zin (2005) to generate state dependent prices of risk, 1 6= 0 in (4). The
habit-term depends on aggregate consumption growth, ct+1, dened as
the log-change in aggregate consumption such that the consumer takes
the habit level as given when maximising utility. I extend the preference
shock with a subjective ination target, t. The (log) law-of-motion for
the preference shock, qt  log (Qt), is assumed to have the following
form:
 qt+1=cct (ct+1   Et [ct+1]) +  (t+1   Et [t+1]) (9)
+
1
2
2V art (t+1) +
1
2
(cct)
2 V art (ct+1)
The rst term in (9) makes current marginal utility dependent upon
past consumption growth in the economy, ct, and introduces habit
formation in preferences. The parameter c is negative such that, in
the spirit of habits, high consumption yesterday coupled with a positive
consumption shock today increases marginal utility today. The second
term in (9) captures the consumers aversion to ination such that a
positive shock decreases the utility of a given level of consumption in a
state with high ination relative to a state with low and stable ination.
 is thus positive.
Habits are the key to t moments of risk premia in this model. As
explained in section 2.1, without Qt the utility-function would collapse
into the standard CARA form widely applied in asset pricing literature
but with modest success, see e.g., Cochrane (2001), and would give a
completely AFTM unable to generate time variation in risk premia. A
deeper analysis of this proposition and of the terms in the preference
shock necessitates a look at the production side of the economy intro-
duced next.
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4 A simple macro-nance model of the yield curve:
The production sector
The modeling of the production sector follows the standard DSGE par-
adigm closely. Appendix (10.1) provides the details of production side
while this section only introduces the nal equations.
A nal goods producer assembles intermediate goods into a nal
good, while the intermediate goods producers face monopolistic com-
petition and Calvo pricing. A producer which is free to reset prices
each period sets its price, pt (i), as a markup MM  ( 1) over nominal
marginal cost, MCt  Wt
pt (i) =M
MWt
The parameter  governs the price elasticity of demand for the good
and is assumed to be strictly above one. Let small case letters denote
the log of the variable. Real marginal cost can be substituted out with
the output gap, xt, dened as the di¤erence between actual output and
the equilibrium level of output under exible prices and a constant wage
mark up, MW ,
mct = ('+ )xt +m
W
t =  mMt (10)
in which mct; mMt denotes the log linearisations of the real marginal
costs and the desired markup around their steady state respectively.
I denote ut a cost-push shock as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999)
representing deviations from (10) and embodies real imperfections that
generate a time-varying gap between output and its e¢ cient counterpart.
These ine¢ cient uctuations in the wage process stems from variation in
the wage mark-up from wage setting consumers and includes distortions
from taxes, wage bargaining power etc.
The pricing framework gives rise to a New-Keynesian Phillips curve
as a function of marginal costs, and constitutes the aggregate supply
side of the model:
t= mct + Et [t+1] + ut (11)
 (1  ) (1  )

in which t  log (Pt+1=Pt) denotes ination in the economysprice level
and  is the probability that a rm can reset its price at time t, see Calvo
(1983).
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5 Risk premia, habits and the subjective ination
target
The following sections explain how bond risk premia arise in this model
in general and the role of habits and the subjective ination target in
particular all for given prices, while the last section provides an eco-
nomic motivation behind the inclusion of the subjective ination target
into preferences. To do this, I start by dening a general asset pricing
framework and then I move on to consider asset prices as implied by the
macroeconomic model in this paper.
5.1 General asset pricing framework
Arbitrage free asset prices with the future uncertain pay o¤ t, P (t),
are from (7) given by the linear pricing relation:
P (t) = Et

Mt+1t+1

(12)
Mt+1 is the pricing kernel which from (5) and (7) equals the representa-
tive consumersintertemporal marginal rate of substitution
Pt = Et
24t+1
t
Mt+1
Pt+1
35 (13)
The gross risk free rate, Rft , equals the inverse of the conditional expec-
tation of the stochastic discount factor:
Rft = (Et [Mt+1])
 1 (14)
The price of a zero coupon bond maturing in n-periods follows from (12)
the recursion:
P nt = Et

Mt+1P
n 1
t+1

= Et [Mt+1:::Mt+n] (15)
Through the denition 1
P 1t
= Rft and the no-arbitrage restriction in (15),
state variables which a¤ect the gross risk free rate of interest also a¤ect
prices of bonds with longer maturities. From (3), if this state variable
generates a non-zero correlation between the payo¤ of the asset and
the discount factor, the state-variable further generates a non-zero risk
premia in bonds. I will use these two observations to explain how habits
and the subjective ination target works in this economy.
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5.2 Market price of risk
A main determinant of the correlation between the stochastic discount
factor and the payo¤ of the assets is from (4) the market price of risk.
One main task in the macro-nance literature is to identify these from
the macroeconomic model. The stochastic discount factor, Mt+1, equals
in a complete market setting contingent claims prices scaled by true
probabilities, P . Dene the risk neutral probabilities, Q, as
Q
P
= RftMt+1 (16)
The left hand side of (16) thus gives the Radon-Nikodym derivative.11
Given normally distributed shocks and positive probabilities that sum
to one, the left-hand side equal:
Q
P
= exp

 ~t"t+1   1
2
~
0
t
0 ~t

(17)
"t+1 denotes a vector of structural shocks in the economy and ~t is the
market price of risk which I thus can identify from (14), (13), and (16)
up to functional form assumptions about the utility function
Mt+1
Et [Mt+1]
= exp

 ~t"t+1   1
2
~
0
t
0 ~t

5.3 Model specic asset pricing framework
Turning to the model specic pricing framework, the stochastic discount
factor is derived from (5) and (7):
Mt+1 = 

Ct+1
Ct
  
Pt
Pt+1

Qt+1
Qt

(18)
I can under log-normality write (14) and (18) as follows:
mt+1 log (Mt+1) =     ct+1   t+1 +qt+1
it log

Rft

=  Et [mt+1]  1
2
V art (mt+1) (19)
in which     log () is the steady state real interest rate, andct+1 de-
notes consumption growth. (19) hides a Fisherian relationship in which
the second term, 1
2
V art (mt+1), captures precautionary savings.
11See e.g., Du¢ e (1996).
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Assumptions about the economy need to ensure the expectation
of the right hand side of (17) is one, as it is a probability measure,
and such that the market price of risk is linear, a restriction imposed
by the AFTM. I impose conditional independence between shocks to
consumption growth and shocks to the subjective ination target due
to the AFTM restriction. The variance terms in (9) make sure that
Et [qt+1] =  12V art (qt+1) such that the probabilities sum to one.
Hence, the variance terms gures in (9) such that the model can gener-
ate term premia, while it is relatively hard to come up with a convinc-
ing economic explanation to why they should a¤ect preferences directly
though both consumption variability and ination variability can not be
thought of a being especially pleasant for consumers.
The following two sections use this framework to explain the eco-
nomics behind habit and the subjective ination target, taken their
presence into preferences as given, and especially their impact upon the
non-risky part in the yield curve, dened as expectations of future risk
free rates, and the risky part dened through (4).
5.4 The economics behind external stochastic habits
To help gain intuition behind the preference shock and the terms therein,
see (9), I assume temporarily that consumption growth can be written
into a linear stationary process12
ct+1 = cct + c"
c
t+1 (20)
in which "ct+1  N (0; 1) ; c 2 ( 1; 1). I, for ease of exposition, consider
only the real part of the stochastic discount factor
mRt+1 =     ct+1   cctc"ct+1  
1
2
(cctc)
2 (21)
The marginal utility of consumption tomorrow is in this framework given
by:
@U (Ct+1)
@Ct+1

mt+1=mRt+1
= C t+1Q
C
t exp
 
 cct"ct+1  
(cctc)
2
2
!
(22)
in which QCt  QCt 1 exp
h
(cct 1c)
2
2
+ cct"
c
t+1
i
Habit is the opposite of durability: Consumption today raises the
marginal utility of consumption tomorrow. A shock to consumption
12This will up to a constant be so in the general model. See section 6.
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through the stochastic habit term,  cct"ct+1, is a direct shock to the
consumersmarginal utility of consumption, like a preference shock in
a non-habit model. The di¤erence is that the e¤ect of a preference
shock in this model depends upon consumption in the previous period
such that if the consumer came from a state with a booming economy, a
positive consumption shock will raise the marginal utility of consumption
tomorrow, and if the boom was big, so is the consumersappetite for
consumption. Risk premia arises in response to uncertainty, so it is the
stochastic dependence of the valuation of marginal utility tomorrow and
consumption today that generates risk premia, as the consumer does not
know for sure how payo¤s of the asset is valued in the periods to come.
5.4.1 Risk premia and habits
I note from (1) and (2) the coe¢ cient Bn 1 can be read o¤ from (20).
Let Bcn denote this coe¢ cient in (1) and write B
c
n+1 = B
c
n (c   cc) 
c1, 
c
1   (c   c2c). The market prices of risk can be found from
(17), such that the risk premium in a model under the assumptions (20)
and (21) is:13
Ect

hprnt+1
 Bcn 12ccovt   "ct+1   cct"ct+1; "ct+1
Bcn 12c 
c0
+Bcn 1
2
ccct
c1Xt
(23)
The rst term in (23) visualises the CARA part of the risk premia can-
not generate any non-zero standard deviation in bond risk premia, but
can only generate a maturity specic premia through Bcn 1. This con-
stant risk premia is increasing in . Positive risk premia are attached to
risky payo¤ if the consumer receives positive payo¤s when the consumer
does not want them. That is, when the consumer already enjoys a high
level of consumption thus increasing consumption variability. The more
the consumer dislike this consumption variability, the higher  is, the
more the consumer want to avoid assets that pays o¤well when the con-
sumer already feels wealthy, and such an asset consequently demands
a higher premium for the consumer hold it. Looking at An and Bn in
(1), 0 a¤ects the long run mean of the yields under the Q-measure, and
consequently the rst moment of risk premia.
The stochastic habit term, Qt, introduces state dependent risk pre-
mia through the second term in (23), and thus a potential for tting
second order moments of term premia. From (22), with habits, the val-
uation of payo¤s, extra consumption in the period to come, depends on
13The approximation arises due to the ignorance of the Jensen term.
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consumption in the previous period, and thence does the risk premia at-
tached to the risky asset. From (22) and (23), the coe¢ cient c plays the
dual role of determining the sensitivity of the representative consumers
risk aversion to the current growth rate of aggregate consumption, the
market price of risk, as well as the dependence between the marginal
utility of consumption and previous level of consumption growth.
5.4.2 Habits and the risk free rate of interest
I now turn to the relationship between habits and the expectations part
in bond yields consisting of risk free rates of interest, which in this
simplied framework is given by:
ict =  + Et [ct+1] 
2
2
2c   c2cct (24)
The last term in (24), c
2
cct, arises through the stochastic habit term
giving rise to a non-zero correlation between consumption growth today
and tomorrow. Holding consumption today and expected consumption
tomorrow constant, an increase in consumption at time t increases the
marginal utility of consumption today making the consumer to borrow
from the future, driving up the risk free rate. Habits thus introduce
persistence in the risk free rate and, through (15), further out in the
yield curve.
The rst three terms have standard interpretations. The short-rate is
increasing in the time preference, , and expected consumption growth,
Et [ct+1], as the consumer has an incentive to try to borrow to reduce
the discrepancy between consumption today and in the future, while the
short-rate depends negatively on the precautionary savings term, 
2
2
2c ,
as the consumer build a bulk ward against swings in consumption in
terms of higher savings.
5.5 The economics behind the subjective ination
target
The subjective ination target is assumed to follow the stationary sto-
chastic process
t+1 = 1 + t + 

t + "

t+1 (25)
in which "t+1  N (0; 1) ; ;  2 ( 1; 1) and 1 is a constant term.
Exogenous shocks to the subjective ination target, "t+1, can arise due
to, say, greater political pressure upon the central bank governor to let
ination rise and keep growth high. t is not an ination target for
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the monetary authority as it does not explicitly enters into any Taylor-
rule nor explicitly in any central bank loss function as in e.g., Graeve,
Emiris, and Wouters (2008) and Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006).
However, the presence of the term t into (25) implies that, say, tighter
monetary policy is able to decrease the subjective ination target.
I assume that  is close to one consequently introducing a unit-
root process for the representative consumerssubjective ination tar-
get. Credibility takes time to build and the heart of credibility is that it
is long lasting.14 Further, though persistent, movements in the subjec-
tive ination target should a priori not a¤ect aggregate variables in the
economy to a great extend at business-cycle frequencies, and I impose
this restriction upon the model as well.
I assume the following dynamics for the cost-push shock in (11)
ut+1 = u + uut + 
u
t + u"
u
t+1 (26)
in which "ut+1  N (0; 1) ; u; u 2 ( 1; 1), and u is a constant term,
such that ination depends upon the subjective ination target. From
(11) aggregate supply depends upon a cost-push shock embodying real
imperfections which arise from ine¢ cient variations in wages. I let these
exogenous variations in wages be dependent upon the subjective ination
target consequently assuming that the subjective target a¤ects labour
market imperfections. I follow Gali (2008) by assuming these real imper-
fections arise exogenously and so does this interdependence between the
labour market and long run ination expectations. The intuition is that
the wage setter can only set nominal wages but cares about the number
of goods the wage is able to purchase. The subjective ination target
embeds expectations of the level of ination thus making the decision
for the wage setter dependent upon this variable.15 ;16
14A highly persistent process for an ination target is likewise supported by data,
see e.g., Dewachter and Lyrio (2006), Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006), and
Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2006).
15The empirical literature on the interrelationship between the labour market and
monetary policy regime is scarce. Abildgren (2008) provides evidence for a relation-
ship between the monetary policy regime and the length of labour contracts for the
case of Denmark such that stable regimes provides longer labour contracts. Fregert
and Jonung (1998) and Fregert and Jonung (2006) provide similar evidence for the
case of Sweden.
16The subjective ination target thus gures explicitly in the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, (11), and through this relation also in the reaction function for the
central bank, see section 6. In this respect, the model does not di¤er much from the
existing literature, see e.g., Graeve, Emiris, and Wouters (2008), Hordahl, Tristani,
and Vestin (2006).
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5.5.1 The macroeconomic e¤ects of a subjective ination tar-
get shock
The subjective ination target causes persistent uncertainty about con-
sumption growth in the economy, and this uncertainty stems from the
subjection of monetary policy credibility. To see this, reintroduce the
nominal part of the stochastic discount factor and, as in section 5.4,
calculate the marginal utility of consumption tomorrow:
@U (Ct+1)
@Ct+1

mt+1=mt+1
=

@U (Ct+1)
@Ct+1

mt+1=mRt+1
 exp
 
 "t+1  
()
2
2
!
The macroeconomic implications of a one-period shock to the ination
target are twofold. Firstly, the subjective ination target shock decreases
utility of a given level of consumption, as consumers do not like ination.
That is, the consumer enjoys consumption more if the consumption takes
place in a state with stable perceptions of future ination, as higher
perceptions of future ination is a signal of low marginal growth at some
point in the future through monetary policy even though the current
level of output in the economy is high with a low level of ination.
Secondly, an exogenous shock to the subjective ination target in-
troduces an indirect a¤ect on consumption growth that runs through
the cost-push shock which increases through u in the period to come.
This higher cost-push shock in turn pushes ination up through (11).
Monetary policy combats this shock to ination raising the real rate
tilting the path of intertemporal consumption through the IS-curve.17
The higher level of ination further pushes up the subjective ination
target through  in (25) repeating the e¤ects. The subjective ination
target is close to be a unit process,   1, so these e¤ects are persistent,
and hence causes uncertainty about long run consumption growth.
5.5.2 The asset pricing e¤ects of a subjective ination target
shock
The macro economy is the ip-side of the nancial market, so the macro-
economic a¤ects of a one period shock to the subjective ination target
should also turn up in bond yields, and they do. To gain insight into the
functioning of the subjective ination target, assume at this stage that
17See section 6.
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ination can be written directly in terms on the cost-push shock:18
t+1 = t + 

t + "

t+1
in which "t+1  N (0; 1) ; ;  2 ( 1; 1). Through (17) the market price
of subjective ination target risk are 0 =  and 

1 = 0. The subjective
ination target thus a¤ects the long run mean of the yields under the
Q-measure. The more the consumer dislike ination, the higher  is,
the more the marginal utility of a given level of consumption varies
in response to subjective ination target shocks. The interpretation
of the parameter  is consequently that it measures the representative
consumerslevel of risk aversion to the current subjective ination target
shock. As in (23), positive risk premia are attached to risky payo¤ if the
consumer gets positive payo¤s when the consumer do not want them,
that is when marginal utility is low. The subjective ination target shock
decreases marginal utility, so the bond market is willing to pay a price
to get rid of payo¤ that materialises when the subjective ination target
is high.
This is the direct e¤ect on risk premia from the subjective ination
target but not the only one in a model with habits. The subjective
ination target creates persistent uncertainty in consumption growth,
and consumption growth is from (23) the key determinant of the time
varying part of the risk premia. Hence, the subjective ination target
through habits a¤ects variations in the long run level of risk premia.19
Lastly, the short-rate can in the full model be written as:
it = i
c
t + Et [t+1] 
1
2
V art (t+1)  covt (ct+1; t+1) (27)
in which the third and forth terms combined constitutes ination risk
premia. Hence, the subjective ination target only indirectly inuences
the short-rate through its e¤ects upon consumption growth and ination.
18This will up to a constant be so in the general model. See section 6.
19The specication of the subjective ination target and the external stochastic
habits is akin to the long run risk specication in Bansal and Yaron (2004) with
one main di¤erence: Bansal and Yaron (2004) specify a specic structure upon the
consumption endowment, while I specify the growth rate of marginal utility of con-
sumption. Bansal and Yaron (2004) model the growth rate of consumption to be
dependent upon a small persistent predictable component, while uctuations in eco-
nomic uncertainty is modeled through time-varying volatility. The authors argue
their model is able to explain a various nancial markets puzzles like the equity
premium puzzle.
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5.5.3 A di¤erent interpretation of subjective ination target
and stochastic preferences
The previous sections explained the economic mechanism between risk
premia, stochastic habits and the subjective ination target. This sec-
tion aims to motivate the inclusion of the subjective ination target into
preferences. I argue in this section that there exists an equivalence be-
tween the inclusion of the subjective ination target into preferences and
into the budget constraint following Feenstra (1986). Ination surprises
erode the real value of outstanding debt and wages, and as such provide
an explicit explanation for ination aversion.
I show in appendix 10.5 how the budget constraint can be rewritten
into
crt  
nX
i=1
rit ib
ri
t i=
WtNt +t   Tt
Pt
 
nX
i=1
 
brit   brit i

(28)
 
nX
i=1
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 
1 + rit i

"
i 1X
j=0
 
t j   et j
#
"
i 1Y
j=0
(1 + t j)
# brit i
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
in which superscript r denotes variables deated by the price level in the
economy, Pt. I have introduced rt j 
"
i 1Y
j=0
 
1 + et j
# 1  
1 + Y jt j
j  
1 to denote the ex ante return from t   j to t, in which  1 + Y jt jj
denotes the j-period bond yield and et j denotes expected ination.
The last term in (28) highlights the way unanticipated ination can
change income in that period.
Consider now condition (5) from the consumers maximisation prob-
lem repeated here for convenience
UCt
 
C;Qt

Pt
= t (29)
The lagrange multiplier, t, can be given the interpretation as the shadow
value of an extra unit of income. A positive subjective ination target
shock decreases the left hand side of (29) and therefore must the shadow
value of an extra unit of income decrease as well, given the price level in
the economy.
Now assume a model in which the subjective ination target shock
a¤ects ination in (28) directly such that a positive shock erodes the real
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value of bond debt. This is turn raises income pushing down the shadow
value of extra income and the right hand side of (29) falls. Consumption
must therefore rise or, as in this model, the ination shock must decrease
the marginal utility of a given level of consumption reestablishing the
equality sign in (29).
Lastly, I also stress the similarity between models with money in the
utility function, see e.g. Gali (2008), and a model with a subjective
ination target shock included into preferences. In money-in-the-utility
models, the consumersutility is increased by an increase in money hold-
ings holding constant the path of real consumption for all t, and that is
so even though money holdings are never used to purchase consumption.
Putting money in the utility function is a useful shortcut for ensuring
a demand for money. There are many models for the e¤ects of ina-
tion upon the well-being for the consumers like shoe-leather costs, menu
costs, ination surprises eroding purchasing power through falling real
wages etc. Including an subjective ination target shock in the prefer-
ence shock is a useful shortcut for ensuring the consumer faces aversion
to higher ination, and as for money-in-the-utility function, it is just a
shortcut, and as money-in-the-utility models introduces a demand for
money in a simple and tractable way, the inclusion of the subjective in-
ation target directly as a preference shock captures ination aversion
in a simple and tractable way.
6 A simple macro-nance model of the yield curve:
Monetary policy
The Central Bank solves the problem of minimising the expected, dis-
counted present value of future output gaps and ination with respect
to its policy instrument, the short-rate of interest, it, given aggregate
demand and aggregate supply
min
(i)
1
2
Et
" 1X
i=0
i
 
 x2t+i + 
2
t+i
#
in which   represents the weight of output gap uctuations in the loss
function for the central bank.
Aggregate supply is given by (11). Appendix 10.2 derives from (5)
and (7) the following IS-relation, a relationship between consumption
growth, and the short real interest rate, which constitute the demand
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side in this economy:
(1  cV art (ct+1))xt=Et [xt+1]  cV art (ct+1)xt 1 (30)
 1

(it   Et [t+1])  

  1


V AR   1


COV
+zt+1   cztV art (ct+1)
I have dened

V AR 1
2
V art (t+1) + 
21
2
V art (ct+1)

COV  cov ( t+1; ct+1) + cov ( t+1;qt+1)
in which the latter two denitions denotes conditionally constant co-
variance and variance terms respectively. The ination terms combined
constitute the ination risk premium discussed in section 5.5. zt, de-
notes the change in the natural rate of output less relative government
spending interpreted as a demand shock and follows the following sto-
chastic process
zt+1 = 2 + zzt + z"
z
t+1
in which "zt+1  N (0; 1) ; z 2 ( 1; 1), and 2 denotes a constant. (30)
is the ip-side of the short-rate of interest presented in (5.4) and (5.5)
and the same intuition applies namely that habits introduces persistence
into the consumers demand for goods in the economy represented by the
term cV art (ct+1).
Following e.g. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) the solution to the
central bank problem is given by:
t =  
1
( ('+ ))2 +   (1  u)
ut  ut (31)
xt =    ('+ )
( ('+ ))2 +   (1  u)
ut   zut (32)
in which  and z are constants. xt =  zut reects a central bank that
pursues a leaning against the wind policy as in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) such that a positive cost-push shock that pushes ination above
target makes the central bank to raise interest rates and thus lower the
output gap. Hence, under discretion, the central bank lets the output
gap and ination to vary in proportion to the value of the cost-push
shock in this period.
The macroeconomic side of the model thus consists of the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve, (11), the IS-relation, (30), and central bank
policy responses, (31) and (32). The next section derives bond prices
consistent with this macroeconomic model.
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7 A simple macro-nance model of the yield curve:
The nancial market
Appendix 10.2 shows that consumption growth can be written as a sum
of the change in the output gap, xt+1, and the demand shock, zt:
ct+1 = xt+1 +zt+1 (33)
Use (31) and (32) to rewrite ination and growth in consumption:
t = ut; ct+1 =  zut+1 +zt+1
Shocks to ut a¤ect ination and I will in view of this interpret the cost-
push shock as a nominal shock though the shock originates in the real
economy.
The state variables in this economy, Xt+1, are thenceforward the
cost-push shock, the demand shock, and the subjective ination target
shock, which together have the following dynamics consistent with the
discussion in section 5.5:20
Xt
0BBB@
t+1
zt+1
ut+1
ut
1CCCA =
0BBB@
1
2
3
3
1CCCA

+
26664
 0  z;u 0
0 z 0 0
 0 u 0
0 0 1 0
37775

0BBB@
t
zt
ut
ut 1
1CCCA
+
26664
 0 0 0
0 z 0 0
0 0 u 0
0 0 1 0
37775

0BBB@
"t+1
"zt+1
"ut+1
0
1CCCA
"t+1
; "t+1 v N
 
0(4;4); I(4;4)

(34)
The following proposition summarises the mapping between the AFTM
and the underlying macroeconomic model.
Proposition 1 The structural economy admits the following expressions
for the stochastic discount factor, market prices of risk, and the (short)
nominal rate of interest:
mt+1 =  it   1
2

0
t
0
t  0t"t+1
20Note that  in the simplyed framework in (25) equals  z;u in the full model.
Likewise, the parameter u equals .
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it = 0 + 
0
1Xt (35)
The coe¢ cient in the short-rate equation is given by:
0 
"
 +  (1  z) ~2 +
h
(1  u) ~3   ~1
i
 1
2
22z   12 ( z+)2 2u
#

0
1
h
; z; u; 0
i0
 =  (  z)
z = z + c
2
z + cz (z )2u
u=

( z+) u + z  cz2z   cz2 (z+)2u

The market prices of risk are given by:
t= 0+1Xt (36)
0 =
h
; ; (z+) ; 0
i0
1 =
26664
0 0 0 0
0 c  zc zc
0 zc z2c  z2c
0 0 0 0
37775
26664
t
zt
ut
ut 1
37775
The elements in the 1-matrix bridge two explanations for the expec-
tations hypothesis puzzle. McCallum (1994) shows how monetary policy
can break the expectations hypothesis while Dai and Singleton (2002)
contributes the empirical evidence for the puzzle to time-variation in
risk premia, and both are right in this framework. The expectations
hypothesis does not hold because of time-variation in risk premia, but
this time variation is not something that arises out of the blue. It is an
equilibrium response to monetary policy through the policy parameter
z.
It is intuitive why central-bank responses to variation in the output
gap inuence risk premia. Risk premia arises due to the covariance be-
tween growth in marginal utility and the payo¤of the asset, see (4). The
representative consumersmarginal utility growth depends on variation
in the output gap, so the central bank response to variations in this
variable therefore must play a role for market price of risk.
As explained in section 5.4 and 5.5, the expression for the nominal
short-rate is a Fisherian relationship minus ination risk premia and
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precautionary savings terms. The parameter  governs the a¤ect from
the subjective ination target onto the short-rate, so a small value for
this parameter is consistent with an subjective ination target that,
through its near unit-root behaviour, a¤ects the economy in the long-
run and not on business-cycle frequencies.
The processes in this economy, (34), the short-rate, (35), and the
market price of risk, (36), are a¢ ne. Hence, only the measure change
from the observed probability measure to the equivalent martingale mea-
sure is needed to apply the bond price solution in (1). Using the Girsanov
theorem, see e.g. Du¢ e (1996), p. 288, I get:
Xt+1=+ Xt+"t+1 ,
Xt+1=+ Xt+

"Qt+1  t

,
Xt+1=( 0)
Q
+ ( 1)
Q
Xt +"
Q
t+1
Subscript Q denotes the mean term, Q, autoregressive matrix, Q, and
shocks to the economy, "Qt+1, under the Q-measure.
Proposition 2 summarises the closed form solution for bond prices in
this economy:21
Proposition 2 The state-dynamics, the pricing kernel, and the market
prices of risk imply an Essentially A¢ ne model for bond prices given by
(1) and (2)
Proof. See appendix (10.3)
The bond price solutions in proposition 2 are useful both because
they avoid approximations but also because they allow a deeper under-
standing of the determination of risk premia in terms of their macroeco-
nomic driving forces. I exploit both points in the following.
8 Analysing the model
The macro-nance model is next solved, calibrated and simulated. I
analyse risk premia through a decomposition of the yield curve into
21It might seem odd that the time-varying part of the market prices of risk in
proposition 2 does not depend on shocks to, say, ination. One reason behind this is
that in this case the proposition would no longer hold, as the state-dynamics under
the Q-measure would no longer be linear due to the presence of, say, tcct.
Proposition 2 thus restricts the model to some extent, and the natural trade-o¤ in
macroeconomic modeling between simplicity and model properties arises.
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an expectations part, ESnt , and a term premia part, TP
n
t , in which
fnt  pnt   pn 1t is the forward rate:
ynt =
1
n
n 1X
i=0
f it =
1
n
n 1X
i=0
Et [it+i]
ESnt
+
1
n
n 1X
i=0
 
f it   Et [it+i]

TPnt
(37)
The term fnt  Et [it+n] has a portfolio interpretation: Borrow for a year
in the future spot market and contract today to lend in the forward
market. The di¤erence is the expected excess return or risk premia.22
Section 8.1 denes a good t of the model as a model that ts em-
pirical rst and second order moments of risk premia, consumption, in-
ation, and the short and long rate of interest. Section 8.2 discusses the
calibration of the model. Section 8.3 is devoted to a deeper analysis of
the model.
8.1 A denition of a good t for the model
The key research question in this paper is whether a macroeconomic
model is able to generate term premia in the range of 160 bp. per year
and an unconditional standard deviation of around 50 for a bond with
10 years to maturity. These numbers are averages of estimates for term
premia from nominal yield data for the U.S. from the beginning of the 80s
until the present found in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2005), Kim and
Wright (2005), Rudebusch and Wu (2004), and Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2006), ranging from 106 bp. to 210 bp. for the mean and 17-69 bp. for
the unconditional standard deviation. The relatively large di¤erences
between these estimates reect that estimation of risk premia is not
trivial and the literature lacks a widely accepted method and model, see
e.g. the discussion in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006). I will bear this
caveat in mind when I evaluate the t of the model.
I also evaluate the model against macroeconomic data in terms of the
mean and the unconditional standard deviation of the macroeconomic
variables in the model. One lesson from the previous section is that
market prices of risk are endogenously determined from the consumers
marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and tomorrow.
22TPnt is also equal to a sequence of holding period returns
1
n
n 1X
i=1
 
f it   Et [it+i]

=
1
n
n 1X
i=1
Et

hprn+1 it+i

so the analysis in (4) holds. It is however easier to implement TPnt using forward
rates rather than using holding period returns.
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Therefore, risk premia varies only when the macroeconomic variables
that determines this rate of substitution varies. This point haunts the
calibration of the DSGE models as almost all the parameters in the
models must t both a property on the macroeconomic side as well as
on the nancial side of the model.23 It is thus not su¢ cient to evaluate
the model against nancial data. Macroeconomic data must be included
as well.
Table 1 summarises the empirical moments which the model aims to
t
Mean Standard Deviation
Term Premium 162 52
Short Rate of Interest 657 296
Long Rate of Interest 761 228
Consumption 172 328
Ination 300 300
Table 1: This table shows moments of macroeconomic variables and bond risk premia. Moments
are calculated from U.S. data from the beginning of the 80s until the present. The calculation of the
moments for the term premium is explained in the text. The moments of the short interest rate, a
1-year bond, and the long interest rate, a 10-year bond, are calculated from the data in Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2006). The moments for the (log) consumption growth rate are from Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). The moments for ination are from Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin
(2006). Everything is measured in basis points per year.
Standard deviations, though problematic, are a good measure for
the t of the macroeconomic model in this paper, as excess variability in
the aggregate economy is likely to be the result if the calibration boots
term premia by boosting standard deviations and/or risk parameters.
However, the macroeconomic model still needs to be determinate and
provide impulse response functions that resemble closely those found in
comparable models in the DSGE literature, see e.g., Woodford (2003)
and Gali (2008).
23As an example, from (4) the key to t the nancial moments is the parameters
that determines risk, say ; c or  in this model, together with the standard devia-
tions on the shocks in the economy, . A boost to these parameters is likely to induce
implausible behaviour for the macro economy, as higher standard deviations and risk
parameters leads to a more volatile behaviour of the macroeconomic variables, as
both the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, (11), and the IS-relation, (30), depend on
the same parameters as risk premia.
Further, though the utility function includes stochastic habits,  is still both the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal rate of substi-
tution, so boosting  clearly has profound implications for the response from short-
rates to consumption growth.
136
8.2 Calibration
The model is analysed, calibrated, and solved using Uhlighs toolkit, see
Uhlig (1995). Table 2 presents the calibrated parameters. I impose near
Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
 0.9875 u 0.001
 0.79 z 0.9
 1.5 u 0.8
' 1.36 u -0.15
  0.175  0.99
 10  0.001
c -30 z 0.00043
 0.001065 u -0.0000051
z 0.00115 u 0.001
Table 2: This table shows the values of the calibrated parameters. One period in the model
corresponds to one quarter. The model is calibrated to US data.
unit-root behaviour for the subjective ination target,   1. u is
small and negative such that the central bank is able to inuence the
subjective ination target but only slowly through time. The calibration
of the parameters ; ';  resemble values used in the DSGE literature.
 is small in line with the discussion in section 5.5. The calibration
of   implies a determinate macroeconomic model obeying the Taylor
principle, see e.g. Woodford (2003). Both the intertemporal rate of
substitution, 1

, and the standard deviations are set to rather conserva-
tive values, and are no higher than what is used in the existing DSGE
literature.
The calibration of the constant term in (34), , ensures the state-
variables, Xt, and the short-rate, it, converge to long-run means as found
in data. The endpoints, V 1t , of a process, Vt, are the limiting conditional
forecasts of the process, V 1t  Et [Vt+j]
j!1
. The end points ofXt thus equal:
X1= [I  ] 1 =
h
  3

  1z 1;u (u   1)
2
1 z
1
z
1
;u
3 +
1
z
1
;u
i0
The end point for risk free rate equals:
Et [it+j]
j!1
= 0 + 
0
1X
1 (38)
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and the end-point for the individual terms in the term premia, TP1t ,
equals:
TP1t  
0
1
n 
I   Q
 1
Q   (I   ) 1
o
 01
 
X1Q  X1

Conditional forecasts clearly play a key role both for the ESnt -, and
TP nt -part in (37) so the calibration of X
1 is not innocuous.
I calibrate  such that the end-point of the subjective ination target
is 300 bp. per year and such that the end-point of the demand shock,
zt, equals 172 bp. per year, which is the average growth rate of con-
sumption from table 1. The calibration implies an endpoint of the risk
free rate of around 700 bp. per year, which is within the estimates in
table 1.24
8.3 Results
8.3.1 The Bond Premium Puzzle is not a puzzle
The key result of this paper is stated in table 3 consisting of rst and
second order moments obtained from simulations of the model: The
Bond Premium Puzzle is not a puzzle. The mean of the term premia is
Mean Standard Deviation
Term Premium 186 (162) 17 (52)
Short Rate of Interest 505 (657) 317 (296)
Long Rate of Interest 858 (761) 18 (228)
Consumption - 247 (328)
Ination - 355 (300)
Table 3: This table shows model simulated moments for key variables in the economy. The
numbers in brackets are the numbers from table (1) repeated here for convenience.
close to the goal of 162 bp. from table 1. The model gives a somewhat
small standard deviation of the term premia though it is a lot bigger
than what the literature so far has found, and it does reside within the
interval for empirical estimates of unconditional standard deviations of
24Gallmeyer, Hollield, and Zin (2005) introduces an exogenous preference shock
into their habit term. I could have included such a shock into my model and through
its constant term have obtained an extra free parameter. However, economic the-
ory tells very little about the value of this parameter and such a parameter should
therefore neither be a key determinant for the level of the term structure nor term
premia. The ination target in contrast explicitly provides a constant parameter
with a clearer economic interpretation.
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term premia. As can be seen from the standard deviations for all the
macroeconomic variables, the risk free rate, consumption, and ination,
the model achieve this with a good t of the macroeconomic side of the
model.
The model does have troubles with the t of the standard deviation
of the long interest rate, which is o¤ its empirical counterpart by a factor
12. This is a general problem in the literature, see e.g., Den Haan (1995)
or Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) which denote this the excess
volatility puzzle. The underlying problem is stationary and ergodic shorts
rates which shows up in almost any DSGE model, implying convergence
to a constant too fast to account for the empirical volatility in the long-
end of the yield, see e.g. Atkeson and Kehoe (2008), and the same
problem prevail in this model, see gure 3. The calibration in table
2 ensures that this constant, which in the AFTM equals (38), has an
empirical plausible value, but the convergence towards it is too quick.
It is thus natural to analyse whether a di¤erent calibration is able
to generate more variability in bond yields in this model. The task is
to generate su¢ cient persistence in the short-rate and next to ensure a
su¢ cient amount of its variability is transmitted to long rates. Boosting
standard deviations is likely to raise the unconditional standard devia-
tions of the TP nt -part in (37), which is low in the model, and I comment
on this as well.
Moments of Term Premia and Yields
Parameter Value E

TP 40t

Var

TP 40t

E

y4t

Var

y4t

E

y40t

Var

y40t

z 0.99 -62 20 500 166 -100 49
 bs
z 0.99 -57 75 500 222 -500 217
 3
z 0.9 -35 10 500 275 -270 75
 5
u 0.85 2000 16 500 176 2890 34
 3
Table 4: This table shows the e¤ ect on moments of term premia and yields of changing the
calibration of key parameters for determination of second order moments of term premia and bond
yields. bs means base-line value. Everything is measured in basis points per year.
Table 4 only consists of key moments for yields and term premia but
the picture is clear from this partial view of table 1. Take the volatility of
the long end of the yield curve, V art (y40t ). I increase the autoregressive
parameters in  to make the convergence to the end-points of both the
risk free rate and the processes in the economy, i1t , X
1
t , slower. More
139
persistent demand - and cost-push shocks, higher z and u, is not the
solution, which can be seen from the rst and last row of table 4 in which
the persistence of these shocks are increased from 0.9 to 0.99 and from
0.8 to 0.85 respectively.
I next increase the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , from its
base-line calibration of 1.5 to 3-5. The model can generate higher volatil-
ity of the term premia and long bond yields by a combination of doubling
 and by imposing near unit-root behaviour for the shocks, z  1, see
row 2 and 3 in table 4. The problem is that these changes in the cali-
bration make rst moments of bond yields and risk premia become more
and more negative in the long end of the curves.
Hence, the model fares well in terms of matching the moments in
table 1, but the model is too simple to generate more volatility in the
long end of the yield curve without destroying the t of rst moments
of both term premia and yields.
8.3.2 A deeper look at the macroeconomic model: Impulse
response functions
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions for the macroeconomic
variables from a shock to each of state-variables in the economy. The
same second-order moments can be obtained with di¤erent models that
have di¤erent implications for the interrelationship among macroeco-
nomic variables. The three gures together show the dynamics in this
model resembles that of a basic DSGE model, see e.g., Woodford (2003).
The top gure in gure 1 is a visualisation of the theoretical dis-
cussion in section 5.5: The subjective ination target causes long run
uncertainty in consumption growth. A shock to the subjective ina-
tion target raises ination through its e¤ect upon the cost-push shock in
(11). This causes a monetary policy tightening and consumption falls,
see (30). The e¤ects are small at business-cycle frequencies, the subjec-
tive ination target can only a¤ect cost-push shocks, ination and thus
risk free rates by , see section 7, but persistent as I have imposed a
near unit-root behaviour for the subjective ination target,   1, see
table 3.
The impulse response function of a demand shock, gure at the bot-
tom to the left in gure 1, shows a similar pattern as in the basic DSGE
model: Higher demand now raises consumption, see (30), which put
pressure on ination through the output gap in (11), which feeds back
to higher interest rates in the response function for the central bank.
The gure to the bottom right in gure1 shows the e¤ects of a cost-
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push shock upon the macro economy. Two e¤ects arise. The rst e¤ect
corresponds to what is found in the basic DSGE model: Higher ination
is combated by the central bank raising the policy rate, see (31), which
in turn depresses consumption growth through higher real interest rates,
see (30).
The second e¤ect of a cost-push shock works through the subjective
ination target as discussed in section 5.5. The cost-push shock pushes
the subjective ination target upwards as the cost-push shock increases
ination which signals a breach of the monetary policy target of zero, see
6. This causes the real rate to be a little higher and consumption growth
a little lower, and these e¤ects are highly persistent due to the near unit-
root behaviour of the subjective ination target. This e¤ect visualises
the cost in terms of lower consumption growth of a central bank that
has lost credibility and pushed the economy into an inationary state
with higher ination expectations.
8.3.3 A deeper look at the yield curve dynamics: Simulated
yields
Figure 2 shows the steady-state and simulated decomposition of (37) for
a 1-year and a 5-year bond, and two snap-shots of simulated decompo-
sitions. Figure 2 is a visual test of the yield curve model. I want to
generate the moments for risk premia in table 1, but I do not want to
do this at the expense of the yield curve dynamics.25
The plots in gure 2 all verify that not only is the model able to
t the numbers in table 1, but it is also able to generate yield curve
dynamics as observed in post-war data, see e.g. Piazzesi (2003). The
yield curve is on average upward sloping, the ESnt -part is on average
slightly upward sloping, and the TP nt -part increases with maturity (top
left gure). Further, the bottom plots show the model is able to gener-
ate di¤erent shapes of the yield curve, hump-shaped, at, and steeply
upward sloping, and even a downward sloping curve though on few oc-
casions.
The top-right gure visualises the problems for this model of intro-
ducing su¢ cient variation in the long end of the yield curve. 5 year
bond yields vary considerable less than 1-year yields, and this decline
in variation as the maturity of the bonds increases is clearly due to the
inability of the this model to generate su¢ cient variation in expectations
25Figure 2 does not focus on second order moments like conditional heteroskedas-
ticity. All the factors in this economy are Gaussian and bond yield are thus ho-
moscedastic. Hence, the model provides little hope in tting conditional second
order moments. See also Dai and Singleton (2000).
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of the future state of the economy epitomised by a less variable ESnt for
n increasing.
8.3.4 What a¤ects the rst moment of risk premia? Slope and
level e¤ects
This section analyses the determination of the rst moment of the TP nt -
part in (37) by looking at the underlying driving forces behind the de-
composition of the yield curve complementing the partial equilibrium
analysis in section 5.4 and 5.5. Figure 3 shows the response of the yield
curve decomposition at time t to an annualised standard deviation shock
to each of the factors.
Movements in the subjective ination target does not introduce a
lot to movements in the yield curve at business-cycle frequencies, as a
standard deviation shock to the subjective ination target only raises
the yield curve by around 10 bp. (top-right gure), but moves yields of
all maturities approximately equally and thus generates a level e¤ect on
the yield curve.
Two things in the model explain the movements. Firstly, as discussed
in the section 8.3.2, the subjective ination target shock only has a small
e¤ect upon macroeconomic variables. Secondly, the unit-root behaviour
implies that subjective ination target shocks do not die out quickly.
This is reected in a small but at factor loading, Bn, on the yield curve
from a shock to the ination target, see top-left gure in gure 3. The
subjective ination target shock therefore a¤ects yields of all maturities
approximately equally and the e¤ects work through both terms in (37).
The ESnt -part is a¤ected by the shock through the loading on the risk
free rate, , due to the subjective ination targets e¤ect on ination
a¤ecting the risk free rate. Intuitively, higher nominal yields are ex-
pected for all maturities if the level of ination is higher. The TP nt -part
is a¤ected by the market price of risk, , generating a positive term
premia curve reecting a lower marginal utility of the same level of con-
sumption turning into a negative correlation between consumption and
bond returns and thus positive premia through the curve, see section 5.4.
The market price of subjective ination target risk is of the completely
a¢ ne form, which, as explained section 5.4, a¤ects the mean of the yield
curve under the Q-measure providing a slope e¤ect from the TP nt -part
in the decomposition. Complementing the analysis from section 5.5, un-
certainty about the subjective ination target in 10 years time is greater
than the uncertainty about the subjective ination target tomorrow, so
investors demand a larger risk premium from holding subjective ination
target risk in long term bonds than in short terms bonds.
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Figure 4 shows the response of the yield curve decomposition through
time to an annualised standard deviation shock to each of the factors.
The near unit-root implies the subjective ination target captures a sto-
chastic trend in bond yields and risk premia, so although the e¤ects
of a shock to the subjective ination target are small at business-cycle
frequencies, as shown in gure 3, they continue through time, see top
gure in gure 4, and can as such provide an explanation to the decline
in both yields and term premia from the Volker period until the present
low levels in terms of a series of shocks to the subjective ination target
that combined have pushed the level downwards.26 Notice also from the
bottom gures in gure 4 that the subjective ination target is the sole
determinant of risk premia and bond yields at longer horizons, as the
e¤ects of demand shock and cost-push shock die out relatively quickly.
However, the empirical numbers are not fully supported by the model
as 25 annual standard deviation shocks to the subjective ination target
only can explain a 0.5 percent decline in risk premia and not 3 as found in
data. The underlying explanation, however, is supported theoretically.
As emphasized by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2006), term premia should
be zero or negative in an environment with stable ination dynamics,
which in term of the model says, when the subjective ination target
is low and has not been subject to shocks in the near past. In this
environment risk arises from variable real rates, and term premia should
only be positive in an environment with unstable ination, as rolling over
short-term bonds runs the reinvestment risk that the short term real rate
has changed. The explanation to the decline in risk premia given from
this model framework is exactly that the US-economy today reside in an
environment with more stable ination dynamics relatively to the period
in the beginning of the 80sepitomised by the lower subjective ination
target and thus better anchoring of ination expectations.27
The bottom left gure in gure 3 shows that a positive demand
shock depresses term premia, while the shock increases the ESnt -part.
Empirical evidence, e.g., Fama and French (1989) and Fama and French
(1996), and theory, Cochrane (2007), says that risk premia should vary
26The 10-year bond yield stood at around 12 percent in the beginning of the eighties
with an estimated term premia of around 3-5 percent and as I write, these gures
are around 5 percent and -2-2 percent respectively. See e.g. gure 4 in Rudebusch,
Sack, and Swanson (2007) for a nice plot of estimates of term premia in bond yields.
27Empirical estimates of ination targets, see e.g., Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin
(2006), Dewachter, Lyrio, and Konstantijn (2006), Graeve, Emiris, and Wouters
(2008), nds a more rapid decline of an ination target from the Volker period to the
present. This supports the explanation for the decline in yields and term premia given
in this paper, though it also implies that to t the empirical evidence, the subjective
ination target shock in this model should have a bigger e¤ect upon yields.
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with the business-cycle. Risk premia should be low on the top of the
business-cycle when the average investor feels less risk averse and high
on the bottom of a recession. A demand shock is a good proxy for good
times, see (33), and good times in this model means low term premia,
see section 2.1. Expectations of future risk free rates rise through the
loading of the demand shock on the risk free rate, z  z, reecting
the consumer spreads the demand through time and consume less now,
invest more, and consume more in the future, which in turn pushes
up interest rates. The more the consumer cares about consumption
variability, the higher  is, the stronger is the e¤ect on interest rates
from a demand shock.
The last plot in gure 3 shows a cost-push shock almost only a¤ects
expectations of future short-rates and not term premia. Like the demand
shock, the cost-push shock a¤ects the slope of the yield curve. The cost-
push shock a¤ects the risk free rate by u reecting the shock a¤ects both
ination, see (31), and the output gap, see (32), and thus risk free rates
though the Fisherian relationship in (27). The risk free rate increases as
the Central bank obeys the Taylor principle when conducting monetary
policy thus raising the risk free rate by more than the change in ination.
The numbers are interesting. During the previous three monetary
policy tightening cycles in the U.S. prior to the last one - 1988-1989,
1994-1995, and 1999-2000 - the 10-year bond yield increased by 26 basis
points for every 100 basis point increase in the Federal target. Recall
that in this model the central bank reacts to the cost-push shock. Figure
3 shows that the cost-push shock give rise to a 100 basis point increase
in the short-rate and a 24 basis point increase in the long-end. Hence,
disregarding the last period of policy tightening, the model seems to t
the U.S. yield curve response to a monetary policy shock well.
I infer from gure 3 and gure 4 the underlying determinant of term
premia in the 10-year bond yield on business-cycle frequencies is almost
only demand-shocks while both demand shocks and cost-push shocks
determine the expectations part in the 10 year yields. 10-year yields
and 10-year term premia are in the medium to long run anchored by
a sum of subjective ination target shocks. The underlying determi-
nants of risk premia are, as explained in section 2.1, standard, but the
e¤ects are bigger in this model, as I do not need to apply higher order
approximations.
Lastly, I recall that I have introduced unconditional correlations be-
tween the ination target and the cost-push shock under both the Q and
P measure, see section 7, so the yield curve dynamics at business-cycle
frequencies could be due to these correlations and not solely cost-push
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shocks and/or demand shocks. To analyse this, I simply exclude the in-
ation target from the model above and do the same analysis as shown
in this section. The results are shown in appendix 10.4 and tells that
the conclusions from this section hold: The yield curve behaviour at
business-cycle frequencies are not due to shocks to the subjective ina-
tion target while the determinant of the yield curve at long horizons can
be contributed to the subjective ination target.
8.3.5 What a¤ects the second moment of risk premia? Vari-
ance decomposition
This section analyses the underlying forces that generates the second-
order moments of risk premia. I explain below two ndings about the
long end of the yield curve. Firstly, uctuations in long nominal inter-
est rates are due mostly to uctuations in term premia, and secondly,
variation in term premia stems from nominal shocks.
The top-right gure in gure 5 shows the variance decomposition of
the yield curve into the contribution of the ESnt -part and the TP
n
t -part
of (37). 90 per cent of the movements in the long end of the yield curve
are due to movements in the TP nt -part. On the other hand, the short
end of the yield curve moves mostly because expectations about future
short-rates changes.28
The top-left and bottom gures in gure 5 shows the variance decom-
position of each term in the total decomposition, the ESnt -part and the
TP nt -part, into the relative contribution of the individual factors inXt+1.
Figure 5 answers how each factor contributes both to the total variation
in the yield curve and to the individual terms in the decomposition.
The subjective ination target shock does not a¤ect the variability
of yields signicantly, which does not come as great surprise keeping the
discussion in section 8.3.4) in mind. The ESnt -part is almost equally
inuenced by real shocks and nominal shocks through the yield curve,
while the relative importance of the real and nominal shock changes
with the maturity of the yields in the TP nt -part of (37). Real shocks do
play a role for the variability of the short-end of the TP nt -curve (25 per
cent), but the variability of the long-end of this curve is almost solely
determined by nominal shocks (90 per cent).
The ndings above are supported in the empirical literature. Risa
(2001) nds the variability of a 10 year bond is mostly explained by
ination risk premia and term premia not due ination. Ang, Bekaert,
28Figure 2 foresee this result by showing a decline of the variability in the ESnt -part
maturity increases.
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and Wei (2008) nds that around 80 percent of variation in the long end
of the yield curve can be explained by a sum of expected ination and
ination risk premia. Further, Beechey (2007) nds that for 10-15 year
nominal bond yields, three quarters of the reaction to macroeconomic
news announcements is due to movements in the TP nt -part. All these
points amount in this model to a mixture of movement in the TP nt -part
possibly due to cost-push shocks. Regarding the short end of the yield
curve, Risa (2001), Beechey (2007), and Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008)
nd that movements in one year bonds can be attributed to movements
in real rates and expected ination, which in the model economy amounts
to movements in the ESnt -part and demand shocks, which was what I
also found above.
To rephrase the ndings from gure 3 and 5, the central bank moves
short-rates in response to ination, see (31), and movements in the out-
put gap, see (32). Long rates are expectations of future risk free rates
and a term premium, see (37). Though the central bank can stabilise
short-run ination and output to a certain degree it can not move risk
free rates indenitely, so long rates must reveal something about long
run ination expectations. That is what I found in gure 3. This sec-
tion relates uctuations around this long run level to uctuations in term
premia, the top-right gure in gure 5, due to nominal shocks, the last
three gures in gure 5, while fundamentals, that is the ESnt -part, are
stable relatively to TP nt -part.
8.4 An application of the model: The bond yield
conundrum and risk premia
The Fed began to tighten monetary policy from mid 2004 to mid 2006
but saw the yield on a 10-year bond fell. This was at that time denoted
a bond yield conundrum (BYC) by the then chairman, Alan Greenspan.
Can this simple model provide an explanation behind this behaviour of
the long end of the yield curve during the BYC period? I suggest the
answer is yes.
The low 10-year bond yield has partly been contributed to unusually
low term premia, see Kim and Wright (2005), Rudebusch, Sack, and
Swanson (2007), Wu (2008). A low term premia in this model is con-
sistent with a series of subjective ination target shocks driving term
premia towards zero. But such an explanation is not su¢ cient to ex-
plain the behaviour of 10-year bond yields during this period, as the
BYC period saw not only low and possibly negative term premia but
also an almost zero correlation between short and long interest rates.
This stands in stark contrast to the periods of monetary tightening prior
146
to the BYC period, see section 8.3.4. Other factors must have played
its part during this period unless a very big shift in long run ination
expectations occurred through the monetary policy tightening.
The macro-nance model in this paper says the di¤erence between
the BYC period and prior periods to a di¤erence between the types of
shocks that hit the economy. Figure 3 predicts the shocks that hit the
economy prior to the BYC period where cost-push shocks raising the
long-end by 24-26 basis-points. The shocks that hit the U.S. economy
during the BYC period, however were demand shocks and possibly fur-
ther subjective ination target shocks, as demand shocks are the source
to a large, temporary negative shock to term premia only raising the
long-end of the yield curve by 12 basis points.29
Hence, the BYC period does not seem to be at odds with the model
in this paper, and was in light of this model not really a conundrum.
The behaviour of the long-end of the yield curve during the BYC period
was an equilibrium reaction to a combination of demand shock(s) and
credibility gains for the central bank in its conduct of monetary policy
in terms of a series of negative subjective ination target shocks.
9 Conclusion
This paper analyses the interaction between bond risk premia and macro-
economics. The key contribution is that the bond premium puzzle is not
puzzling if the model provides closed form solutions for bond prices shy-
ing away from higher-order approximations. The key steps to generate
plausible bond risk premia are rstly to use the empirically successful
a¢ ne models originated in nance, and from a macroeconomic model,
to map the parameters in the a¢ ne modelsreduced form relations into
a structural framework. The model provides an economic interpretation
of the decline in term premia and yields observed during the previous
three decades in terms of series of unit-root shocks to the consumers
subjective ination target in the economy.
This paper has addressed the macroeconomic determinants of risk
premia, but as nancial markets are the ip side of the macro economy,
risk premia should also reveal interesting aspects of consumer behav-
iour. One such example is the cost of business-cycles. Lucas (2003)
famous paper argues that these costs are small, but as emphasized by
Cochrane (2007), asset prices reveals risk aversion, and asset prices say
that there are a considerable amount of risk aversion, and hence, the
29Graeve, Emiris, and Wouters (2008) derive and estimate a macro-nance model
for the yield curve and also explain the conundrum by demand shocks.
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cost of macroeconomic uctuations can potentially be large. This paper
provides realistic term premia and thus risk aversion, and therefore has
the potential to address this question possibly through a second-order
approximation of the utility function as in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997). I will leave this question for future research.
Lastly, suspicion can easily arise when somebody is able to provide an
answer to an economic puzzle by introducing more degrees of freedom.
As stressed by Zin (2002), assumptions made about preferences in a
model should be reasonable, but as Zin points out:
we are not yet at the stage where there is a consensus about
what types of preference assumptions are reasonable, [Zin
(2002)].
Wachter (2002) provides an answer to what is reasonable: The model
must be parsimonious. Wachter argues that a parsimonious model is
a model in which the number of phenomena to be explained is much
greater than the number of free parameters.
Seen in this light, I must therefore not evaluate the success of this
paper on the ability of tting term premia moments, as I introduce
the parameters to t exactly these. I must instead evaluate my model
against what I do not calibrate the parameters to. As an example, I
do not calibrate any parameter to t counter-cyclical risk premia nor to
t the average response of long bond rates to a tightening of monetary
policy. But that is what I get.
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10 Appendix
This appendix derives the aggregate supply side, appendix (10.1), the
IS-relation, appendix (10.2), and closed-form solution for bond prices,
appendix (10.3).
10.1 Appendix: The aggregate supply side
The production sector in this model is quite standard and follows closely
e.g., Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008), which I refer to for details.
Final goods are assembled by the following production function:
Ct =
Z


cct (i)
 1

 
 1
The nal goods producers minimise costs solving the following problem:
min
Z 1
0
pt (i) ct (i) di st:
Z


cct (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
 Ct
The demand for the intermediate good is given by
cct (i) = Ct

pt (i)
Pt
 
The price index follows from these equations,
Pt =
Z


pt (i)
1 
 1
1 
Labour is used as input to produce intermediate goods according to
the linear production function in which technology is normalised to one:
yt (i) = Nt (i), where Nt (i) denotes labour input into rm i. With
labour free to ow across rms, with constant returns to scale production
function, the wage rate will be equalised across rms in equilibrium,
and all rms will have the same nominal marginal cost of production,
MCt =
Wt
@F (Nt)
@Nt
= Wt, and will employ the same amount of workers,
Nt (i) = Nt. The prot function for the intermediate producer can
therefore be written as:
= pt (i) yt (i) WtNt (i)
=Yt

pt (i)
Pt
 
(pt (i) Wt)
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The demand curve follows from the optimal demand for the consumers
of the individual good in the indices. The problem for the intermediate
rm is to maximise prots with respect to its price, pt (i). The rst order
condition for the producer which is free to reset prices equals:
pt (i) =

(   1)Wt =M
MMCt
Deviations from this optimality condition under completely exible prices
can arise due to nominal rigidities introduced next.
Intermediate good rms face Calvo pricing such that 1    of the
producers in the sector are allowed to be reset in each period, while
 of the prices remain unchanged, following Woodford (2003) and Yun
(1996). Each supplier that can chose a new price for its good at time
t faces the same problem as anybody else who can change its price at
that date. The optimal price, pt , for the individual rm that can change
its price will in equilibrium equal the price chosen by the rest. The
pricing index for this sector is therefore given by Pt = [(1  ) p1 t +
P 1 t 1 ]
1
1  . The intermediate goods producer takes into account the
dynamic aspect of the price setting, and maximises the present value of
his prots discounting these prots by the stochastic discount factor.
max
pt(i)
Et
" 1X
T=t
T tMt;T(:)
#
=Et
" 1X
T=t
T tMt;T
"
pt (i)
Pt
 
Yt
Pt
(pt (i) Wt)
##
The producer specically set his price such that the expected mark-up
equals the desired mark-up:
0 = Et
264 1X
T=t
T tMt;T
264 YtPt

pt(i)
Pt
 
(1  )
+ Yt
Pt

pt(i)
Pt
  1
Wt
Pt
375
375 (39)
Together with the price index, (39) determines the evolution of the ag-
gregate price given the evolution of output and the disturbances in the
economy, and these equations thus constitute the aggregate-supply block
of the production sector. I notice that the habit term drops out as its
expectation equals one for all time periods.
A log linearisation of (39) yields:
pt = (1  )Et
" 1X
i=0
()imcnt+i
#
(40)
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Log-linearising the price index yields the familiar expression:
pt = pt 1 + (1  ) pt (41)
(40) and (41) can be combined to obtain a New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
t= mct + Et [t+1] (42)
 (1  ) (1  )

Marginal cost can be substituted out with the output gap, xt, dened
as the output that would prevail in the economy under exible prices
and a constant wage mark up, MW . The optimality condition for the
consumerslabour supply is given by expression:
UN (Nt)M
W
t = UC (Ct)
Wt
Pt
(43)
This condition, together with the production function, yt (i) = Nt (i)
, and the equilibrium conditions, UC (Yt) ; UN (Nt) ; yt (i) = Yt can be
combined to write output of consumption goods as:
Y '+t =

Mwt
MM
 1
'
Qt
A log linearisation of this expression yields:
 mMt = ('+ ) yt   q^t +mWt (44)
Marginal cost in can be substituted out with (44) in the previous ex-
pression for the Phillips-curve, (42):
mct =  mMt = ('+ )xt +mWt (45)
10.2 Appendix: The IS-relation
This section derives the IS-relation in this economy through a log-normal
approximation of the stochastic discount factor. Start from the con-
sumerse¢ ciency condition for the choice of savings/consumption, equa-
tions (5) and (7), and use log-normality of the shocks:
it =  Et [mt+1]  1
2
V art (mt+1)
The mean term is:
Et log
"

Pt
Pt+1

Ct+1
Ct
 
Qt+1
Qt
#
= Et [   t+1   ct+1 +qt+1]
151
The conditional variance terms are:
1
2
V art log
"

Pt
Pt+1

Ct+1
Ct
 
Qt+1
Qt
#
=
1
2
V art (   t+1   ct+1 +qt+1)

V AR 1
2
V art (t+1) + 
21
2
V art (ct+1)
Note that Et [qt+1] =  12V art (qt+1). These variance terms are all
constant. The conditional covariance terms are:
cov ( t+1; ct+1) + cov ( t+1;qt+1) + cov (ct+1;qt+1; )
I will later show that the terms cov ( t+1; ct+1) and cov ( t+1;qt+1)
are constant, and I denote them by

COV  cov ( t+1; ct+1) + cov ( t+1;qt+1)
These covariance terms potentially involves lagged variables of the state-
variable due to the state-dependence of risk. The time-varying term is:
cov (ct+1;qt+1)= cctcov (ct+1;ct+1) =  cctV art (ct+1)
= cctV art (ct+1)
Rewrite this IS-relation into standard expression introducing the nota-
tion introduced above:
 it = Et [   t+1   ct+1]
 cctV art (ct+1) + 
V AR + 
COV
,
ct = Et [ct+1]  1

Et [it   t+1] (46)
+cctV art (ct+1) 


  1


V AR   1


COV
Impose equilibrium conditions:
ct= yt   et
et  log

1  Gt
Yt

yt   et=Et [yt+1   et+1]  1

(it   Et [t+1])
+cctV art (ct+1) 


  1


V AR   1


COV
yt=Et [yt+1]  1

(it   Et [t+1])
+cctV art (ct+1) 


  1


V AR   1


COV + et   Et [et+1]
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The log form of the aggregate resource constraint can be written as
ct = xt + zt, in which xt is the output gap and zt is equal to the natural
rate of output less government spending.
xt = Et [xt+1]  1

(it   Et [t+1]) + cctV art (ct+1)
  

  1


V AR   1


COV
+et   Et [et+1]  zt + Et [zt+1]
,
(1  cV art (ct+1))xt = Et [xt+1]  cV art (ct+1)xt 1  
1

(it   Et [t+1]) +
  

  1


V AR   1


COV (47)
+zt+1   cztV art (ct+1)
Substitute the reaction of the central bank to ination to rewrite this
expression further. The covariance terms can be written as:

COV  cov ( t+1; ct+1) + cov ( t+1;qt+1)
=z2u   tz22u
The covariance term can be written as:

V AR 1
2
V art (t+1) + 
21
2
V art (ct+1)
=
1
2
2
2
u + 
21
2
 
z22u + 2zc

Rewrite the shock term:
1 

z+



z2u   2z

c

(ect + zt)
 Et

ect+1 + zt+1

 

z+



z2u   2z

c
 
ect 1 + zt 1

=Et [zt+1] 

z+



z2u + 2z

czt
=

z  

z+



z2u   2z

c

zt
The nal expression is thus:
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
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
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
c

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=Et [xt+1]  1

(it   Et [t+1])
+

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


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
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+

z  

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
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10.3 Appendix: Bond prices
This appendix derives closed form solutions for bond prices. The proof
follows the proof in Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
First note that the return on a one-period bond must equal the risk
free rate:
P 1t = Et [Mt+1] = e
 it = e 0 
0
1Xt
The starting values for the recursions: A1 =  0;B1 =  01. Assume the
price on an n-period bond is given by P nt = e
An+B
0
nXt. I will now show
that the (log) linear form also applies to the price of bonds with other
maturities than n:
P n+1t =Et

Mt+1P
n
t+1

=Et

exp

 it   1
2

0
t
0
t  0t"t+1 + An +B
0
nXt+1

=exp

 it   1
2

0
t
0
t + An

Et
h
exp
n
 0t"t+1 +B
0
nXt+1
oi
=exp

 it   1
2

0
t
0
t + An


Et
h
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n
 0t"t+1 +B
0
n [+ Xt +"t+1]
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=exp

 it   1
2

0
t
0
t + An +B
0
n+B
0
nXt


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h
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n
B
0
n  
0
t

"t+1
oi
(49)
Write the second term in the last equation as follows using normality of
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the shocks, "t+1:
Et
h
exp
n
B
0
n  
0
t

"t+1
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
1
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
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0
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0
t


0
(Bn  t)

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1
2

0
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 B0nt + 12B
0
n
0
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!)
Now continue from relation (49):
P n+1t =exp
( it   120t0t + An +B0n+B0nXt
+1
2


0
t
0
t   2B0nt +B0n
0
Bn
)
=exp

 it + An +B0n+B
0
nXt  B
0
nt +
1
2
B
0
n
0
Bn

=exp
( 0 +B0n ( 0) + 12B0n0Bn + An
+

 01 +B0n ( 1)

Xt
)
Matching coe¢ cients results in the recursion in equation (1).
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10.4 Appendix: Model without the subjective in-
ation target shock
This gure shows the impulse response function (top-left), the sim-
ulated and steady-state yield curve (top-right), responses of the yield
curve decomposition to a shock to each factor at time t (bottom-left),
and through time, (bottom-right), in a model without the subjective
ination target.
10.5 Appendix: A budget constraint in interest rates
Consider for now the case of two bonds, one maturing in the period to
come and one in two periods time. I start from the budget constraint
and I introduce interest rates instead of prices
P 1t B
1
t + P
2
t B
2
t  B1t 1 = B1t +B2t   (1 + it 1)B1t 1  
 
1 + Y 2t 2
2
B2t 2
in which I for simplicity with the analysis that follows consider yields
dened as P nt = (1 + Y
n
t )
 n. Next divide by the price level, Pt, and
let the left hand side of the budget constraint denote after tax income,
t  WtNt +t   Tt
Ct +
B1t +B
2
t   (1 + it 1)B1t 1  
 
1 + Y 2t 2
2
B2t 2
Pt
= t
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Consider maturing bond in isolation
  (1 + it 1) B
1
t 1
Pt
   1 + Y 2t 12 B2t 2Pt ;
=
  (1 + it 1) B
1
t 1Pt 1
PtPt 1
   1 + Y 2t 22 B2t 2Pt 1Pt 2PtPt 1Pt 2
which can be written as
  (1 + it 1) B
1
t 1Pt 1
PtPt 1
   1 + Y 2t 12 B2t 2Pt 1Pt 2PtPt 1Pt 2
=
 b1t 1

(1 + it 1)
(1 + t)

  b2t 2
  
1 + Y 2t 2
2
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
!
in which I have introduced ination (1 + t)  Pt 1Pt . I also let superscript
r denote variables deated with the price level. I can thus write
crt + b
r1
t + b
r2
t   br1t 1

(1 + it 1)
(1 + t)

  br2t 2
  
1 + Y 2t 2
2
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
!
= rt
I next introduce the ex post return from t   1 to t, rt 1 = (1 it 1)(1+t)   1.
Consider rstly the one-period bond
br1t  (1 + it 1) br1t 1

1
(1 + t)

= br1t  br1t 1 (1 + rt 1) = br1t  br1t 1rt 1 br1t 1
and next the two-period bond with the ex post return from t   2 to t,
r2t 2  (
1+Y 2t 2)
2
(1+t)(1+t 1)
  1
 br2t 2
  
1 + I2t 2
2
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
!
=  br2t 2
 
1 + r2t 2

which allow me to write
crt + b
r1
t + b
r2
t   br1t 1 (1 + rt 1)  br2t 2
 
1 + r2t 2

= rt
To highlight the respective roles of anticipated an unanticipated ina-
tion, let rt be the ex ante real rate of return and let et be the expected
rate of ination. Add and subtract the following
(rt 1   rt 1) br1t 1=
(t   et ) (1 + rt 1)
(1 + t)
br1t 1
(rt 2   rt 2) br2t 2=
 
1 + r2t 2
( t 1   et 1+ (t   et)
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
)
br2t 2
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in which I have assumed that tt 1 etet 1  0. Take individual bond
terms rst
br1t   br1t 1 (1 + rt 1) + (rt 1   rt 1) br1t 1   (rt 1   rt 1) br1t 1
=
 
br1t   br1t 1
  rt 1br1t 1 + (1 + rt 1) (t   et)(1 + t) br1t 1
and
br2t   br2t 2
 
1 + r2t 2

+
 
r2t 2   r2t 2

br2t 2  
 
r2t 2   r2t 2

br2t 2
=
 
br2t   br2t 2
  rt 2br2t 2 +  1 + r2t 2
( 
t 1   et 1

+ (t   et)
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
)
br2t 2
crt +
 
br2t   br2t 2

+
 
br1t   br1t 1
  r2t 2br2t 2   rt 1br1t 1+ 
1 + r2t 2
( t 1   et 1+ (t   et)
(1 + t) (1 + t 1)
)
br2t 2+(1 + rt 1)
(t   et )
(1 + t)
br1t 1 = 
r
t
Generalising to the case of an economy with bonds of all maturities, I
get
crt +
nX
i=1
 
brit   brit i
  rit ibrit i	
=
rt  
nX
i=1
 
1 + rit i
 "i 1Y
j=0
(1 + t j)
# 1 " i 1X
j=0
 
t j   et j
#
brit i
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11 Figures
Figure 1: The e¤ect upon the macro economy of an innovation to the subjective
ination target (top gure), demand shock (gure at the bottom left), and to the
cost-push shock (gure at the bottom right).
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Figure 2: The top-left gure shows the decomposition of the yield curve (YC) into
the ESnt -part and the TP
n
t -part at the steady state. The top-right gure shows
simulated yields for the 5-year and 1-year bond together with their decompositions.
The bottom gures show two snap-shots of the simulated yield curve decomposition.
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Figure 3: The top-left gure shows the factor loadings in the bond prices,  Bnn .
The factor loadings are scaled by the annualised standard deviation of the respective
shocks. The top-right and bottom gures show the response of the yield curve de-
composition to a one standard deviation shock to each of the factors in the economy.
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Figure 4: The gures show the response of the yield curve decomposition to a one
standard deviation shock to each of the factors in the economy through time. For
brevity the gure only shows the immediate response (fat lines) and the e¤ect 40
quarters hence (dotted lines).
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Figure 5: This top left gure shows the variance decomposition of the yield curve
into the expectations part, ESnt , and the term premia part, TP
n
t . The top right and
bottom, gures show the variance decomposition of the expectations part, ESnt , and
the term premia part, TPnt , into each factor in the economy.
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Additional material for: Real-Time
E¤ects of Central Bank
Interventions in the Euro Market
Rasmus Fatum and Jesper Pederseny
Abstract
This paper investigates the real-time e¤ects of sterilized for-
eign exchange intervention using o¢ cial intraday intervention
data provided by the Danish central bank. Our analysis employs
a two-step weighted least squares estimation procedure. We con-
trol for macro surprises, address the issue of endogeneity, and
carry out an array of robustness tests. Our main result is that
intervention exerts a signicant inuence on exchange rate re-
turns only when the direction of intervention is consistent with
the monetary policy stance, thereby illustrating that sterilized
intervention is not an independent policy instrument.
Key words: Foreign Exchange Intervention; Intraday Data;
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ERM II Cross-Country Comparison
ERM II Cross-Country Comparison
Denmark Estonia Lithuania Latvia Slovakia
ERM II entry 0101-1999 2806-2004 2806-2004 0205-2005 1603-2007
Central Rate 7.46038 15.6466 3.45280 0.702804 35.4424
Band 2.25 pct. 15 pct. 15 pct. 15 pct. 15 pct.
De-Facto Band +/- 0.50 pct. +/- 0.00 pct. +/- 0.00 pct. +/- 1.00 pct. +/- 14.80 pct.
Min. fx 7.4234 15.6466 3.45280 0.5533 32.866
(2504-2002) - - (0403-2002) (1211-2007)
Min. fx 7.4630 15.6466 3.45280 0.6960 34.277
(1812-2007) - - (1603-2007) (1106-2007)
Table 1: Source: ECB (www.ecb.int) and own calculations. The exchange rates are quoted in
amounts of the home currency needed to purchase 1 Euro. For each country, the "de-facto deviation
band" is based on the larger distance between the central rate and minimum or maximum exchange
rate over the respective ERM II entry date to 30 July 2008. The Danish "de-facto deviation band"
of +/- 050 pct. has never been announced or o¢ cially acknowledged. Estonia and Lithuania have
moved to currency boards. The Latvian "de-facto deviation band" of +/- 1.00 pct was announced
by the Latvian monetary authorities on the date of the Latvian ERM II entry. The dates in brackets
denote the date for the respective observation.
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WLS Estimation of Equation (1) Using Alternative
Break-Point: 9 August 2002 (instead of 16 August
2002)
WLS Estimation of eq. 1: 9 August 2002 Breakpoint
Full Sample Sub-sample 1b Sub-sample 2b
C 0.4427 7.8730 0.6726
(0.9418) (13.4870) (2.2072)
 t -0.1526*** -0.291*** -0.079
(0.0570) (0.0631) (0.0680)
 t 1 -0.1605*** -0.2722 -0.1604***
(0.0582) (0.1808) (0.0431)
 t 2 0.0638 0.0938 0.0335
(0.0665) (0.1702) (0.0660)
 t 3 -0.045 -0.0297 -0.0518
(0.0640) (0.1163) (0.0770)
 t 4 0.1329** 0.1295 0.1068
(0.0589) (0.1148) (0.0694)
 t 5 0.1866** -0.1451 0.3265***
(0.0795) (0.1466) (0.0763)
 t 6 0.124* 0.1705** 0.1077
(0.0645) (0.0827) (0.0836)
t 1 -0.6386*** -0.7581*** -0.6142***
(0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0078)
t 2 -0.4518*** -0.5819*** -0.427***
(0.0074) (0.0117) (0.0085)
t 3 -0.312*** -0.4174*** -0.2928***
(0.0071) (0.0119) (0.0080)
t 4 -0.2013*** -0.2611*** -0.1905***
(0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0072)
t 5 -0.102*** -0.1313*** -0.0967***
(0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0059)
Sum 0.14933 -0.34407 0.2833**
Wald Test Statistic 1.96 1.74 6.09
Table 2: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression. Sub-sample
1b covers the period 01012002-08082002, while sub-sample 2b covers the period
09082002-31122004. Sub-sample 1b covers 52 interventions, while sub-sample 1
covered 49. The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily
DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes the intervention variable. t j;n
denotes 5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and
their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000 Their standard deviations are multiplied by
1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per
cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of Equation (1) with sub-sample 2
covering 17 August 2002 to 15 June 2004
Mean Equation for sample 15082002-15062004
C 0.9156  t -0.0763
(2.6692) (0.0689)
 t 1 -0.1783***  t 2 0.058
(0.0277) (0.0734)
 t 3 -0.0505  t 4 0.1261
(0.0819) (0.0714)
 t 5 0.3016***  t 6 0.1125
(0.0814) (0.0915)
t 1;n -0.6044*** t 2;n -0.4181***
(0.0087) (0.0094)
t 3;n -0.2848*** t 4;n -0.1857***
(0.0089) (0.0080)
t 5;n -0.0983***
(0.0066)
Sum 0.29316 Wald Test Statistic 5.80**
Table 3: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression using the sample
from mid-august 2002 to mid-june 2004. The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence
of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes the inter-
vention variable. t j;n denotes 5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients for the constant,
the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000 Their standard deviations
are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the
10, 5, and 1 per cent level. This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression
in which the distance between the Euro/Dkk exchange rate and the central rate of
7.46038.. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [
]. Subscript denotes lags.
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Distance from Central Rate included in WLS Esti-
mation of Equation (1)
WLS Estimation of eq. 1: Distance from Central Rate included
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C -1.7924 6.8765 -2.2084
(1.1061) (12.6740) (2.3208)
 t -0.1233** -0.2964*** -0.0364
(0.0598) (0.0664) (0.0662)
 t 1 -0.1468*** -0.2517 -0.1508**
(0.0514) (0.1704) (0.0637)
 t 2 0.0296 0.0569 0.0450
(0.0561) (0.1629) (0.0706)
 t 3 -0.0433 -0.0364 -0.0548
(0.0673) (0.1159) (0.0819)
 t 4 0.1169* 0.1139 0.0878
(0.0596) (0.1172) (0.0717)
 t 5 0.2415*** -0.1410 0.2563***
(0.0869) (0.1424) (0.0805)
 t 6 0.1186 0.1397 0.0965
(0.0673) (0.0839) (0.0935)
t 1;n -0.6435*** -0.7603*** -0.6200***
(0.0067) (0.0096) (0.0078)
t 2;n -0.4594*** -0.5819*** -0.4359***
(0.0073) (0.0119) (0.0083)
t 3;n -0.3161*** -0.4188*** -0.2969***
(0.0071) (0.0118) (0.0080)
t 4;n -0.2030*** -0.2618*** -0.1918***
(0.0063) (0.0107) (0.0072)
t 5;n -0.1024*** -0.1326*** -0.0967***
(0.0051) (0.0083) (0.0059)
dt 1;n -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007)
dt 2;n 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0011
(0 .0006) (0 .0011) (0.0007)
Sum 0.1932 -0.4150 0.2436
Wald Test Statistic 3.0839* 2.5921 3.4515*
Table 4: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression in which the dis-
tance between the Euro/Dkk exchange rate and the central rate of 7.46038.. The
dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point
exchange rate. dt j denotes deviations from the unconditional mean.  t j denotes
the intervention variable. t j;n denotes 5 min. fx returns. The coe¢ cients for the
constant, the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000 Their standard
deviations are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respec-
tively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates;
test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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Intervention and Policy Consistentcy
 Full Sample:
Total 89 (220) intervention days (transactions)
Purchases of EUR 68 (157)
Sales of EUR 21 (63)
 Sub-Sample 1 (1 January 2002 - 16 August 2002)
Total 23 (58) intervention days (transactions)
Purchases of EUR 23 (58)
Sales of EUR 0 (0)
 Policy Consistency:
Monetary Policy Neutral (o¢ cial policy rate unchanged)
Exchange Rate Policy, parity measure All are consistent
Exchange Rate Policy, mean measure All are consistent
 Sub-Sample 2 (17 August 2002 - 31 December 2004)
Total 66 (162) intervention days (transactions)
Purchases of EUR 45 (99)
Sales of EUR 21 (63)
 Policy Consistency:
Monetary Policy All 45 (99) purchases of EUR are consistent.
All 21 (63) sales of EUR are inconsistent.
Exchange Rate Policy, parity measure All 45 (99) purchases
of EUR are consistent. All 21 (63) sales of EUR are inconsis-
tent.
Exchange Rate Policy, mean measure 31 (67) purchases of EUR
are consistent. 14 (32) purchases of EUR are inconsistent. All
21 (63) sales of EUR are consistent.
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Only Four Cosine and Four Sine Terms Included in
Equation (2)
WLS Estimation of eq. 1: 4 co- and sine terms in eq. 2
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.5000 0.0683 0.8000
(0.9430) (1.3000) (0.2284)
 t -0.1596*** -0.2824*** -0.0887
(0.0565) (0.0654) 0.068
 t 1 -0.1622*** -0.2527 -0.1817
(0.0572) (0.1759) (0.0200)
 t 2 0.0647 0.0662 0.0391
(0.0661) (0.1639) (0.0670)
 t 3 -0.0443 -0.0211 -0.0565
(0.0653) (0.1135) (0.0810)
 t 4 0.1424** 0.1220 0.1210
(0.0595) (0.1154) (0.0700)
 t 5 0.1813** -0.1197 0.3173
(0.0782) (0.1422) (0.0780)
 t 6 0.1234* 0.1619* 0.1158
(0.0669) (0.0838) (0.0880)
t 1;n -0.6387*** -0.7598*** -0.6139
(0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0078)
t 2;n -0.4521*** -0.5836*** -0.4268
(0.0074) (0.0116) (0.0085)
t 3;n -0.3123*** -0.4188*** -0.2927
(0.0071) (0.0119) (0.0080)
t 4;n -0.2017*** -0.2624*** -0.1906
(0.0064) (0.0108) (0.0072)
t 5;n -0.1023*** -0.1329*** -0.0968
(0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0059)
Sum 0.16 -0.33 2.70
Wald Test Statistic 1.81 1.60 5.12**
Table 5: This table shows the estimates from the 2WLS regression using only 4 lags
of the Sine- and Cosine terms in the model for the absolute residuals. The dependent
variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange
rate.  t j denotes the intervention variable. t j;n denotes 5 min. fx returns.
The coe¢ cients for the constant, the interventions and their sum are multiplied by
1.000.000 Their standard deviations are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and ***
denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors
in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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Estimation of eq. 2: Volatility using 4 co- and sine terms
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
C 0.0009*** 0.0002 0.0010***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Normalising Constant I -0.0007*** -0.0001 -0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Normalising Constant II 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Realised Volatility 0.2737*** 0.1280*** 0.2691***
(0.0053) (0.0162) (0.0054)
Sine terms
1 -0.0351*** -0.0044 -0.0427***
(0.0066) (0.0107) (0.0078)
2 -0.0045*** -0.0015 -0.0052***
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009)
3 0.0015** -0.0014 0.0024***
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0008)
4 0.0015** -0.0006 0.0021***
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Cosine terms
'1 0.0250*** 0.0032 0.0305***
(0.0055) (0.0082) (0.0065)
'2 0.0107*** 0.0011 0.0132***
(0.0021) (0.0033) (0.0025)
'3 0.0041*** -0.0003 0.0052***
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0011)
'4 0.0016*** 0.0007 0.0017***
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Table 6: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression,
equation (1). The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatil-
ity measure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential,
j, and interventions,  t j. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the sine, co-
sine, and interest di¤erentials are multiplied by 1.000. The coe¢ cients and standard
deviations for the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **,
and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard
Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes
lags.
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Estimation of eq. 2: Volatility using 4 co- and sine terms
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
Interest di¤ erentials
1 -0.0852 -0.1404*** -0.0019***
(0.1413) (0.0513) (0.0001)
2 -0.0935 -0.0232 -0.0004***
(0.2058) (0.0713) (0.0001)
3 0.2477 0.2276*** 0.0025***
(0.1501) (0.0581) (0.0001)
Interventions
 t -0.0724*** -0.3316*** 0.0257
(0.0005) (0.0632) (0.0873)
 t 1 -0.0724 0.0111 0.1066
(0.0716) (0.1222) (0.0884)
 t 2 0.0792 0.0786 0.0853
(0.0740) (0.1191) (0.1086)
 t 3 -0.0383 -0.0891 -0.0317
(0.0866) (0.0772) (0.0921)
 t 4 -0.0558 -0.1310 -0.0308
(0.0731) (0.0828) (0.0902)
 t 5 0.0681 -0.0396 0.0955
(0.0712) (0.0932) (0.0994)
 t 6 -0.0497 -0.1774*** 0.0052
(0.0816) (0.0685) (0.1012)
R2 0.1051 0.0103 0.1192
F-statistic 450 8 415
Table 7: The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression,
equation (1). The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatil-
ity measure, trigonometric terms, j and 'j, the EUR-DKK interest rate di¤erential,
j, and interventions,  t j. The coe¢ cients and standard deviations for the sine, co-
sine, and interest di¤erentials are multiplied by 1.000. The coe¢ cients and standard
deviations for the interventions and their sum are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **,
and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard
Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes
lags.
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WLS Estimation of Equation (1): Volatility Dummy
We include a volatility-dummy equal to one when the 5-minute interval
durring which an intervention occurs falls on a high-volatility day. A
high-volatility day is dened as a day in which the daily realized volatility
measure is at least twice the mean daily realized volatility of the full
sample.
WLS Estimation of eq. 1: High volatility regimes
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 t -0.0097 -0.2832*** -0.0167
(0.0906) (0.0904) (0.0640)
 t 1 -0.1583*** -0.2553 -0.1649***
(0.0568) (0.1732) (0.0399)
 t 2 0.0593 0.0628 0.0336
(0.0657) (0.1640) (0.0660)
 t 3 -0.0531 -0.0267 -0.0611
(0.0624) (0.1133) (0.0746)
 t 4 0.1311** 0.1245 0.1035
(0.0587) (0.1160) (0.0699)
 t 5 0.1967** -0.1271 0.3683***
(0.0802) (0.1386) (0.0637)
 t 6 0.1403** 0.1559* 0.1065
(0.0643) (0.0791) (0.0834)
t -34.8700 2.2507 -27.7990
(21.3560) (10.5420) (23.2920)
Sum 0.3063 -0.35 0.37
Wald Test Statistic 4.7053** 1.4468 9.8672***
Table 8: We regress returns on lagged returns, interventions and a dummy for inter-
ventions that fall on days with "High" volatility. The dependent variable is the rst
di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes
the intervention variable. t j is a dummy equal to one when the 5-minute interval
durring which an intervention occurs falls on a high-volatility day. A high-volatility
day is dened as a day in which the daily realized volatility measure is at least twice
the mean daily realized volatility of the full sample. The coe¢ cient estimates associ-
ated with the constant and the lags of the dependent variable are not shown for ease
of exposition. The Wald test of the sum fo the intervention coe¢ cient estimates is
not applicable due to the inclusion of the interactive dummy. The coe¢ cients and
standard deviations for the constant, the interventions, the dummies and their sum
are multiplied by 1.000.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10,
5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic
values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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WLS Estimation of eq. 1: High volatility regimes
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 t -0.0984 -0.2744*** -0.0667
(0.0637) (0.0891) (0.0782)
 t 1 -0.1604** -0.4452* -0.1436*
(0.0729) (0.2290) (0.0791)
 t 2 0.1134 0.0432 0.1307
(0.0766) (0.1799) (0.0976)
 t 3 -0.0796 -0.1419 -0.0859
(0.0676) (0.1695) (0.0804)
 t 4 0.1379** 0.0805 0.1419*
(0.0607) (0.1357) (0.0726)
 t 5 0.0815 -0.2566 0.1863**
(0.0676) (0.1993) (0.0813)
 t 6 0.1314 0.2209* 0.1232
(0.0841) (0.1117) (0.1055)
t -8.4890 -2.8493 -4.5406
(11.5264) (15.1557) (16.4106)
t 1 -10.3198 34.0551 -25.1566
(14.3467) (21.6399) (18.4944)
t 2 14.5616 0.2497 24.4631
(15.4458) (35.6109) (19.0203)
t 3 -3.3806 20.4485 -14.3984
(11.0618) (26.3346) (11.6204)
t 4 7.5592 10.3994 11.7552
(10.4696) (16.0720) (14.5821)
t 5 25.3589 22.3895 40.9772
(15.8181) (19.9198) (23.5588)
t 6 8.4584 -23.8364 23.3115
(15.0871) (16.0923) (21.8275)
Sum 0.1257 -0.77 0.29
Wald Test Statistic 1.1066 4.2287** 4.5124**
Table 9: We regress returns on lagged returns, interventions and a dummy for inter-
ventions that fall on days with "High" volatility. The dependent variable is the rst
di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes
the intervention variable. t j is a dummy equal to one when the 5-minute interval
durring which an intervention occurs falls on a high-volatility day. A high-volatility
day is dened as a day in which the daily realized volatility measure is at least twice
the mean daily realized volatility of the full sample. The coe¢ cient estimates associ-
ated with the constant and the lags of the dependent variable are not shown for ease
of exposition. The Wald test of the sum fo the intervention coe¢ cient estimates is
not applicable due to the inclusion of the interactive dummy. The coe¢ cients and
standard deviations for the constant, the interventions, the dummies and their sum
are multiplied by 1.000.000 *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10,
5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic
values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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HAC Estimation of Equation (1)
HAC Estimation of eq. 1: Mean Equation
Full Sample Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 t -0.1200* -0.2800*** -0.0700
(0.0706) (0.0073) (0.0875)
 t 1 -0.18*** -0.26* -0.18**
(0.0776) (0.1857) (0.0896)
 t 2 0.14* 0.06 0.15*
(0.0966) (0.1714) (0.1154)
 t 3 -0.08 -0.02 -0.11
(0.0666) (0.1250) (0.0880)
 t 4 0.16*** 0.15 0.16*
(0.0690) (0.1220) (0.0842)
 t 5 0.14* -0.14 0.24**
(0.0897) (0.1505) (0.1076)
 t 6 0.15* 0.1 0.15*
(0.0938) (0.0990) (0.1154)
Sum 0.10 -0.39 0.35
Wald Test Statistic 1.91 2.04 6.35**
Table 10: This table shows the estimates from a HAC regression of equation 1. The
dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point
exchange rate.  t j denotes the intervention variable. The coe¢ cient estimates
associated with the constant and the lags of the dependent variable are not shown for
ease of exposition. The coe¢ cients, standard deviations and the sum are multiplied
by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per
cent level. Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [
]. Subscript denotes lags.
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HAC Estimation of Equation (1) using 12 lags of
Intervention
HAC Estimation of eq. 1: Mean Equation
Sub-sample 1 Sub-sample 2
 t -0.3400 -0.0800
(2.6150) (0.0714)
 t 1 -0.2500 -0.1600***
(0.1825) (0.0442)
 t 2 0.0700 0.0500
(0.1667) (0.0725)
 t 3 -0.0300 -0.0600
(0.1579) (0.0822)
 t 4 0.1400 0.1100*
(0.1111) (0.0714)
 t 5 -0.1500 0.3200***
(0.1471) (0.0792)
 t 6 0.2000 0.1200*
(0.2899) (0.0863)
 t 7 0.2000 0.06**
(0.1408) (0.0300)
 t 8 -0.1400 -0.0200
(0.1176) (0.2000)
 t 9 -0.0900 0.0500
(0.1500) (0.1220)
 t 10 -0.1400 -0.0600
(0.1037) (0.0772)
 t 11 0.1600 -0.0010
(0.2857) (0.1111)
 t 12 -0.1300 0.0700
(0.1733) (0.0875)
Sum -0.05 0.40
Wald Test Statistic 0.05 2.75*
Table 11: This table shows the estimates from a HAC regression of equation 1 using
12 lags of the intervention variable. The dependent variable is the rst di¤erence of
the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  t j denotes the interven-
tion variable. The coe¢ cient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of
the dependent variable are not shown for ease of exposition. The coe¢ cients, stan-
dard deviations and the sum are multiplied by 1.000.000. *, **, and *** denotes
signicance at respectively the 10, 5, and 1 per cent level. Standard Errors in ( )
below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]. Subscript denotes lags.
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Figures
Figure 1: DKK/EUR spot exchange rate returns over the 1 January 2002 to 31
December 2004 period. Dotted lines correspond to condence intervals for a white-
noise process.
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Figure 2: Average residuals for each 5 min. interval across days against the absolute
average tted residuals from Equation 2 (dotted line). Full sample.
Figure 3: Average residuals for each 5 min. interval across days against the absolute
average tted residuals from Equation 2 (dotted line). Sub-sample I.
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Figure 4: Average residuals for each 5 min. interval across days against the absolute
average tted residuals from Equation 2 (dotted line). Sub-sample II.
Figure 5: The dark observations are the raw exchange rate returns; the light obser-
vations are the tted exchange rate returns. The gure at the top plots the tted
returns from the initial estimation of Equation (1). The lower graph shows the tted
returns from the WLS procedure of Equations (1) and (2).
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